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ABSTRACT 
The cognitive processing of sensory information, as 
exemplified by the judgement of subjective similarity, is 
discussed in relation to studies of verbal mediation and 
studies concerned with the role of language in cognition. 
Five experiments are reported which investigate the effects 
, 
of pairing labels with stimuli, on the judgement of stimulus 
similarity. The labels produced small but consistent shifts 
in stimulus similarity judgements which were shown to be 
related to the similarity of the labels used. Much of the 
data were found to be consistent with a trace decay model; 
there was no evidence that the labels increased the underlying 
dimensionality of the task. The strategy by which subjects 
integrated the information present in the stimuli and their 
accompanying labels appeared to follow an averaging 
formulation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ROLE OF VERBAL PROCESSES IN COGNITIVE ACTIVITIES 
- A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The role of verbal processes in conceptual and other complex 
cogni~ive activities of the human organism has long been a topic 
of academic interest. Hull, for example, showed interest in the 
possibility that language might play a part in such cognitive 
processes as similarity perception. In a discussion of secondary 
generalization he concluded that 
II ••••• the commonsense notion of similarity and 
difference is based upon the presence or absence of 
primary generalization gradients, whereas so-called 
logical or abstract similarities and differences arise 
from secondary, learned, or mediated similarities and 
differences, particularly those mediated by verbal 
reactions. II (Hull, 1943, p.194.) 
It is interesting to note that more than a quarter of a century 
later, Capehart et al (1969), in a discussion of their new theory 
of stimulus equivalence (which is based upon information theory and 
adaptation level theory) pointed out that 
lilt is recognised that certain equivalence phenomena 
may be mediated by verbal factors. Under such 
conditions, A.L. effects may not prevail. 1I 
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Their avoidance of any attempt to integrate 'verbal factors' with 
their otherwise general theory of stimulus equivalence is under-
standable. Since Hull's book was published, there has been very 
little direct investigation of the role of language in human 
judgement processes. 
The suggestion that similarity judgements may provide a 
useful vehicle for the investigation of cognitive processes has 
been made by Wallach (1958, p.104): 
" •...• the question of psychological similarity may 
lie at the basis of diverse kinds of psychological 
research on cognition that have hitherto usually been 
considered apart from each other - ranging from studies 
on stimulus generalization to studies on learning and 
thinking." 
Throughout this thesis we will be using the judgement of 
subjective similarity as our approach to the cognitive mechanisms 
in which verbal processes are thought to playa part. This 
approach has been outlined by H8ijer (1969, 1970) who is of the 
opinion that 
"any psychological theory of similarity must be a 
cognitive theory" (1970, p.1). 
Similarity will here be viewed as a relation, where a relation can 
be defined as a set of ordered pairs (Berlyne, 1965). As Reese 
(1968) has suggested, an ordered pair is a pair of elements 
presented in a particular spatial or temporal order, symbolised 
aRb to denote that 'a' ~tands in the relation R to fbI. In 
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other words, similarity, as one kind of relation, is a variable 
characterising pairs of obj ects. Sj tlberg (1969) claims that the 
possibility of measuring similarity has seldom been questioned, 
although little data)bearing directly on the issue i;;~een 
published. Beals, Krantz and Tversky (1968) point out that 
similarity, or psychological distance, is widely used in psychology 
both as a descriptive and as an explanatory concept. They add that 
since judgements of the similarity between stimuli contain 
information about the ways the stimuli are perceived and coded, 
similarity judgements provide a useful tool in the study of 
perception and cognition. Yoshida and Saito (in press) and Beals 
et al (1968) have distinguished the direct and the indirect methods 
of similarity estimation. Since we are defining similarity in 
terms of cognitive processes we will be using direct methods, that 
is, we believe it is possible to accept numerical (or equivalent) 
judgements from subjects who have been given a suitable scale and 
adequate instructions to judge similarity. We will assume that, 
under the conditions employed in this research, subjects behave 
as rational judges in that intra-individual consistency in scale 
usage is high. In some cases we will also assume, as an approximation, 
that inter-individual differences in judgement are normally 
distributed and that pooling of data from subjects within a given 
experimental condition is justified. 
In summary then, we will define similarity as the ordering 
of pairs of stimuli that is produced by subjects who respond 
rationally under instructions to "judge similarity" given an 
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adequate category scale. This approach to similarity is contrasted 
with the indirect approach, as exemplified by the Gibson (1940) 
definition of similarity as "that relationship between stimulus 
items which can be indicated and measured in terms of their tendency 
to generalize." The emphasis In this thesis will be on the cognitive 
processes to which similarity is considered to provide a means of 
approach, rather than on the nature of the similarity process 
itself. 
The two topics of interest here, cognitive processes as 
exemplified by similarity judgement, and verbal mediating processes, 
are certainly not new to psychology; In fact both topics have 
generated a considerable body of research. However, perhaps largely 
for historical reasons, the theories and data relevant to each area 
have tended to develop in divergent directions. It will therefore 
be necessary to r?view the literature relevant to the two topics 
separately,- before attempting to postulate any specific relation-
ships betw~en verbal mediation and cognitive processes including 
the judgement of similarities. The first section of this review, 
then, will be mainly concerned with the concept of mediation, with 
the emphasis on a cross-section of the literature that is relevant 
to the study of verbal mediating stimuli and responses. Part Two 
of the review will be concerned with investigations of the influences 
of language on cognition, and will emphasise the ways in which this 
field differs, in background and in current theoretical and 
methodological approach, from the research on verbal mediation. 
Finally in this chapter, attempts that have been made to bridge 
these two fields will be outlined and suggestions for an 
experimental investigation of the role of verbal mediation In 
similarity judgement will be explored. 
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PART I. 
SOME SELECTED STUDIES OF VERBAL MEDIATION. 
The historical development of the concept of verbal 
mediation can be sketched in terms of a few key experiments. These 
will first be described; we will then attempt to gain a more 
detailed understanding of the term mediation as it is used in 
contemporary psychology. 
Historically~ the British Associationists appear to have 
been the first psychologists to study the problem of mediation. 
The classic paradigm of mediate association as set forth by them 
is deceptively simple. Rephrased in modern terminology, it states 
simply that 
"If element A is associated with element B, and element 
C is also associated with element B, then element A will 
acquire some association with element C". 
In the early 1930's Shipley apparently rediscovered 
mediation for modern psychology, while performing some experiments 
on classical conditioning. He put two groups of 10 subjects through 
an experimental programme consisting of two discrete conditioning 
steps. The first step consisted of repeated pairings of "extra 
stimuli" with a sudden rap on the cheek which served to evoke an 
eyeblink from the subject. In the first group of 10 subjects a 
buzz and a flash of light were used as the "extra stimuli"; in 
the second group, the buzz alone was used. The second step in the 
experiment for both groups consisted of the repeated pairing of the 
flash of light with a shock~ which served to evoke finger 
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withdrawal. At the end of the experiment, the "extra stimulus" 
of the first step (buzz) which had never been given in the second 
step, was presented alone, and was found to evoke finger withdrawals 
in 60% and 70% of the subjects in each group respectively. An 
additional group of 10 subjects showed that finger withdrawal did 
not occur at the test point unless the test stimulus was one that 
had previously been used In one of the two steps of the experiment. 
Finally, a further group of 10 subjects showed that finger withdrawal 
occurred in but a small ~ercentage of subjects (20%) when the shock 
used in the second step had not been paired with an "extra stimulus". 
Thus, the reaction did not occur with any appreciable degree of 
regularity except when the test or critical stimulus had been 
coupled with some response and the critical response had been 
coupled with some extra stimulus. Shipley (1935) concluded that 
the reaction depends on the previous conditioning of both the test 
stimulus and the critical response, and called it an indirect 
conditioning reaction. 
The experiment suggests th2t a response, In this case the 
eyeblink, can in a manner of speaking, "carry" another response 
(finger withdrawal) from one stimulus (tap on cheek) to another 
(light flash) without the latter having ever been used, eit_her as 
a conditioned or an unconditioned stimulus for the elicitation of 
the finger withdrawal response. 
Lumsdaine (1939) raised the question of whether or not the 
mediating reaction actually occurs. He repeated Shipley's 
experiment with detailed graphic recording and found that in most 
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cases the light did elicit a winking reaction which was closely 
followed by finger withdrawal. There were some cases, however, in 
which the withdrawal reaction antedated the eye movement and this 
suggests that the winking reaction may be only an overt index o£ 
the actual mediation process. In fact, the mediation hypothesis 
leads us to expect just this; for in the original training, the 
light (sign) was presumably becoming associated with the fractional 
anticipatory portions of the reaction to the tap on the cheek (the 
stimulus object) and it i~ this mediation process which is more or 
less faithfully indexed by the overt winking. 
An early extension of the mediation paradigm to verbal 
behaviour appeared in some studies by Razran (1949). He showed 
that a salivary response which has been conditioned to one word, 
e.g. IIstyle ll will readily generalise to another word, e.g. IIfashion ll 
which is physically very different, but which elicits much the same 
meaning or mediating reaction. In fact, Razran found that consider-
ably more generalization of conditioning (59% as opposed to 37%) 
occurred on the basis of similarity of meaning (synonyms) than on the 
basis of sight or sound (homophones; e.g. for IIstyle ll a homophone 
would be "stile"). 
To take the mediation paradigm one step further into the 
field of psycholinguistics, a purely verbal experimental test f6r 
mediate association was provided by the following experiment 
performed by Sacks and Russell (1953). This experiment made use of 
naturally associated pairs of words, e.g. " umbrella ll and IIrainll. 
Sacks and Russell had subjects associate one member of the 
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"umbrella" - "rain" word pair with a nonsense syllable (e.g. zup) 
by the method of paired associates. They then tested for association 
between the nonsense syllable and the other member of the natural 
pair by requiring the subject to learn a new list which contained 
this pair. His performance was contrasted against other subjects 
in a control group who had not learned the appropriate first list. 
Thus, given (from norms) A ~ 
Subject first learns C ~ 
And is then tested with C ~ 
B (e.g. Umbrella - Rain) 
A (e.g. Zup - Umbrella) 
B (e.g. Zup - rain). 
Under these conditions, enormous facilitation of second 
list learning was found, in that subjects virtually learned the 
second list in one trial. 
To answer the criticism that subjects were "aware" of the 
relationship between the words in the first and second list, 
Russell and Storms (1955) extended the chain by another inferred 
link: 
e.g. Given (from norms) soldier ~ sailor, sailor -7 navy, 
but soldier ~ navy 
Subject first learns 
and is tested with 
zug -7 soldi er 
zug ~ navy. 
Again significant facilitation was found in the second list. 
Note that the assumed implicit stimulus (in this case, the word 
"sailor") did not appear anywhere in the experiment, and subjects 
were apparently unaware of the relationship between the first and 
second lists. 
More recent work, e.g. Mink (1957) has shown that mediation 
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is not necessarily a neat, automatic associative process. Further 
complications have arlsen from the suggestions made by Jenkins 
(1961) that reinforcement of specific mediation responses made by 
a given subject may be crucial, and also that there may be some 
importance attached to the general likelihood of eliciting the 
mediational processes, as determined either by the characteristics 
of the tasks confronting the subject, or by his history of 
reinforcement for mediating in the specific situation. Mandler 
(1961) however, takes the view that the strategies used by subjects 
are crucial and claims that a term such as "decision making" may 
be more appropriate than the term reinforcement. He draws a 
comparison between some of the more complex mediation paradigms 
and the typical concept learning experiments in which the subject's 
task is to acquire and use a strategy; the strategy in this case 
being the use of a verbal mediating response. Russell (1961) has 
also pointed out that mediation processes are characterised by a 
high degree of selective use, and may be used only under the 
operation of appropriate "sets". Recent research thus appears to 
have elevated the mediation concept from Shipley's view of it as a 
relatively simple form of conditioned behaviour to a modern view 
which places it on a par with other complex cognitive processes 
like concept formation and judgement. We will return to this point 
again in Chapter 6. For the present, however, we will be concerned 
with a more general summary of the literature on mediation processes. 
A considerable body of research has been performed using 
paired associate and related learning tasks to explore various aspects 
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of the mediation paradigm, and much of it has been reviewed by 
Cofer and Musgrave (1961). Our aim here, however, is to explore 
very generally some aspects of the wide variety of research that 
has drawn upon the concept of mediation, in order to gain some 
insight into the nature of the process. The problem that we wish to 
investigate involves the possibility that language mediates in some 
way between the raw sensory input and the internal or covert 
reactions to the input which determine the outcome of the complex 
cognitive activities that occur during such processes as judgement. 
Areas of research in which mediation and related phenomena are 
considered to operate include the following: 
1. Investigations of mediation in paired associates learning. 
2. Investigations of stimulus predifferentiation. 
3. Studies of verbal factors in the acquisition of motor 
skills. 
4. Studies of transposition and the perception of stimulus 
relations. 
5. Experiments involving mediation in concept learning. 
6. Mediated generalization studies. 
Some typical studies from each area will now be discussed 
as a means of illustrating various aspects of the mediation 
phenomenon. 
1. Mediation in paired associates learni~. 
Studies relevant to this area have already been discussed 
in sufficient detail. There have been attempts to show that 
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mediation operates without awareness of the process on the part 
of the subject e.g. Russell and Storms (1955). One notable 
feature appears to emerge however; for as soon as the task is 
made sufficiently complex for us to be sure that the subject could 
not be aware of mediation, other factors such as the use of 
strategies are reported to become significant e.g. Jenkins (1961). 
The use of these strategies in turn suggests that awareness of the 
phenomenon is important for subjects to show mediation. In fact, 
this controversy suggests interesting parallels with that of the 
problem of awareness in verbal conditioning, (Greenspoon, 1955). 
Leftwich, Nawas and Sieg~l (1969) recently investigated the problem 
and came to the conclusion that cognitive theory, and its construct 
of awareness provided a better account of the verbal conditioning 
phenomenon than reinforcement theory. 
2. Studies of stimulus predifferentiation. 
The term stimulus predifferentiation has been referred to 
the observation that the learning of different responses to physically 
similar stimuli is reputedly facilitated by the prior pairing of 
discriminal verbal responses with each member of the set of 
physically similar stimuli. The responses whose acquisition iB_ 
reported to be facilitated are usually motor transfer tasks. The 
typical explanation has been that when verbal responses are learned 
to a set of physical stimuli, the response-produced stimulation 
which accompanies the verbalisation contributes to each total 
stimulus complex; these differential correlates of verbalisation 
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then enhance the perceived difference between the otherwise 
similar physical stimuli and thus enhance discrimination and there-
fore learning (Spiker, 1956). Initial investigations of pre-
differentiation were concerned with purely verbal learning problems • 
. The original predifferentiation hypothesis as stated by Gibson, 
was as follows: 
"If dQfferentiation has been set up within a list (of 
paired associate items), less generalization will 
occur in learning a new list which includes the same 
stimulus items paired with different responses; and 
the trials required to learn the new list will tend 
to be reduced by a reduction of the internal 
generalization." (Gibson, 1940) 
In its original form, the concept of predifferentiation was thus 
considered to be purely mediational. Miller and Dollard (1945) 
extended the concept to motor behaviour by postulating that the 
verbal responses, which are learned during pretraining, transfer 
to the motor task and it is this transfer of additional distinctive 
cues to the discriminanda which reduces the generalization between 
them, thus facilitating learning of the appropriate motor task. 
An experiment by Norcross (1958) is a typical example 
of the approach, and has sometimes been cited as evidence for the 
acquired distinctiveness of stimuli, produced by labelling. Her 
stimuli were line drawings of Indian children's faces; two boys 
and two girls. Using a fully counterbalanced design, she taught 
different groups of kindergarten children to use similar names 
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('zim' and 'zam') for one pair of faces and dissimilar names 
('wug' and 'kos') for the other pair. The transfer task 
consisted of learning to press a different one of 4 buttons to 
each face. It was predicted that learning performance would be 
better for the pair of stimuli with dissimilar names; the prediction 
was confirmed. She concluded that response-produced verbal cues may 
differentially affect a transfer task, depending upon the degree 
of generalization among the verbal cue components. Carroll (1964) 
has put forward a valid criticism of this interpretation. He 
points out that since her procedure called for the child to verbalise 
the correct name for each face before he made his motor response, 
the experiment may be regarded as showing merely that it is harder 
to learn associations to relatively similar verbal stimuli than to 
dissimilar verbal stimuli, a finding which has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in paired associate experiments. In fact, as Carroll 
suggests, it is difficult to conceive of an experiment that would 
demonstrate acquired distinctiveness without being subject to the 
criticism that the discrimination is made in response to words 
rather than to characteristics of stimuli that are somehow invested 
in them by the words assigned to them. The hypothesis that 
discriminatory responses can be made to verbal stimuli is interesting 
in itself and seems to be a more reasonable interpretation of the 
experimental results. 
A related study by Spiker (1959) is also of inter~st for the 
implications it may have for our understanding of the process of 
mediation. Briefly he showed that preliminary training with 
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distinctive stimuli facilitates discrimination learning with stimuli 
that lie along the same dimension but are among themselves less 
distinctive. The improvement in discrimination was explained by 
postulating that the pretraining with distinctive stimuli aids the 
d~velopment of appropriate orienting responses which transfer to the 
more difficult discrimination. Procedurally, this approach is not 
unlike that used by Uznadze (1966) in his investigations of the 
psychology of set. 
Other investigations have included the pairing of single 
letters with irregular inkblot sh~pes (Arnoult, 1953), the pairing 
of nonsense labels with random shapes (Ellis, 1968) and letters 
with 6 colours ranging from red to yellow (Cantor, 1955). By using 
patterns of lights in a 5 x 5 matrix, Murdock (1958) was able to 
investigate the role of stimulus similarity (some patterns were more 
similar than others) however, the results were inconclusive. In 
general, there appears to be fairly reliable evidence that the 
pairing of distinctive words, syllables or other stimuli with 
otherwise indistinctive stimuli facilitates the learning of new 
responses to the labelled stimuli. We ca~not infer that the 
labels enhance the distinctiveness of the stimuli however; these 
studies merely show that the total stimulus complex stimulus-plus-
label is more easily discriminated from another similar stimulus 
with a different label than when the same two stimuli are presented 
to subjects without attached labels. This finding ~n itself is 
interesting and suggests that the role of labelling in the 
perception of stimulus relations may be of interest in a detailed 
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inv.estigation. 
3. Studies of Verbal Pret~aining in the Acguisition of 
Motor Skills. 
Closely related to the predifferentiation studies are 
investigations in which motor acquisition is considered to be 
facilitated by verbal factors which do not exert their influence 
at the discrimination stage of learning, but rather, facilitate 
learning of the correct ~esponses to the already-discriminated 
physical stimuli. In "stimulus predifferentiation" studies subjects 
learn to associate words or other symbols with stimuli which are 
later used in the motor task. In the "verbal pretraining" studies 
subjects associate words or phrases with stimuli which substitute 
for those later used in the motor task - the replacement words or 
phrases In fact indicate to subjects the correct motor response to 
be made to each stimulus. McAllister (1953) has clarified the 
differences between the two approaches and suggested the following 
new terminology: 
(i) Irrelevant pretraining, in which the training makes use of 
irrelevant stimuli or response words or both, 
(ii) Relevant S, in which pretraining involves relevant stimuli 
but irrelevant response words, 
(iii) Relevant S - R in which pretraining involves both relevant 
stimuli and relevant response words. Relevant stimuli are the 
same as, or are reasonable substitutes for motor task stimuli 
while relevant response words are those which indicate, for the 
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motor task, the appropriate responses to particular stimuli. 
Relevant S as defined above is "stimulus predifierentiatiorl'while 
relevant S - R is verbal pretraining. 
McAllister tested the influence of three kinds of relevant 
S - R training In which subjects had to learn to associate one of 
6 colours with each channel of a star discrimeter. Groups of 
subjects associated the colour patches with response words based 
on one of three analogues of the star channels on the discrimeter: 
there was a "degrees" analogy (e.g. red - "300 degrees"), a 'clock" 
analogy (e.g. red - "10 o'clock") or a "directions" (e.g. red -
"left, forward") analogue. In all cases, relevant S - R pretraining 
facilitated motor performance. The "directions" and the "clock" 
analogues were superior to the "degrees" analogue. A group given 
relevant S pretraining associated words that were unrelated to the 
motor task with stimuli which simulated those used in the motor 
task (e.g. a red patch was associated with the word "fitful!!). The 
relevant S subjects did significantly better than the subjects 
given irrelevant pretraining but showed less facilitation than the 
relevant S - R groups. 
Battig (1956) in a similar study confirmed McAllister's 
results. However, by using more complicated stimulus displays, 
Battig was able to manipUlate the complexity of the task. He 
found a significant decrease in transfer as task complexity 
increased. He suggested two reasons £or this: 
(a) Verbal pretraining may primarily influence learning by 
channelling subjects' responses in a direction which leads to a 
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more rapid discovery of the correct solution, particularly where 
the simpler learning tasks are involved. 
(b) Performance presumably becomes more important as task-
complexity increases. There is a limit to the number of cues to 
which a subject can react in a complex task, so as complexity 
increases, verbal cues begin to interfere and verbal pretraining 
becomes ineffective. 
Using 4 light intensities, each of which could be turned 
out by the subject manipulating the correct one of 4 switches, 
Holton and Goss (1956) investigated positive transfer to a 
discriminative motor task as a function of 5 types of premotor 
verbal experience: 
(a) The learning of different nonsense syllable names for the 
light stimuli, 
(b) The learning of experimenter-supplied familiar names for 
the stimuli (e.g. dull, very bright), 
(c) The learning of self-supplied familiar names for the stimuli, 
(d) Instructions to se~ discriminate among and name the stimuli 
covertly, and 
(e) Instructions to see, discriminate among and name the stimuli 
overtly. 
There were 15 groups of 10 subjects including a control group 
given no premotor experience. In terms of both errors and errorless 
trials, the motor task performances of the groups given premotor 
experience were superior to the performances of the control group. 
McCormack (1958) has summarised the general explanation for 
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the facilitation of motor learning by verbal pretraining as follows: 
He assumes that verbal responses generate cues (s1' s2' s3'···· sn) 
which accompany the stimuli (S1' S2' S3' ... Sn) during the motor 
task. Hence when S1 is encountered, the total complex is S1 + s1' 
If S1' S2 and ...• Sn are highly similar, and if s1' s2 and •.. 
s are distinctive, then discrimination will be easier between 
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S1 + 8 1 and S2 + s2 than between S1 a~d S2 and motor performance 
will be facilitated. He reports an experiment by Rossman and Goss 
(1951) in which small amounts of pretraining retarded rather than 
facilitated motor learning. He assumes that, with small amounts 
of pretraining, each stimulus elicits each label equally often so 
that discriminative motor responses are made between 51 + s2 and 
S1 + s1 and between S2 + s1 and S2 + s2' This is the same in 
effect as adding an identical componfllt to two already similar 
stimuli; hence discrimination is delayed and motor performance is 
retarded. Using 6 similar red-yellow hues paired with star 
discrimeter channels he showed that subjects pretrained on the motor 
task stimuli gave inferior performances early in the task but 
superior performance later. 
Duncan (1953) using a slightly different approach studied 
transfer using a star discrimeter paired with 6 lights. Transfer 
was studied as a function of 2 variables; degree of learnirrg-of the 
first task and similarity of the 2 tasks. Similarity between tasks 
was defined as the number of lights (2, 4 or 6) which were newly 
paired with different discrimeter channels on the final task. 
Transfer increased both with degree of first task learning and 
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inter-task similarity. Tra~sfer w~s attributed to a combination 
of response generalization and "learning to learn". 
The studies of verbal pre-training lead us to much the same 
conclusion as we arrived at in the review of the stimulus pre-
differentiation studies. That is, the labels facilitate learning 
but only by providing an additional stimulus cue to which a learned 
response can be made. We do not need to postulate a change in the 
perceived relationships between the unlabelled and the labelled 
stimuli. In particular there is no need to postulate that the 
stimuli themselves are made more distinctive by having labels 
paired with them; this problem is related to the perception of 
stimulus relations and will now be discussed in some detail. 
4. Studies of Transposition and the Perception of Stimulus 
Relations. 
Reese (1968) refers to transposition as a kind of transfer 
that appears to result from response to relations among stimuli 
or to patterns of stimulus qualities rather than to the absolute 
qualities of the stimuli, for example the continuing choice of the 
larger of two stimulus objects after changes in their absolute 
sizes. The term mediation appears to be invoked frequently in 
discussions on the perception of stimulus relations; likewise the 
role of similarity between stimuli is an important consideration 
in discussions on stimulus relations. 
Reese (1968) summarises a number of studies and comes to the 
following conclusions: Increasing stimulus similarity generally 
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increases transposition in both human and animal subjects. 
However, the effect appears to reverse for young "verbal" children; 
they show more transposition with distinctive stimuli than with very 
similar stimuli. This inconsistency may be due not to a reduction 
in transposition with similar stimuli, but to an enhancement of 
transposition with distinctive stimuli. The young child may be 
able to utilise so~e kind of verbal concept to mediate the 
transposition response only when the stlmulus differences are 
large, perhaps because small stimulus differences fail to arouse 
the conceptual response. In a test of the relationship between 
stimulus similarity and transposition, McKee and Riley (1962) 
found more transposition of loudness than of pitch. A series of 
related studies, reported in Reese (1968) led these authors to 
conclude that although discrimination between different pitches was 
found to be much more difficult than between different loudnesses, 
the observation that more transposition occurs between the stimuli 
which are harder to discriminate could be attributed to verbal 
factors. The explanation was that children may have more verbal 
labels for different loudnesses than for different pitches, and that 
these labels could in some way mediate transposition, perhaps by 
inducing an "acquired equivalence" of cues, during the training and 
test phases. 
The mediation theory interpretation of transposition ha~ been 
discussed in some detail by Reese (1968). Theoretically, if stimuli 
arouse verbal responses or labels in subjects, then approach and 
inhibitory tendencies can become conditioned to these labels. 
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Suppose we train a subject to approach a 2" square and avoid a 1" 
square. The 2" square arouses the label mediating "larger" 
which then becomes conditioned to the approach response, while the 
1" square arouses the mediator "smaller" which becomes conditioned 
to the avoidance response. Now on the test trial we present an 
eight inch and a four inch square. By generalisation the 8" square 
arouses the mediator "larger" while the 4" square arouses the 
mediating response "smaller" and so the conditioned subject approaches 
the former square and avoids the latter. The theory has aroused a 
certain amount of criticism, but it is difficult to test 
experimentally. Nevertheless, the concept of mediation has been 
considered to provide a useful description and explanation of 
much of the data from transposition studies. 
5. Mediation in Concept Formation Studies. 
We next turn to what may be the most thoroughly investigated 
field in which mediation is considered to play a part - the role of 
mediating stimuli and responses in concept learning. The early 
research in this field has been thoroughly summarised by Goss 
On the basis of the studies discussed, plus his own 
research, he concludes that concept learning, as typically 
demonstrated in the laboratory, cannot be conceived without the 
postulation of common verbal or other responses to subsets of 
stimuli whose members are highly dissimilar physically (but not 
conceptually). Fenn and Goss (1957) used sets of blocks which 
varied on a number of dimensions (e.g. height, thickness, colour) 
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aGd paired exemplars of certain of the dimensions with names which 
• were either real (e.g. sm~ll, but tall) or nonsense syllable 
(e.~. CEV) names. Their prediction, using blocks which had been 
labelled in terms of height and size, was that "The common mediating 
stimuli should enhance similarity of the blocks within each category. 
Acquired distinctiveness based on different mediating stimuli for 
each category should decrease inter-category generalization based 
on colour and shape. Therefore, these relationships of external 
and mediating stimuli should increase the probability of 
ma~ipulative sorting of the blocks into height-size categories". 
The results showed that experience with familiar word and 
nonsense syllable labels led to a significant increase in sortings 
of the blocks on the basis of height and size. Both nonsense and 
real word labels were equally effective as mediating stimuli. The 
experiment was repeated using pre-school children (tarey and Goss, 
1997) with the result that familiar word but not nonsense label 
mediating stimuli produced the results predicted. A third 
investigation (Lacey and Goss, 1959) investigated variations in 
the mediatBd similarity of the blocks in the 4 height / size 
categories. For separate groups, 4, 3 and 2 nonsense labels were 
assigned to the blocks. It was expected that the 4-label condition 
would produce the greatest dissimilarity among the 4 height-size 
categories, and as predicted, sorting was best performed by those 
subjects for whom the labels had emphasised the dissimilarity 
between the 4 height / size categories. 
Namikas (1967) investigated the effects of relevant, neutral, 
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and irrelevant pretra~ning with respect to the dimensions 
involved in his concept formation task. The results showed that 
relevant pretraining facilitates concept identification, and also 
that informational feedback about the correctness of each response 
improves performance. 
Johnson (1967) in an attempt to uncover the nature of the 
mediational responses in concept identification explored the 
differences between reversal shifts, intradimensional shifts and 
extradimensional shifts. An extradimensional shift involves a 
change in both the relevant dimension and the values on the dimension 
(e.g. from red and orange colours to triangular and square shapes.) 
An intradimensional shift involves only a change in the levels 
of the same relevant dimension (e.g. from red - yellow to blue -
green colours). A reversal shift involves a change in neither. 
If the subject acquires, during initial training, a mediation 
response which corresponds in some manner with the relevant 
dimension, the mediation response would remain appropriate after 
a reversal shift, but in the case of an extra-dimensional shift 
the response would have to be extinguished and a new one learned. 
We can also ask whether the mediation response corresponds more 
closely to the relevant dimension (e.g. colour) or to the values 
of stimuli on the relevant dimension (e.g. red - green). Unlike 
an extradimensional shift, an intradimensional shift involves a 
change only in the levels of the same relevant dimension, hence if 
mediation responses are specific to the particular levels of the 
relevant dimension, then an intradimensional shift would approach 
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an extradimensional shift in difficulty. The data analysis showed 
that reversal and intradimensional shifts did not differ significantly 
in trials to criterion, however the extradimensional shift required 
significantly fewer trials. This suggests that mediational learning 
which corresponds to the relevant dimension is important in concept 
learning. 
In general, then, there appears to be good evidence that 
verbal factors playa part in conceptual learning. Kendler (1961) 
has defined concept learning as any situation that involves the 
lIacquisition or utilization or both of a common identifying response 
to dissimilar stimuli ll • Hunt (1962) defines concept learning as the 
"learning of names ll , where a name is a symbol used to refer to a 
set. In fact, one of the characteristics of language is that 
words generally refer to classes of objects rather than to discrete 
examples or instances; it is not surprising therefore, that 
language should be a relevant factor in conceptual learning. 
Granted then, that verbal factors playa part in concept learning, ~) 
the question to ask is whether verbal factors are actually a 1 
necessary part of cognitive activity. This problem will be discusse 
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I further at a later point. 
6. Studies of Mediated Generalization. 
Relevant literature in this field has been summarised up 
to 1960 by Horton and Kjeldergaard (1961). Problems of mediated 
association have been discussed elsewhere. A special application 
of the theory of mediated association however, can be invoked to 
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explain wny two different stimuli elicit the same response (stimulus 
equivalence), why two different responses are evoked by the same 
stimulus (response equivalence) or why a stimulus and response 
elicit each other without having been previously dire~tly 
associated (chaining). Most of the proposed mediational models 
now current have been derived from Hull's notion of secondary 
generalization. Horton and Kjeldergaard (p.2) classify them into 
two distinct classes: 
(a) representational mediation models such as those of Cofer and 
Foley (1942), Osgood (1952), and Mowrer (1954), and 
(b) associational mediation models like those of Jenkins (1975) 
and Russell (1955). The former variety emphasises the nature of 
the mediation process, while the latter kind emphasises its e£fect. 
Although the history of mediate association can be traced 
back to Hull's work in the 1930's and the work of Shipley (1933, 
1935) and Lumsdaine (1939), Horton and Kjeldergaard (p.10) report 
that a surprisingly small amount of research has used paired 
associate learning of verbal material of the type discussed earlier. 
Such work suggests that factors such as reverse associations and 
contiguity are important in mediation. 
Eight paradigms of mediated generalization are developed 
and investigated experimentally. Analysis of the possible mediating 
links in these paradigms led the authors to the conclusion that 
backward or bidirectional association was a necessary explanatory 
construct to account for mediation. They suggested that task set 
(e.g. what is the subject supposed to be doing) and strategy (how 
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the subject goes about doing it) are possibly important 
variables in determining the significance of mediation. (p.24.) 
Koplin (1967) points out that in most of the earlier studiAS 
generalisation was tested between associated words which were 
selected from free association norms. He attempted to produce 
mediated generalization of a lever-pressing motor response by 
means of experimentally induced or acquired associations, however 
was unable to do so. This failure was attributed to a IIpool effect ll 
in which a cohesive pool of bonds is established between all 
stimuli used during the training for acquisition of the motor 
response. Malloy and Ellis (1970) established a link between the 
predifferentiation studies and the mediated generalization approach 
by showing that training designed to produce acquired distinctive-
ness or acquired equivalence of cues produced an increase in the 
tendency for subjects to give generalised responses to test 
stimuli. This finding is consistent with the view that attaching 
common verbal responses to different stimuli generates common 
response-produced cues which increase the functional equivalence of 
the stimuli. 
This, then, lS a survey of the main fields in which mediation 
is postulated to playa part. An attempt will now be made to draw 
some general conclusions about the nature of mediation so that the 
theoretical background to the research described in later 
chapters can be sketched. B~oadly speaking, in all the mediation 
studies reported here, the subject faces a specific task, usually 
involving learning. The mediating stimuli and responses appear to 
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facilitate acquisition of the correct response to the task by 
providing additional relevant cues to the subject which either 
channel his behaviour in the direction of a new strategy or else 
facilitate learning by providing additional relevant associations 
which serve as cues to direct his behaviour. 
One point which emerges from the studies summarised here is 
that there is little agreement between theorists on the process 
to which the term mediation should refer. Bugelski (1962) uses the 
term to refer to a process where subjects actively establish 
mnemonic words or phrases in paired associate learning, e.g. the 
word "DEPUTIZE" to mediate the pair "DEP" - "TEZ". On the other 
hand, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) suggest that a 
representational mediational process may be an element of all S - R 
learning. They divide the usual S - R paradigm into two stages -
decoding (the association of the stimulus with representational 
mediators) and encoding (the association of the mediated self-
stimulation with overt instrumental responses). Staats (1968, 
p.188) takes the view that language mediates behaviour because 
language and thought are synonomous: 
"to say that language sequences • • determine 
thought is redundant. These language sequences ~ 
types of thought and could be called chains of thought 
responses. It is suggested that a large portion of 
what we call thought is composed of such chains". 
Staats, along with Osgood (1953) and Mowrer (1954) views word 
meaning as an implicit response. Osgood suggests that meaning 
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responses come under the control of the word stimuli through 
instrumental conditioning, while Mowrer and Staats suggest that the 
principle involved is that of classical conditioning. For these 
theorists then, language mediates thought because thought is 
largely the manipulation of words to which implicit meaning responses 
have become conditioned. This view of the role of verbal processes 
in thought has received so~e experimental support. For example, 
Staats and Staats (1957) took the view that if meaning is an actual 
response, it should be possible to classically condition it, i.e. 
the meaning response elicited by a word could be conditioned to any 
contiguously presented stimulus. In three experiments a nonsense 
syllable was presented 18 times, each time paired with the audit8ry 
presentation of a different word. While these words were different, 
they all had an identical meaning component (as measured by the 
Osgood semantic differential scale). In each experiment there was 
significant evidence that meaning responses had been conditioned 
to the nonsense syllables. (Data from those subjects who reported 
"awareness" of a relationship between certain words and syllables 
were not analysed.) Brown (1958, p.101) has criticised the 
conditioning approach: 
"Osgood • • pushed the mediating response back into 
the nervous system where no one will undertake to 
, 
look for it. • The theory is not to be judged on 
the evidence for fractional implicit responses but by 
the success with which it predicts . • overt behaviour. 
I have found that this success cannot, at present, be 
given anything approaching a conclusive evaluation. 
Conditioning theories of linguistic meaning have been 
squeezed by the same pressure to the same sanctuary -
the central nervous system. Assuming that words must 
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have immediate effects, and plagued by a shortage of overt 
effects, the conditioning theorist haG revised his 
conception of meaning from overt response to implicit 
and eventually medLated response." 
A similar criticism of the conditioning approach has been put 
forward by Wallach (1958). The verbal conditioning approach also 
came under fire in Chomsky's (1967) critique of Skinner (1957). 
In addition, recent experimental studies, e.g. Maltzman, Langdon 
and Feeney (1970), Maltzman (1968), Feather (1965), Maltzman and 
Belloni (1964), Deno and Jenkins (1967) and Turquin (1969) have 
cast doubt on the view that conditioning via mediators can account 
for the "meaning" of verbal st imuli and responses. 
There appear to be few adequate definitions of mediation in 
the literature. The most satisfactory definition noted by the 
present writer is that given by Duncan (1967, p.347): 
"Mediation involves the apprehension of an association 
or connection of some kind between words or other events." 
In fact, it seems reasonable to reduce the whole of the mediation 
concept to the postulate that mediation involves the awareness of 
some additional piece of learned information which mayor may not 
be explicitly or overtly given in the experimental situation 
but which serves as a cue for the subject 1n his task of solving 
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the experimental problem set for him by the exparimenter. 
If we accept the view stated by Garner (1962), that 
uncertainty is a prerequisite to structure and that the "search 
for structure" is inherent in behaviour then the additional cues 
provided by so-called mediating stimuli and responses can be 
considered to facilitate the subject's task simply by providing 
additional information. Gibson (1966) has taken a similar view, 
and indicates a subject who actively "hunts" or searches for 
meaning to make sense of what little information he can get. 
Some recent research in the field of sensory interaction 
(e.g. Wilson and Gregso!1, 1967; Mitchell and Gregson, 1968) 
suggests that increasing the confusion or ambiguity in the subject's 
task leads to a greater reliance on any irrelevant stimulus cues 
that are present in the experimental situation. It could be 
argued that if we add labels or names to stimuli which are being 
handled by the subject in a relatively confusing experimental 
situation the labels will be used as a cue to reduce uncertainty 
and hence aid the subject in his search for structure. 
If we accept this view of the central nervous system as 
an active organiser of information into structural categories, we 
can foresee two possible relationships between this structuring 
process and the structure of language itself. Since words 
generally refer to classes of stimuli we can postulate that either 
we classify the environment into groups of objects because we have 
verbal concepts of these classifications (i.e. language in a sense 
mediates perception) or we can postulate that we classify stimuli 
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and only then label them (i.e. we perceive firs~ then label). 
Voss (1969) has pointed out that all perceptual behaviour is 
inseparably related to the thought processes and vice versa. The 
most acceptable current view of perception appears to be the 
information processing viewpoint. The major assumptions of this 
view have been outlined by Voss (1969; Chapter 1) and include the 
following points: 
A perceptual response lS assumed not to be an immediate 
consequence of stimulation but rather one which has gone through a 
number of stages or processes, each of which takes time to organize 
or transverse. It is assumed that total time from stimulus onset 
to the occurrence of a perceptual response can be divided into 
intervals, with each interval characterised by a different operation. 
We can then create a block design of these intervals. A number of 
such models have been constructed, e.g. Broadbent (1958), Sperling 
(1963) and Melton (1963). 
A second main assumption of the information processing 
viewpoint is concerned with limited information handling capacities. 
We thus need to look for instances in which recoding of information 
takes place in such a way that some of the content might be 
expected to be maintained more explicitly at the expense of other 
aspects which are lost. Verbal information which accompanies the 
-stimulus input, for example,-may be handled as a significant part 
of the total input in, some circumstances, but rejected as contributing 
nothing to the search for structure under other circumstances. 
Earlier reference was made to a trend in recent research 
which suggests that mediation would be better viewed as one of 
perhaps several alternative strategies which are available to 
subjects in a typical learning task. Indeed, the term mediation 
itself, as currently used in the literature, appears to be broad 
enough to encompass a wide range of possible strategies. This 
suggestion is given support by the observation that instructions 
to mediate frequently improve performance on learning tasks in 
which mediation is believe d to occur. (Paivio and Yuille, 1967; 
Yarmey and esapo, 1968; Yuille and Paivio, 1968; and Schwartz, 
Pelton (1969) has shown that the construction of mediation 
by the subject himself is more effective than the perception of a 
ready-made link in the facilitation of learning by mediation, 
again suggesting that mediatio~ operates as a strategy. 
The approach that will be taken in this thesis is that the 
concept of mediation has often been used as a blanket term to 
describe a theoretical situation which could be more adequately 
and more precisely explained in alternative terms. It is held 
that a better understanding of the process could be achieved by a 
closer examination of the way in which information is utilised by 
subjects in a learning or judgement task. Such an approach would 
allow us to draw upon many more diverse but nevertheless related 
areas of psychology which have hitherto been regarded as fields 
which are distinct, in both methodology and in terms of underlying 
processes, from the mediation studies which have been discussed on 
earlier pages. 
The area which is directly relevant to the problem of 
the role of verbal processes in judgement has been currently 
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classified as a branch of psycholinguistics. In particular, we 
are interested in studies which have been concerned with the 
role of language in cognitive processes. 
that we now turn. 
It is to these studies 
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PA~T II. 
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
Subjectively, it is difficult to conceive of the 
possibility of thought without words; yet the psychological 
interpretation of the role of language in fuought remains an 
area of great controversy. We have seen that the current 
theoretical trend is against theories which connect verbal 
processes to cognitive activities via conditioning. The studies 
reviewed in this section have been less concerned with the 
mechanisms by which language might be considered to mediate 
thought; rather they stem from the area of linguistics and 
particularly the linguistic relativity theory of Benjamin Lee Whorf. 
The two extreme viewpoints on the role of language in 
cognitive behaviour which were noted in the review of the 
mediation studies also occur in this field. The poet Mandelstam 
showed an interest in the problem when he wrote "I wanted to utter 
a word, but that word I cannot remember; and the bodiless thought 
will now return to the place of shadows". 
McGuigan (1966, p.3.) appears to equate thought with 
language processes when he defines thinking quite simply as "the 
composite of bodily activity (neural, muscular, etc.) that 
necessarily results from the presentation of a language stimulus". 
Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956, p.66.) on the other hand claim 
that "many experiments in concept attainment, including our own, 
have shown that subjects are able to distinguish correctly exemplars 
from non exemplars of a concept before being able to name the defining 
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features on which their jUdgements are based". 
Carroll (1964) lists one of the major functions of language 
as a system of responses that facilitates thinking and action for 
the individual. He also concedes that many kinds of thinking are 
possible without language. 
An excellent review of studies relevant to the problem of 
determining the role of language in cognitive processes can be 
found in Lenneberg (1967, p.346-363). 
He summarises a number of important studies to support his 
view that naming is actually the consequence rather than the cause 
of categorisatio~ processes. He also raises the important 
question of whether the semantic structure of a subject's 
language influences his cognitive structuring of the sensory 
input arising from his environment. This is the Whorf Hypothesis 
of linguistic relativity, which has aroused considerable interest 
from psychologists and linguists alike. 
Carroll (1964) takes the view that possession of names for 
objects does not alter our absolute capacity to discriminate among 
these things when they are extremely similar. He adds however 
that the special names which some specialists learn to use to refer 
to stimuli such as hues help in one way; they enhance the ability 
of the user to recognise and identify particular instances from 
memory. He quotes as evidence the well-known Brown and Lenneberg 
(1954) study in which colour codability was related to how well a 
given colour could be recognised in a task where it had to be 
picked out from an array of 120 colours. This approach has been 
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discussed in detail in Lenneberg (1967). 
Their measure of codability is essentially a measure of how 
well people agree in giving a name to a stimulus; in this case, 
a colour. For example high codability would be expressed by a word 
which uniquely and unambiguously label13 a highly specific stimulus, 
for example the physical colour of blood. The subjects, who 
were all native born American English speakers, were screened 
for colourblindness. Their task involved the recognition of 
certain colours after they had been shown them one, ~r in some 
cases, four) at a time for short periods. After a timed interval 
they viewed a large colour chart from which they were required to 
choose the colours which they had been showL before. The measure 
of codability, which had previously been determined, and has since 
been independently confirmed by Beare (1963), was not found to 
predict the recognisability of a colour when the recognition task 
was easy. (One colour to be recognised after a seven second 
waiting period). However, as the task was made more difficult, 
codability began to correlate with recognisability and the 
relationship was most clearly seen in the most difficult of the 
tasks (four colours had to be recognised after a three minute 
waiting period during which subjects were given irrelevant tasks 
to perform.) At first this looked like experimental proof that 
under certain conditions a person's native language may facilitate 
or handicap a memory function. However, it later became 
apparent that the way in which the colour stimuli were selected 
was a crucial factor. Burnham and Clark (1955) used the same 
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procedure as Brown and Lenneberg, but used different colours, and 
instead of a positive correlation between codability and recog-
nisability they fOl;nd a negative correlation. Lenneberg (1967) 
reports that both experiments were repeated by Lantz (unpublished) 
and Lantz and stefflre (1964), all with similar results. He 
concludes that semantic structure influences recognition only 
under certain experimental conditions namely when the task is 
difficult and the stimuli are chosen in a certain way. In other 
words both of the experimental techniques used are special cases. 
The Lantz and Stefflre (1964) study showed that it is not 
the semantic characteristics of the language that influenced the 
cognitive pr08ess of recognition, but rather it is the particular 
use that subjects will make of language in a specific situati::m. 
Instead of using the Brown and Lenneberg approach, which primarily 
brings out language peculiarities, they measured accuracy of 
communication between SUbjects. They showed that the accuracy with 
which each stimulus in an array can be communicated between subjects 
predicts recognition of that colour. Since codability predicts 
recognisability only in special contexts, Lenneberg (1967, p.354) 
infers that subjects make use of the ready-made reference 
facilities offered them through their vocabulary only under certain 
circumstances: " •••• he is in fact not bound by the semantics of 
his natural language; there is little evidence of the tyrranical 
grip of words on cognition." 
Lenneberg (1967, p.355) concludes that whatever slight 
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l{mitations the semantic structure of a language may have on 
recognition under special circumstances, these limitations may be 
largely overcome by the creative use of descriptive words by the 
individual. He accepts the Lantz and. Stefflre suggestion that 
there are situations in which the individual communicates with 
himself over time, when faced with a complex cognitive task. 
Carroll (1964) reports two crosB-cultural studias which were 
designed to test the Whorf hypothesis. In 1956, Lenneberg and 
Roberts replicated the Brown and Lenneberg experiment, using 
speakers of the Zuni language (used by Indians of New Mexico). 
Striking differences between English and Zuni speakers were 
reported both in the codability of colours and the ease with which 
various colours could be remembered by the speakers of the two 
languages. Casagrande worked with Navaho children whose 
language requires that certain verbs of handling (pick up, hold, 
drop, etc) take special forms depending on the object being 
handled. He compared Navaho and English speaking children matched 
for age, with respect to how often they used shape, form or 
material as a basis for sorting objects rather than colour; he 
used sorting tasks that are usually performed by young children 
on the basis of colour. The Navaho-speaking children had a 
tendency to perform the task on the basis of form at distinctively 
younger ages than the English-speaking children. However, a later 
study using Boston children suggested that environmental experience 
rather than language was the crucial variable. Carroll concludes 
that there is little convincing support for the linguistic relativity 
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hypothesis. 
Other experiments have attempted to demonstrate the 
advantage of words in various tasks in which perceived impressions 
have to be stored and remembered in some way. Bartlett (1932) 
analysed data on retention in terms of whether or not subjects had 
spontaneously verbalised d1lring observation of stimulus materials, 
and found that those who verbalised had superior retention. 
Kurtz and Hovland (1953) had children observe an array of 16 
familiar objects. Half of the subjects were given a sheet of 
names of the objects while the remainder were given a sheet of 
pictures of the objects. As the experimenter indicated each 
object the subjects found and encirclAd the name or picture of 
the object. In the group with printed names, the subject 
pronounced the name aloud while encircling the object. No 
indication was given that there would be a later test of retention. 
Recall was tested after one week and superior ret~ntion was found 
in the verbalization group. The study can be criticised however 
by postulating that verbalization may require subjects to direct 
their attention to the more distinctive properties of the objects 
while the control group had only to discriminate at a level 
sufficient to differentiate the objects from each other but not 
from the new items presented in the recognition test. 
A classic investigation of the role of labelling in retention 
was performed by Carmichael, Hogan and Walter (1932). They showed 
that verbal labels which are presented prior to exposures of certain 
ambiguous line drawings result in the reproduction of figures which 
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r~semble the objects referred to by the labels. An early study 
by Hanawalt and Demarest (1939) showed that if the labels are 
presented immediately after or even up to seven days after 
presentation of the figures, the labels will still influence 
reproductions at each recall interval. 
Bruner, Busiek and Minturn (1952) exposed the figures for 
10, 50 and 100 milliseconds, with the verbal label given prior to 
the exposures and with subjects reproducing the figures immediately 
after each exposure. Again the verbal labels were found to 
influence figure reproduction, and Bruner et al interpreted this 
as evidence for perceptual assimilation as distinct from the 
mnemonic assimilation as found by Carmichael et al. 
Prentice (1954) used a recognition rather than a reproductio~ 
technique. His subjects observed a series of verbally labelled 
figures twice and then were required to select the previously 
seen figures from a group of 60 figures which contained the 12 
original figures plus 48 figures which were distorted to represent 
the labels of the two different word lists used. Prentice found 
that errors in the subjects' selections did not significantly 
favour the distortions that were consistent with the labels used. 
He concluded that the label influence is a function of the process 
of reproducing the figures, rather than of the subjects' 
perceptual interactions with them or their remembering of them. 
Herman, Lawless and Marshall (1957) investigated the role 
of set and exposure time as variables influencing the frequency 
of language - influenced reproductions. Subjects who were given 
instructions to view the figures with the intention of 
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reproducing them later, drew significantly fewer language-
influenced reproductions than subjects who were not given these 
instructions, i.e. the former group presumably paid more 
attention to the details in the figures. A strong tendency was 
also found for subjects to draw more language-influenced 
reproductions when the figures were exposed for shorter intervals. 
It was inferred that the verbal labels serve to channel the stimulus 
function of the figure and this stimulus function tends to be 
implicitly operative d~ring reproduction of the figures. 
Carroll (1964) notes that the use of a label, whether by the 
subject alone, or also by the experimenter, implies that the label 
refers to a concept; thus the figure is perceived as being one of 
a class of similar experiences named by the concept. 
Carroll (1964) takes the view that the existence of a word 
which names a concept in a subject's vocabulary is responsible for 
making a given concept particularly salient and easy to attain. 
Lenneberg (1967, p.356) however does not accept the postulate that 
natural language is a biasing factor in the formation of concepts 
in general. He points out that much human activity is based on 
concepts that must have taken place in the absence of naturally 
occurring words; for example, in mathematics, a language is simply 
created ad hoc as the concepts are developed. 
a creative process, not a rigid convention. 
He sees naming as 
He comes to the conclusion (p.362) that "the semantic 
structure of a language may influence cognitive structuration 
where our physiological equipment allows for a range of alternative 
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solutions. But there is no indication that the basic 
organizational capacities are crippled through a crippling of 
language proficiency." 
The studies of the role of language in cognitive processes, 
though traditionally distinct from the typical mediation 
experiments, may in fact differ only procedurally from the 
latter studies. It was suggested earlier that we abandon the 
old term "mediation" in favour of a new system in which we consider 
the subject's task in terms of additional cues and associations 
provided by the informatjon formerly referred to as the mediating 
stimuli and responses. We can then conceptualise the subject's 
task as one of integrating and processing the available informatiori 
in order to arrive at a solution to the problem that has been set 
by the experimenter. Our interest in the problem of verbal 
mediation in judgemental processes then becomes centred on 
determining the influence of verbal information, as provided by 
stimulus labels, on the outcome of the judged similarity between 
the stimuli. 
Few studies appear to have investigated this problem in 
precisely the manner outlined above. A study by Nurminen (1965) 
however was conducted on similar lines to the approach proposed 
here. She associated 8 different Finnish names, which f~ll into 
two distinct classes, with 8 nonsense shapes, by paired associate 
learning. The similarity of the shapes was measured both before 
and after they had been labelled. There was a significant trend 
toward enhanced judged similarity between labelled shapes belonging 
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to the two classes of names, but a nonsignifican~ trend towards 
greater dissimilarity in the predicted direction, i.e. the labels 
enhanced similarity between shapes assigned to the same class by 
names but did not decrease similarity between shapes in different 
classes. The subjects were school children, and similarity was 
assessed by the direct approach. Other studies have used indirect 
techniques to investigate the effect of labels on similarity, e.g. 
Katz (1963). The results, however, tend to be confounded by the 
facts that similarity is usually measured simply as a bipolar 
judgement of "same" or "different" or the dependent variable is 
either the acquisition of a discriminatory response (often motor) 
or a measure of stimulus generalization. Katz and Zieler (1969) 
have also suggested that age of the subject is a relevant variable. 
There is some evidence then, that similarity judgements can 
be manipulated by appropriate pairings of labels with unfamiliar 
and hence potentially un-named stimuli. This raises a number of 
questions of theoretical interest. For example, do nonsense labels 
produce greater modification with unfamiliar, as distinct from 
familiar stimuli? What is the magnitude of shift in judged 
stimulus similarity when labels of various kinds are paired with 
stimuli? Problems concerned with the underlying dimensionality 
of the stimuli also arise when we add labels to stimuli. If it 
can be shown that labels increase the dimensionality of the 
similarity judgements, then we need to ask whether this increase 
is due to the labels as such or simply to the fact that we have 
added information to tbe stimuli, in much the same way as if we 
45 
had added a dimension of colour to taste stimuli. Other 
questions of interest are concerned with the way the stimulus 
plus the label are co~bined to p~oduce an overall~dged similarity. 
This thesis is concerned with an investigation of problems such 
as these. The theoretical background and an experimental 
investigation of some of these points will be examined in the 
chapters which follow, and the relevance of the results to our 
understanding of the relationship between cognition, labelling 
and judgement will be discussed where appropriate. 
CHAPTER II 
AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF 
NONSENSE LABELS ON TASTE SIMILARITY JUDGEMENTS. 
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The previous chapter included a review of the research that 
is directly relevant to the problem of determining the role of verbal 
processes in complex cognitive behaviour. One feature which emerged 
from the studies reported is that there appear to have been few 
attempts to investigate the effects of linguistic manipulation on 
individual subjective judgements. 
When we attempt to investigate the role of verbal factors in 
such processes as discrimination and judgement, a number of problems 
arise. In very general terms, the theoretical situation which is of 
interest to us is one in which we have a finite set of stimuli, 
which can be perceived to vary along a number of distinct dimensions 
or continua. We instruct the subject to structure these discrete 
stimuli as a series of points along one such continuum which he then 
does according to some intrasubjectively determined rule. For 
example, he may be required to assess the relative similarity of the 
stimuli, or he may be asked to rate them in terms of hedonistic 
appeal. The verbal manipulation that we wish to investigate consists 
of an attempt to alter the outcome of this rule by pairing some or 
all of the stimuli with a set of names or labels which differ from 
the labels that the subject is likely to have paired with the stimuli 
in the absence of the experimental manipulation. The experimenter 
does not attempt to al~er the rule by which the stimuli are ordered 
by a given subject (though he may in fact alter the way in which the 
rule is applied). Rather, he attempts only to alter the ordering of 
stimuli within the continuum by actively manipulating the labels 
assigned to the stimuli. We can, of course, expect to produce 
shifts in relative orderings of the stimuli only if the stimulus 
labels carry information that is relevant to the subject in his task 
of ordering the stimuli, and this additional information causes the 
subject to revise his ordering of the stimuli. 
An important factor which relates to the general experimental 
technique outlined above is the problem which will be referred to as 
lIoverwritingll. Given that we can overtly change the labels paired 
with stimuli, we assume that if lIoverwriting" occurs, then we have in 
some way altered the subject's internal verbal categorisation of the 
stimuli with which the labels are paired. This altered categorisation 
then becomes the basis for a new subjective ordering of the stimuli 
within the continuum that we wish to investigate. 
To be more specific, suppose we wish to manipulate the labels 
that are paired with a set of taste stimuli. We have decided that 
the subject's cognitive structuring or ordering of the stimuli which 
we wish to investigate is to be in terms of similarity of the stimuli 
to each other. That is, we use the subject's judgements of relative 
similarity as our dependent variable, and predict that our verbal 
manipulation of the stimulus labels should produce measurable shifts 
In the similarity judgements generated by the subject. Initially, 
we wish to answer two related questions: 
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(1) Can we demonstrate that "overwriting" of a subject's olvn 
previously-learned labels or categorisations of a set of stimuli 
occurs when new labels are experimentally paired with the stimuli? 
(2) Given that "overwriting" occurs at the subjective level, can 
we empirically demonstrate that systematic shifts in the ordering of 
stimuli within a subject's continuum of perceived similarity are 
produced by manipulating the labels paired with individual stimuli? 
It should be noted that the effect which we are investigating 
is necessarily second order. 
As Staats (1968) has pointed out, both the language used by 
an individual, and his experience of the world in which he lives, 
are to a large extent isomorphous with the physical environment. If 
then, we attempt to manipulate verbal processes independently of the 
physical processes which they describe, then we will produce a 
conflict situation in which the isomorphism breaks down and the 
linguist correlates of a physical event will no longer be seen as 
applicable or relevant to the subject's physical experience of that 
event. It is necessary, therefore, to study the effects of labelling 
under conditions in which the credibility of the situation will not 
break down, such as in judgement processes involving easily confused 
stimuli, or in situations for which the subject's sensory experience 
of physical events contains a lack of structure or a high degree of 
uncertainty. Even under such conditions we would expect, for the 
rational judge, that the effects of verbal manipulation will always 
be relatively small; perhaps something no larger than the traditiona] 
time-order effects of psychophysics. In other words, we would expect 
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that there is a limit to the effect that verbal stimuli can have on 
cognitive processes and one of our problems is to find out just 
what that limit actually is. 
The experimental pilot study described in this chapter was 
designed partly to investigate the points mentioned abov~ and partly 
as a very broad and general investigation of the role of verbal 
labelling in the formation of subjective similarity jUdgements. The 
experiment will now be described in detail. 
EXPERIMENT 1. (PILOT STUDY). 
The following experiment was performed in the University of 
Canterbury Gustatory Psychophysics Laboratory. (See Gregson, 1964, 
for a description of the relevant features of this unit.) The 
subjects were 20 undergraduate students from introductory psychology 
courses; they were serving for partial fulfilment of their course 
requirements. All subjects were tested individually, and none 
served more than once. Subjects were seated in a small cubicle 
behind a pair of sliding panels which were used to close off the 
service hatchway; they were thus able to make their responses in 
isolation and out of view of the experimenter. All responses were 
made to a strict time schedule which was signalled to the subject via 
coloured lights and a buzzer. The complete cycle of events on each 
trial, including an encoded stimulu~ description, was recorded on an 
Esterline Angus paper chart recorder via Massey Dickinson modular 
units. 
A set of 8 taste solutions was prepared as follows: 
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(A) Stimuli 1 to 4 will be referred to as simple tastes, since 
they contained only one substance (sucrose, sodium chloride, citric 
acid, or quinine sulphate) dissolved in de-ionised water (resistance 
greater than 2 megaohms per centimeter). An attempt was made to use 
concentrations that were of approximately equal subjective intensities 
(Beebe-Center and Waddell, 1948; Gregson, 1968). These concentrations, 
which are all well above threshold, were as follows: 
Stimulus Number 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Substance 
Sucrose (Suc. ) 
Sodium chloride (NaCl) 
Citric acid (Cit. A.) 
Quinine sulphate (Quin.) 
Concentration 
0.12 gm/ml. 
0.03 gm/ml. 
0.005 gm/ml. 
0.00014 gm/ml. 
(B) Stimuli 5 to 8 were mixtures of the 4 simple tastes. They 
were prepared by mixing 3 of the above tastes, in equal volumes but 
diluted to half the concentrations listed above, with a 4th undiluted 
or "dominant" component. (The 4 components, 3 diluted and one 
undiluted, were mixed in carefully measured equal volumes.) This 
produced a set of 4 mixtures which will be referred to as: 
Stimulus Number 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Description 
Sucrose dominant mixture (.suc. mixt.) 
Sodium chloride dom~nant mixture (NaCl mixt.) 
Citric acid dominant mixture (Cit. A. mixt.) 
Quinine sulphate dominant mixture (Quin. mixt.) 
The mixtures can be considered as impure or "noi sy 11 versions 
51 
of the 4 simple tastes. 
The experiment consisted of a 2 x 2 factorial design, with 
the 20 subjects divided equally among the 4 experimental treatment 
groups. In condition 1, stimuli 1 to 4, the simple tastes, served 
as standard stimuli against which the entire set of 8 tastes, as 
comparison stimuli, were judged. In condition 2, the 4 mixtures 
were used as standards, while the comparison stimuli were again the 
entire set of 8 tastes. The ten subjects in each of condition 1 and 
condition 2 were further subdivided into experimental and control 
groups. In the two experimental groups (one group in condition 1, 
the other in condition 2) the subjects were instructed to use a set 
of 4 experimenter-provided nonsense syllable names or labels to 
refer to the 4 standard stimuli. These labels were "zum ", "tov", 
"jeg" and "dax". The actual one-to-one pairing of labels with 
tastes was varied cyclically from subject to subject. The two 
control groups however, were required to generate their own real-
word labels for the 4 standards in each particular condition. A 
ten-point response scale of similarity / dissimilarity was used by 
the subjects. It consisted of the following categories: 
Identical 
Nearly Identical 
Very Similar 
Similar 
Slightly Similar 
Slightly dissimilar-
Dissimilar 
Very Dissimilar 
Extremely Dissimilar 
Completely Opposite. 
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These categories were paired with a set of 10 morse keys 
located to the right of the seated subject; a cuspidor was located 
on his left and ample de-ionised water was provided for the subject 
to rinse his mouth after each trial. The taste stimuli were 
presented as 10 mI. samples in 50 mI. beakers which had been raised 
to a constant 25 degrees Centigrade in a water bath prior to being 
presented to the subject. The stimuli were presented with a minimum 
interval of 45 seconds between each taste. 
The experiment can be divided into 3 parts: 
PART 1. 
The stimuli which were to be used as standards were presented 
twice to the subject; he tasted them in the order in which they 
are listed above. The following written instructions accompanied 
Part 1 for the experimental group subjects: 
"A set of four tastes will be presented to you. Please 
taste each in turn and make a mental note of the way in which they 
differ. 
The same four tastes will next be given again. Please taste 
each in turn and I will assign a name to each so that you can 
verbally identify it and distinguish it from any other tastes 
which may be given later in this experiment. When you have learned 
the four names for the four tastes, write the names on the sheet of 
paper provided taking care to write them in the same order as you 
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first tasted them." 
Instructions for the subjects in the control groups were 
identical, except that the words "I will" were omitted from 
sentence two. (Subjects in the control groups generated their 
own labels for the tastes.) Subjects listed the 4 appropriate names 
on a sheet of paper which remained in front of them for reference 
throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
PART 2. 
The purpose of this section of the experiment was to familiari.se 
subjects with the standards that they had just named, and also to 
provide a simple test to check that subjects could in fact distinguish 
each taste and pair it with its name. It also served to familiarise 
subjects with the key-pressing sequence. The instructions, for all 
subjects, were as follows: 
"You will now be tested to check that you are able to 
distinguish each taste and pair it with its name. It will also be 
necessary for you to state how similar you consider each taste is, 
to every other taste in the series. You will make these judgements 
by responding with the set of keys on your right. Suppose that you 
named the 4 tastes: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
and Cd). 
You will always make your comparisons and respond in the sequence 
Cc) and Cd), as you have just written on the paper. 
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Thus, if you decide, for example, that the first taste which I give 
to you is (c); then you may decide that it is (i) " s imilar" to (a); 
(ii) "completely opposi tel! to (b); (iii) of course it will be 
"IDENTICAL" to (c), since you have just decided that it is in fact 
(c); and finally you may decide that it is, for example, " very 
s i mil ar 11 t 0 ( d ) . 
Thus after receiving and tasting this first solution you 
will, on the basis of these decisions make the 4 key-presses: 
(i) " s imilar" 
Cii) "completely opposite l1 
(iii) "identical" 
and ' Ci v) 
"
very similar". 
And so on for each new taste as I present it to you. Your judgement 
of what the taste actually is, will always be given by pressing the 
key labelled "identical" but do not forget that responding is always 
in the sequence described above: Ca), (b), Cc), then Cd). 
After you have made the four key-presses, please tell me the 
name of the taste which you have just experienced. Remember you may 
only identify the taste by using one of the four names which you 
wrote down at the beginning of this experiment. When you have 
correctly identified each solution in this way twice, we will move 
on to the next part of the experiment." 
This time the standards were presented 4 times each and in 
random order: 
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Condition 1 Condition 2 
(Simple standards) (Mixture standards) 
4, 1 2 3 8 5 6 7 
2 3 1 4 6 7 5 8 
3 4 2 1 7 8 6 5 
1 4 3 2 5 8 7 6 
(1 refers to sucrose, 2 refers to sodium chloride; 5 is sucrose 
dominant mixture, etc. as listed earlier.) 
The psychophysical method employed will be referred to as the 
tlmemorised standards tl method. Basically, the subject's task was 
to judge a given comparison stimulus (held in the mouth) against 
each of the previously encountered standards (fixed in the memory). 
The stimulus being tasted was always judged against each one of the 
4 memorised standards in the order 1, 2, 3 then 4 in the case of 
condition 1 subjects or in the order 5, 6, 7 and 8 for subjects In 
condition 2. After judging each taste in turn against the 4 
memorised standards, the subject was asked to name the currently 
experienced taste, using one of the 4 names written In front of him. 
(His sequence of key-presses could also be taken as an indicator 
of whether or not he correctly identified the taste, since on each 
trial, one of the memorised standards was in fact identical to the 
comparison stimulus that he was currently tasting; and hence one-of 
the 4 responses on each trial should have been near the tlidentical tl 
pole of the similarity scale.) The sequence of events on each 
trial followed a time schedule which is outlined below: 
Time (seconds) 
o - 24 
25 - 29 
30 
31 - 45 
46 - 60 
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Signal Responses 
Red light. Rest. 
Yellow light. Subject takes comparison stimulus 
in beaker from rack, prepares to 
taste. 
Green light. 
4 buzzes. 
Subject takes contents of beaker 
into mouth and holds it there while 
responding. 
Each buzz signals subject to judge 
(Green light) the comparison stimulus successively 
against the 4 memorised standards. 
Red light. Subject spits out solution, rinses 
with de-ionised water and waits for 
next trial to begin. 
The 32 practice judgements made in this part of the experiment 
were not analysed; their function was merely to habituate the subject 
to the apparatus and the experimental technique. 
PART 3. 
The instructions for Part 3 were as follows: 
"A series of 32 tastes will now be presented. These may be 
(a), (b), (c), or (d), or mixtures of two or more of these 4 named 
tastes. To each one of the 32 give four responses on the scale, 
according to its similarity to (a), (b), (c), and (d) always 
considered in that order." 
Each of the 8 comparison stimuli was presented 4 times, in 
random order, generating 32 x 4 = 128 responses. The randomisation 
of the comparison series for all subjects was: 
7 6 5 4 
4 7 3 1 
1 823 
528 6 
6 8 5 7 
146 3 
231 4 
2 5 7 8 
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The starting point in the series was varied cyclically 
for successive subjects. Responses were made In the time sequence 
listed above and the sliding panels were closed to allow subjects 
to respond in isolation. Subjects from condition 1 (simple 
standards) encountered the mixture comparison stimuli for the 
first time in Part 3; likewise, the condition 2 subjects first 
encountered the simple tastes during this final part of the 
experiment. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS. 
The data were transferred from paper-chart continuous records 
to punched cards for analysis on the Un~versity of Canterbury I.B.M. 
360/44 Computer. The comprehensive programs used in analysis of 
the data were prepared in their initial versions by Professor 
R.A.M.Gregson, to whom thanks are due. 
Data from the 4 repeated presentations of each of the 8 
comparison stimuli were averaged within subjects to give a 4 
(standards) by 8 (comparison stimuli) matrix of mean responses for 
each of the 20 SSe The variances of the 4 entries that were averaged 
in each cell of the 4 x 8 matrix were also calculated. 
By averaging across the 8 mean judgements in each of the 4 
rows of the matrix, 4 baseline scores were obtained. A second 4 x 8 
matrix was calculated in which the mean responses were expressed as 
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z-scores about the baseline values obtained for each of the 4 
standards. 
Finally, for each subject, the grand mean similarity and grand 
variance were calculated by pooling the entire set of 128 responses 
produced by that subject. 
The entire analysis was then repeated using data obtained by 
pooling the responses made by the 5 subjects in each treatment. 
Much of this discussion will be limited to a consideration of the 
pooled results. For each experimental treatment, the 4 x 8 matrix 
of nonstandardised similarity judgements was further condensed by 
combining symmetrical pairs of comparisons to give a set of 26 
judgements between 26 stimulus pairs. 
TABLE 2:1 
Condition 1 Experimental Ss (Pooled data) 
Comparison Stimuli 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Standard 1 1.450 7.875 8.525 9.350 5.250 7.650 7.650 7.250 
Standard 2 1.600 6.425 7.400 6.000 3.250 4.950 5.400 
Standard 3 2.750 5.325 6.250 5.350 4.550 5.550 
Standard 4 2.000 7.250 6.850 6.150 5.550 
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TABLE 2:2 
Condition 1 Control Ss (Pooled data) 
Comparison Stimuli 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Standard 1 1.250 8.550 8.825 8.550 5.200 7.900 7.950 7.850 
Standard 2 1.550 6.000 7.300 6.150 4.350 5.150 6.050 
Standard 3 2.100 6.350 6.550 4.750 5.150 4.950 
Standard 4 2.350 6.800 6.900 6.550 4.200 
TABLE 2:3 
Condition 2 Experimental Ss (Pooled data) 
Comparison Stimuli 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Standard 5 2.850 6.800 7.325 8.000 3.750 5.350 5.800 5.850 
Standard 6 3.150 6.525 6.675 4.650 4.500 4.950 4.950 
Standard 7 5.800 5.150 5.750 4.750 4.400 4.850 
Standard 8 4.750 7.000 5.450 4.950 4.350 
TABLE 2:4 
Condition 2 Control Ss (Pooled data) 
Comparison Stimuli 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Standard 5 2.800 7.125 8.250 8.550 3.950 5.600 6.450 6.600 
Standard 6 2.800 7.100 7.500 6.450 3.650 6.000 6.350 
Standard 7 4.500 6.425 5.850 4.100 4.250 4.850 
Standard 8 5.750 5.700 5.300 5.400 4.500 
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The pooled data from the two treatments in condition 1 and 
the two treatments in condition 2 are graphed in figures 2:1 and 
2:2 respectively. The same data appear in Tables 2:1, 2:2, 2:3, 
and 2:4. (The standardised data were also graphed, however the 
bunching of points around the middle of the scale and the more 
frequent crossing over of the experimental and control group plots 
made interpretation difficult. It was therefore decided to restrict 
this part of the discussion to the raw or nonstandardised data only.) 
Both graphs show that the labelling effect is only slight 
when compared with the range of responses across the whole of the 
similarity scale. The graphs from conditions 1 and 2, which are in 
effect two separate but parallel experiments, bear a striking 
resemblance to each other in overall profile suggesting that much 
the same judgements are produced regardless of whether subjects use 
the simple tastes or the mixtures as standards. There is, however, 
a noticeable flattening of the graph in condition 2; this can be 
attributed to the fact that the mixture standards had more physica,l 
attributes in common and also were more difficult to discriminate 
and hence were judged to be more similar to each other. Furthermore, 
the error variances in the repeated measures were considerably 
higher in condition 2, suggesting a more frequent misidentification 
of the taste stimuli in that condition. 
Q. 
The factor of greatest interest here, however, is the magnitud 
of the relative shifts in judgements between experimental group mean 
judgements and control group mean judgements under the two condition~ 
The shifts on the Whole appear to be slightly larger in condition 2, 
suggesting that the labelling effect may be related either to the 
confusability or to the relative unfamiliarity of the stimuli used. 
This po£nt will be discussed in greater detail later. 
The direction of the shifts in relative similarity judgements 
shown in the graphs, suggests three hypotheses that may be fruitful 
to examine regarding the effect of labels on taste similarity 
jUdgements. 
Hypothesis 1 takes account of the fact that there is a 
preponderance of control group points which exceed in magnitude (on 
the similarity / dissimilarity scale) the appropriate experimental 
group points for each given stimulus pair. The hypothesis simply 
states that nonsense labels reduce the judged similarity between 
taste stimuli as compared with the judgements produced when subjects 
judge the same taste stimuli but use their own preferred labels. In 
fact, the graphs and associated tables show that 15 of the 26 pairs 
of points (57.7%) in condition 1, and 17 of the 25 pairs (68.0%) 
in condition 2 differ in the direction predicted by this hypothesis. 
(There is one pair of tied points in condition 2 which will be 
ignored in this discussion.) 
A more powerful hypothesis can be stated, however. A closer 
examination of the distribution of points across the similarity 
scale suggests that there is a tendency for the control group mean 
judgements to be more extreme towards both poles of the similarity 
scale. To evaluate this hypothesis it is useful to take some kind 
of mid-scale baseline. We then predict that when the control group 
judgements have a value which lies above the baseline, the 
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experimental group judgements will be smaller in magnitude on the 
10 point similarity scale. However, when the control group judgements 
have a mean value that is less than the magnitude of the baseline, 
then the experimental judgements will be greater than the control 
group on the similarity scale. This approach is not unlike the 
unfolding theory of Coombs (1964) in that we are interested in 
distances between pairs of points; one point represents the 
individual's "ideal point" (the "baseline" in our terminology) while 
the other point represents the stimulus in question. We would expect 
the actual value of the ideal point or baseline to vary from subject to 
subject, however for the present experiment it may be adequate to 
assume that the individual baselines will vary only slightly so_ that 
analysis of pooled data may reflect the underlying trends. 
There are two suggestions for determining the actual magnitude 
of the baseline. We can take the grand mean similarity, that is, 
the mean of the entire set of judgements made by the control group, 
as the measure of the mid-point or central tendency of their 
judgements using the scale of similarity. Alternatively, and 
more simply, we could take the natural midpoint of the scale, i.e. 
a scale value of 5.0 as our baseline. For condition 1, the grand 
m€an similarity for the 5 control subjects was 6.089; for condition 
2 it was 5.961. Using these grand mean similarities as OUF 
baselines, we find that 18 out of 26 or 69.2% of the observations 
in condition 1 and 19 out of 25 or 76.0% of the points in 
condition 2 fit the second hypothesis. (By using the grand mean 
similarity as the value for our baseline we allow for the possibility 
that the overall scale usage may be biased towards one end or the 
other of the 10 point similarity scale.) 
Hypothesis 3 uses the natural midpoint of 5.0 as the base-
line. In this case we get a better fit with 19 out of 26 or 73.1% 
of the pairs of points in condition 1 and 21 out of 25 or 84.0% 
of the pairs in condition 2 lying in the direction predicted by the 
hypotheses. Note that hypotheses 2 and 3 do not predict that the 
judgements produced by the experimental groups will always be 
intermediate between the mean judgements for control group subjects 
and the baseline. This more rigid hypothesis is not well substantiated 
j 
by the data. Rather, hypotheses 2 and 3 can be interpreted as 
follows: 
Let j,k represent a pair of stimuli to be judged against each other. 
C is the mean judged similarity produced by the control group. 
E " " " " " " " " experimental group. 
Then the two hypotheses state simply that 
If C jk:::=- baseline, then Ejk -======- C jk 
If C jk -<:::. baseline, then Ejk~ C jk' 
This model will be further developed in later chapters. 
Assuming that the baseline hypotheses do in fact represent 
the true state of affairs, what psychological interpretation can 
we place on this finding? It appears that one of the effects of 
using nonsense labels (as distinct from subject's own labels) is 
that the nonsense labels somehow reduce the perceived or judged 
distinctiveness of the tastes, as shown by a reduction in the range 
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of scale used by the experimental group subjects. (In fact, an 
additional control group in which no labels were paired overtly 
with the tastes would have been useful.) Perhaps the experimental 
treatment effect ca~ be attributed to some kind of strategy whereby 
subjects given labelled stimuli judge similarity not in terms of 
the physical stimuli alone, but in terms of the total complex, 
stimulus (taste) plus label. Since the experimental group, in a 
sense, judged a set of tastes with uniformly meaningless labels 
(subject to errors in the word association measures) , while the 
control group used relatively meaningful names, we would predict 
that the experimental judgements would show a smaller range of 
usage on the similarity continuum, in much the same .way as we would 
expect the 2 dimensional stimuli red square, red circle, and red 
triangle to produce a less extreme set of judgements than say, a 
red squ~re, a blue circle and a green triangle. 
The suggestion that subjects handle the labelled tastes as 
2-dimensional also gains some support from some results discussed 
earlier; namely, the observation that the judgements made by 
subjects in condition 2 showed a greater shift due to labelling 
than the judgements made by subjects in condition 1. The suggestion 
is that when discrimination between the tastes is more difficult, 
labelling becomes a more significant factor in the judgement 
task. (If we consider the labels as a second dimension, then in 
condition 2, as the gustatory dimension becomes more confused, 
greater emphasis is placed on the verbal dimension by subjects, 
hence projucing a greater separation of points for the jUdgements 
made by experimental, as opposed to control group subjects.) 
So far we have not considered the question of whether or 
not the trends noted in the data can be shown to be statistically 
significant. The major part of the analysis for this experiment 
consisted of a series of discriminant function analyses, which will 
now be discussed in some detail. 
The discriminant function was introduced by R.A. Fisher 
in 1936 as a statistical technique to facilitate the classification 
of objects or persons. The basic requirements are that each 
subject generates a set of measurements and that we have related 
sets of measures on the same variables in each of the alternative 
groups into which we wish to classify the individual subjects. The 
problem is to assign the subject to one or the other of these groups 
by appropriately weighting these measures to produce the 
classification associated with the smallest probability of error. 
In terms of the present experiment, given that we have 4 treatment 
groups, each with its own characteristic profile of mean judgements 
that is based on the pooled data from the 5 subjects in that group, 
what are the statistical probabilities that anyone subject will 
be classified as belonging to one or the other of the 4 groups? 
A priori, we know to which treatment group the subject actually 
belongs, but the problem is to show statistically that his response 
profile does in fact indicate his membership within that group, 
rather than within any of the 3 remaining groups. The statistical 
procedure for calculating the probabilities that a given subject is 
associated with each of the treatment groups is outlined in general 
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termQ in Hope (1968) and a worked example is discussed in 
Porebski (1966). 
The analyses reported here were calculated on the I.B.M. 
360/44 Computer using a program based on that developed by Dixon (1964) 
and Anderson (19~8) and modified by Gregson (1968) to give the 
Bayesian a posteriori probabilities associated with the membership 
of each subject in each of the treatment groups. It is necessary 
that the total number of subjects minus two should not be less than 
the number of scores or variables (in this case we have 8 x 4 = 32 
variables or similarity measures), otherwise a trivially perfect 
separation of groups is produced. For this reason the data were 
broken down into smaller blocks of 4 variables and 16 separate 
analyses were carried out; 8 analyses on the raw or nonstandardised 
data and 8 analyses on the same data in standardised form. 
In analyses 1 to 4, the 4 variables in each case were made 
up by combining, for each taste in turn, the simple standards 
judged against the mixtures along with the mixture standards judged 
against the simple tastes. Thus analysis 1 was based on the 
following matrix format: 
Sucrose 
Std. 
j Condi tion 
, Condi tion 
1 Exptal. 1 
1 
1 Contr. 1 
Comparison Stimuli 
Sucrose NaCl Citric Acid Quinine Sulphate 
- - - -1-'- -1- -; 
S Mo t {COndition uc. lX • 
Std. C dOtO on 1 lon 
2 Exptal. 1 
1 
2 Contr. 
Suc. 1 NaCl 
Mixt. 1 Mixt .1 
Citr. A. 
Mixt. 
Comparison Stimuli 
Quin. S 
Mixt. 
Analyses 2, 3 a~d 4 followed the same format except that the 
standards were sodium chloride, citric acid, and quinine sulphate 
simple and mixture standards. Analyses 1 to 4 will be referred to 
as the simple / simple and mixture / mixture analyses. 
Analysis 5 consisted of a different combination of variables: 
Comparison Stimuli 
ISucrosel NaCI 
IMixt. I Mixt. 
I I 
{ 
Condition 1 Exptal.1 Sucrose 
Std. Condit ion 1 Contr. I I 
__________ ___ J ___ L 
S M' t {Condition uc. lX • 
Std. Cd' t ' on l lon 
2 Exptal.l 
I 
2 Contr. 
I 
ISucrosel NaCI 
ICi tric Acid I Quinine Sulphate 
I Mixt. I Mixt. 
J _____ l _______ _ 
I 
I 
ICitric Acid IQuinine Sulphate 
Comparison Stimuli 
Analyses 6, 7 and 8 followed the same format except that the 
standards were sodium chloride, citric acid and quinine sulphate 
simple standards and mixture standards. 
The 8 analyses were then repeated on the standardised data, 
using the same combinations of variables as in the 8 raw data 
analyses. The results of the 16 analyses appear in Table 2:5. 
In all 16 analyses, the Mahalanobis D squared is distributed as 
chi-squared with 12 degrees of freedom; it provides an indication 
of the chance level for which we would expect to find the 
calculated probabilities associated with membership of a given 
subject in each of the 4 experimental treatment groups. 
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TABLE 2:5 
Simple / simple and mixture / mixture combined analyses: 
Raw data 
Analysis. Mahalanobis Signif. 
D squared. level. 
1.(Sucrose) 245.29 
2. (NaCl) 63.13 
3.(Citr.A.) 64.09 
4.(Quin.) 53.21 
Simple / mixture and 
Raw data 
Anal;ysis. Mahalanobis 
D squared. 
9. (Sucrose) 32.19 
10. (NaCl) 9.15 
11. (Citr.A.) 18.06 
12.(Quin.) 7.32 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
mixture 
Signif. 
level. 
0.01 
N.S. 
N.S. 
N.S. 
Standardised data 
Analysis~ Mahalanobis Signif. 
D squared. level. 
5.(Sucrose) 129.64 
6.(NaCl) 75.62 
7.(Citr.A.) 58.02 
8.(Quin.) 68.85 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
/ simple combined analyses: 
Standardised data 
Anal;ysis. Mahalanobis Signif. 
D_sguared. level. 
13. (Sucrose) 18.82 N.S. 
14. (NaCl) 14.84 N.S. 
15. (Citr.A.) 28.92 0.01 
16. (Quin.) 12.19 N.S. 
In general, the transformation of the raw data into 
standardised scores appears to have had little effect on the 
results of the analyses. The following discussion will therefore 
be limited to the results of the analyses of the raw data. 
It is readily apparent from Table 2:5 that the simple / simple 
and mixture / mixture analyses produced highly significant results, 
while the simple / mixture analyses tended to be nonsignificant 
statistically. There is some evidence that the experimental task 
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.became too difficult when subjects were required to judge 
relatively familiar standards against unfamiliar comparison 
stimuli. The discrimination process appears to have broken down 
with a corresponding increase in the error variance of the 
judgements made. This breakdown in discrimination can also be 
seen by referring to the frequencies with which comparison stimuli 
were apparently incorrectly identified. Since, for each subject, 
4 of the comparison stimuli are physically identical to the 4 
standa~ds, while the other 4 are closely related to the standards 
it seems reasonable to assume that for a perfectly discriminating 
subject the physically most closely related stimuli should be judged 
as most similar. For example, a subject in condition 1, given 
sucrose as a comparison stimulus would be expected to judge it as 
most like standard 1. (sucrose). If some other standard (2, 3, or 
4) was judged as most like sucrose, we can infer that the subject 
has misidentified the comparison stimulus. By this definition of 
misidentification, the following judgements between physically 
identical standards and comparison stimuli were observed to be 
based on incorrect identification of the comparison stimulus: 
Stimulus pair 
Sucrose / Sucrose 
NaCl / NaCl 
Citric Acid / Citric Acid 
Freguency of misidentification 
Quinine Sulphate / Quinine Sulphate 
o 
o 
4 
7 
9 Sucrose Mixt. / Sucrose Mixt. 
NaCl Mixt. / NaCl Mixt. 19 
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Citric Acid Mixt. / Citric Acid Mixt. 16 
Quinine Sulphate Mixt. / Quinine Sulphate Mixt. 16 
By a similar argument we would expect that sucrose would be 
judged as more similar to sucrose mixt. standard (and vice versa) 
than to any of the other 3 mixture standards. In this case the 
frequencies of misidentification were as listed below (the first 
member of each pair is the standard; the second is the comparison 
stimulus): 
Stimulus pair Frequency of misidentification 
Sucrose / sucrose Mixt. 13 
NaCl / NaCl Mixt. 8 
Citric Acid / Citric Acid Mixt. 19 
Quinine S. / Quinine S. Mixt. 14 
Sucrose Mixt. / Sucrose 2 
NaCl Mixt. / NaCl 8 
Citric Acid Mixt. / Citric Acid 17 
Quinine S. Mixt. / Quinine S. 10 
Overall, the total number of misidentifications for judgements 
between a familiar standard, and the relatively unfamiliar 
comparison stimuli which were not physically identical to the 
standards, totalled 91, while the misidentifications between 
familiar standards and identical comparison stimuli totalled 71, 
suggesting greater confusion in the simple / mixture judgements 
than in the simple / simple and mixture / mixture jUdgements. This 
may account for the failure of the former pairs of judgements to 
produce statistically significant results. 
/5 
We shall disregard the nonsignificant analyses and concentrate 
on the results from analyses 1 to 4. 
Although the analyses were carried out at the individual 
subject level the data and results from the five subjects in each 
of the four treatments have been pooled and averaged to simplify 
this discussion. The discriminant function analysis produces two 
sets of measures which show the probability with which a given 
subject can be assigned to each of the four experimental treatment 
groups on the basis of his particular set of taste similarity 
judgements. These two sets of measures are (a) the relative 
likelihoods and (b) the Bayesian a posteriori probabilities of 
group memberships. 
Since there are four treatment groups, we would expect, a 
priori, if the experimental treatment had no effect on the 
judgements generated by each subject, that each subject would be 
assigned to each group with a probability of 0.25. If only one of 
the two factors under investigation had any influence on the 
similarity judgements given by subjects, then subjects would be 
approximately assigned to two of the treatment groups with a 
probability of 0.5 and to the other two groups with a probability of 
0.0. In this way, the probabilities give us an approximate 
indication of the relative importance of the two factors under 
investigation here. 
Table 2:6 has been condensed from analyses 1 to 4 by taking 
the 5 subjects belonging to each of the 4 a priori experimental grou~ 
and averaging their a posteriori group membership scores to give the 
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TABLE 2:6 
MEAN BAYESIAN A POSTERIORI PROBABILITIES OF MEMBERSHIP IN EACH 
TREATMENT GROUP POOLED OVER THE 5 SUBJECTS FROM EACH A PRIORI 
TREATMENT GROUP. 
ANALYSIS A PRIORI TREATMENT UNDER WHICH SUBJECTS RESPONDED 
T1 (Cond. 1 T2 (Cond. 1 T3 (Cond. 2 T4 (Cond. 2 
Exptal. ) Control) Exptal.) Control) 
1 T1 0.6686 0.1131 0.0000 0.0000 
(Sucrose) T2 0.1693 0.6668 0.0000 0.0000 
T3 0.0000 0.0000 0.3305 0.2066 
T4 0.0000 0.0000 0.2099 0.3272 
2 T1 0.5488 0.4075 0.0089 0.1359 
(NaCl) T2 0.4076 0.5725 0.0046 0.0917 
T3 0.0007 0.0001 0.7062 0.2818 
T4 0.0429 0.0202 0.2802 0.4906 
3 T1 0.5032 0.3610 0.0065 0.1424 
(Citr.A.) T2 0.3552 0.6343 0.0002 0.0191 
T3 0.7215 0.0016 0.5446 0.3785 
T4 0.6938 0.0031 0.4487 0.4600 
4 T1 0.5031 0.3772 0.0134 0.0273 
(Quin.S.) T2 0.3316 0.5446 0.1708 0.0248 
T3 0.0848 0.0163 0.5768 0.3857 
T4 0.0804 0.0556 0.4060 0.5621 
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mean probabilities for membership in each group. (These mean 
probabilities are shown in the table.) The mean Bayesian a 
posteriori probabilities shown in Table 2:6 are plotted as a series 
of histograms in Figure 2:3. In all 16 of the histograms there is 
a 1 to 1 matching between the a priori and the a posteriori group 
memberships. That is, in all cases the largest a posteriori 
probability is associated with the actual experimental condition 
under which the 5 subjects in that group were treated. 
See Table 2:6. 
A second point to emerge is that the partitioning between 
treatment groups 1 and 2 as opposed to 3 and 4 is much more clearly 
defined than the partitioning between groups 1 and "3 vs. 2 and 4. 
This suggests that the first treatment factor (simple vs. mixture 
standards) is a far stronger treatment effect than the second factor 
(the labelling treatment). In fact, the statistically significant 
results obtained may be largely attributable to the first factor in 
each case - the labelling effect is quite definitely second order 
in this experiment. 
The most clear-cut partitioning on the labelling factor 
appears in analysis 1 (sucrose simple / simple and mixture / mixture). 
Keeping this observation in mind, we will now return to the question 
of "overwriting" discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Let us state, as an initial assumption, that the subject's 
own verbal schema under which he classifies a set of taste qualities 
can be overwritten by the experimenter to produce systematic shifts 
in jUdgements. The data analysed to date do suggest that such an 
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effect has been produced in the present experiment. We will assume 
then, for the present argument, that overwriting has occurred; that 
is, we assume that subjects establish verbalised conceptual schemata 
of taste qualities during their day-to-day interactions with taste 
stimuli in their environment. We can further postulate that the 
more commonly experienced, or more familiar tastes are more likely 
to have a label in the subject's schema than the less familiar 
tastes, i.e. 
Pro (that subject has a label for a given taste) 
= f(prior exposure to that taste). 
The above hypothesis can be restated thus: 
Pro (that subject's own label can be overwritten) 
= f(1 / prior exposure to the labelled taste). 
In other words, overwriting is more likely to be achieved with an 
unfamiliar taste like quinine than with a familiar taste like 
sucrose. However, the point mentioned earlier, that the influence 
of labelling is most marked in the case of sucrose, suggests that the 
hypothesis relating ease of overwriting to familiarity of the stimulus 
is not an adequate conceptualisation of the labelling phenonemon. On 
the basis of prior exposure we would expect (at least in subjects 
from typical Western cultures) that sucrose would be the most_ 
familiar taste quality, (or at least the most extremely overlearned 
labelled taste sensation, matched only by "salty"), and indeed the 
frequencies of misidentifications of standards listed earlier tend 
to support this premise. On the other hand, it also follows from the 
familiarity hypothesis that the simple tastes are more likely to have 
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already-established labels or names than the mixtures, which are 
very unlikely to have been experienced previously. On this basis 
the familiarity hypothesis would predict that the condition 2 data 
would show a greater response shift due to labelling than the data 
from condition 1, and although this tendency does appear to a slight 
extent, the increase in noise or error variance in condition 2 makes 
any such interpretation difficult. 
An alternative approach, which may lead to a clearer under-
standing of the phenomena underlying the present experiment is to 
examine the data in terms of symmetry. If s represents the judged 
similarity between stimuli x and y, then the symmetry principle 
simply states that 
x s y y s x 
In the present experiment it is possible to compare for symmetry, 
judgements made between labelled standards and unlabelled comparison 
stimuli only; in no cases were the comparison stimuli labelled. It 
may be of value to explore the following hypothesis in terms of 
symmetry of the data. The hypothesis examines the proposition that 
symmetry may be related to the labelling factor and predicts that 
greater asymmetry will be shown under one labelling condition than 
under the other. 
First, however, some underlying predictions and postUlates 
will be developed. Let us consider the stimuli in terms of the 
'engrams' or memory traces that we might expect them to produce 
within SUbjects. We can postUlate that memory traces differ in the 
degree to which they are differentiated within subjects and that the 
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differentiation relates to a number of factors including the 
following: 
(1) The degree to which the individual subject has been previously 
exposed to the stimulus concerned is directly related to the extent 
to which the internal representation or memory trace of the stimulus 
is differentiated. 
(2) The degree of differentiation of the memory trace decreases 
as the time interval since the stimulus was last encountered 
increases. (This postulated decay in the memory trace is considered 
to occur over a matter of minutes; it has been empirically tested by 
Brown (1958) with positive results.) 
(3) Shepard (1957) has developed the postulate that stimulus 
confusions and response confusions occur independently of each other, 
and that the probability of both occurring can be described as an 
exponential decay function of the psychological distance between 
the stimuli or responses concerned. 
(4) If a label which adequately conceptualises or describes 
relevant aspects of the stimulus is associated by the subject with 
the stimulus, then this label will reduce the rate of decay of the 
memory trace over time. In the present experiment, the judgements 
involve the comparison between a standard, which is carried in the 
memory, and a comparison stimulus (with its associated receptor 
input), which is actually held in the mouth while the judgement is 
made. 
We can now make a number of specific predictions: 
(a) Real-word labels will enhance to a greater extent the 
distinctiveness of relatively unfamiliar (undifferentiated) taste 
qualities, than the distinctiveness of familiar tastes which are 
already well differentiated due to more frequent day-to-day 
experience of the taste. 
(b) Nonsense labels will reduce the distinctiveness of tastes 
by overwriting their real-word labels with a meaningless 
"description" or "conceptualisation". 
We will now examine these two predictions In terms of the 
symmetry principle. 
Let A and B represent a pair of taste stimuli; s represents 
the judged similarity between them. 
If we assume that symmetry holds in the absence of experimental 
manipulation then statement (a) above predicts that the pairs 
and 
A (labelled) 
B (labelled) 
are unequal or asymmetrical. 
s 
s 
B (unlabelled) 
A (unlabelled) 
Let us further assume that A is a familiar taste and B is an 
unfamiliar taste stimulus, and also that when a subject cannot 
discriminate between two taste stimuli he will judge them to be 
highly similar. Now if, as we predict, labelling exerts a greater 
influence on unfamiliar stimuli then pair (i) above will be less 
precisely discriminated from each other (i.e. judged to have greater 
similarity) than pair (ii), since the unfamiliar stimulus is not 
labelled in (i). Thus we predict that a familiar taste judged 
against a less familiar taste will be judged lower (nearer the 
"identical" pole) on the scale than its symmetrically opposite pair, 
when the first taste of each pair is the one w~ich has been 
overtly paired with a real word label. 
T4is prediction was tested as follows. The four simple 
standards were arranged in a hierarchy of decreasing familiarity 
which was based on the number of misidentifications of each taste 
mentioned earlier, i.e. sucrose:=..= sodium chloride :::::-:-:::=.~ citric acid 
~ quinine sulphate. The symmetrically opposite pairs of stimuli 
and the responses given to them by each of the 5 subjects in the 4 
experimental conditions were tabulated; the results for the 10 
subjects from condition 1 only are shown in Table 2:7. 
Each column of the table is headed by a pair of taste 
stimuli. The first entry in each cell is the mean judgement made by 
a subject when the first of the pair of taste stimuli heading the 
column was the standard, while the second entry in each cell (in 
parentheses) is the mean judgement made when the second stimulus 
served as the labelled standard. Since the order in which the 
pairs are listed follows our hierarchy of familiarity, our 
predictions are that the first entry in each cell of the table will 
be of smaller magnitude than the second entry in the cell for the 
control subjects, since they used real labsls. For the experimental 
subjects, however, we expect the opposite to be true; the nonsense 
labels hinder discrimination rather than enhance differentiation 
of the memory trace, and so we predict that the asymmetry will lie 
in the opposite direction (i.e. the first entry in each cell will be 
of larger magnitude than the second.) In fact, if we neglect tied 
values, a total of 23 out of 28, or 82.1% of the points differ 
Suc.Std./NaCl Suc.Std./Acid 
1. 9.75 (9.5 ) 9.25 (8.25) 
2. 7.5 
~ UJ 
(5.5) 8.75 (8.25) 
~+> 
:: () 3· 7.5 (7.75) 10.0 (9.75 ) oj (j) 
, Or-;) 
~.o (7.5 8.0 (7.5 ) ~;:3 4. 7.5 < U1 q 
5. 8.25 (8.0 8.75 (6.75 ) 
6. 10.0 (8.0 ) 8.5 (8.5 ) 
UJ 7. 9.25 
~+> 
(8.75) 9.25 (8.25) 
) 0 
, (j) 8. 8.75 (9.25) 9.5 (8.25 ) , Or-;) 
~.o ) ;:3 (7.25) 8.0 (8.25) )U1 9. 7.5 
10. 8.5 (8.25) 9.75 (10.0) 
TABLE 2:7 
Suc.Std./guin. NaCl Std./Acid 
10.0 (10.0) 5.75 (6.0 ) 
10.0 (9.75) 5.75 (5.5 ) 
10.0 (9.25) 7.5 (6.5 ) 
10.0 (9.25) 7.5 (7.0 
8.5 (6.75 ) 6.75 (6.0 
9.0 (9.0 ) 5.75 (7.5 
8.25 (9.5) 6.75 (6.0 
9.75 (9.75) 5.0 (3.75 ) 
8.25 (8.0) 8.5 (8.25) 
8.75 (5.25 ) 4.0 (4.25) 
NaCl Std./Quin. 
7.0 (8.75) 
8.5 (7.0 ) 
·7.75 (6.0 ) 
8.0 (7.5 
7.25 (6.25) 
8.0 (9.0 
6.25 (8.0 
5.5 (6.75 ) 
7.75 (7.75) 
6.5 (7.5 ) 
Acid Std ./Quin 
7.25 (9.0 
2.75 (2.0 
6.25 (2.5 
7.0 (7.5 
5.0 (,4.0 
6.5 (8.5 
7.75 (4.0 
6.5 (4.75 ) 
8.0 (7.25) 
2.75 (7.5 ) 
CD 
\Jl 
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in the predicted direction for the experimental subjects while 
only 12 out of 26, or 46.1% of the points lie in the predicted direction 
for the control group subjects. For the ten subjects in condition 
2, the proportions were 13 out of 27 (48.1%) for the experimental 
group and 16 out of 28 (57.1%) for the control group. Of these 
values only the first, for the condition 1 experimental group, is 
statistically significant. The Binomial test produced a z-value of 
-3.212; the two tailed probability of gaining a value equal to or 
greater than this is 0.0014. 
The hypotheses have only been subjected to weak tests here 
however. The failure of the other 3 tre~tment groups to reach 
statistical significance means only that the predicted labelling 
effect did not necessarily exceed the suggested influence of taste 
familiarity. Our aim at this point is merely to exploit the data 
as a means of suggesting new directions for future research. 
This chapter will now be concluded with a summary of the 
main findings and suggestions for future research. 
Two distinct theoretical approaches have been suggested. 
The first, a trace decay model, assumes that our observation that 
different verbal labelling schemata can produce reliable shifts in 
subjective similarity judgements, can be attributed to a slowing 
down of trace decay caused by the pairing of subject-provided real 
word labels for the stimuli. It could be argued that when we pair 
nonsense labels with tastes, the uniformly meaningless cue p~ovided 
by the labels increases the generalization between pairs of stimuli 
and this increase in generalization produces the decrease in range 
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of scale values used in assessing taste similarities. The finding 
that labelling may induce asymmetrical responses to physically 
symmetrical pairs of stimuli can be attributed to the facts that 
(a) we would expect trace decay to be more rapid for unfamiliar 
taste stimuli than for familiar taste stimuli, and that 
(b) nonsense labels would be expected to have a greater effect 
on reducing the differentiation of unfamiliar than of familiar 
taste sensations. 
The second approach assumes that subjects treat labelled 
tastes as multidimensional stimuli and wffiight both physical taste 
and label as separate elements when coming to an overall assessment 
of similarity. Since the nonsense labels can be considered to add 
a set of uniformly meaningless elements to each stimulus we find a 
decrease in the range of scale usage when nonsense labels are 
paired with the taste stimuli. The finding that labelling induces 
asymmetry in physically similar pairs of stimuli can again be 
attributed to the fact that nonsense labels add perceptually similar 
cues to potentially dissimilar stimuli, but the effect of these 
labels on increasing the generalization between tastes is greater 
for unfamiliar than for familiar stimuli. We cannot distinguish 
between the validity of these two theoretical approaches with the 
present data. However, no matter which explanation we accept, it 
appears that by pairing unfamiliar or unusual names with stimuli 
we can "overwrite" the existing labels which are presumed to be 
used covertly by subjects to refer to taste qualities. Secondly, 
this "overwriting" can be empirically demonstrated to induce shifts 
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in the judged similarity between labelled and unlabelled stimuli. 
The results of this pilot study suggest that words playa small, 
but active part in the judgement process of human subjects; that 
stimulus labels can, in a sense, carry additional information which 
supplements the physical input arising from stimuli, and that this 
additional information influences the outcome of subjective 
similarity assessments. These points will be examined in greater 
detail in the chapters which f6llow. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECT DF NONSENSE LABELS ON THE 
JUDGED SIMILARITY OF RECTANGLES. 
In the pilot stud~ there was some suggestion that stimulus 
labels can playa part in determining the outcome of the judged 
similarity between pairs of stimuli. One explanation advanced was 
that the nonsense labels which were used were similar in "meaning" 
(or perhaps uniform in their lack of meaning) and consequently 
they reduced the degree to which differences in the actual 
physical stimuli were weighted by subjects during the judgement 
task. The labels thus reduced the range of responses generated by 
those subjects for whom nonsense labels had been paired with the 
taste stimuli by the experimenter. An alternative explanation, 
based on trace decay theory, was also put forward. 
However, a number of important points were not adequately 
accounted for in the experimental design: 
1. There Was no control over the temporal delay between 
presentation of the standard and presentation of the comparison 
stimulus which was to be judged against it. For example, presentation 
of the first comparison stimulus in Part 3 of the experiment,was 
separated from Part 2 in which the standards had been presented and 
labelled, by a maximum interval of 3 minutes, while presentation of 
the last comparison stimulus followed presentation of the standards 
by almost half an hour. 
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2. There was no control over the possible degree to which the 
memory traces associated with each of the 4 standard taste sensations 
may have decayed progressively over trials in Part 3 since the 
standards were only presented and labelled as such in Part 2. 
3. Of the total set of 8 taste stimuli, the 4 standards only 
were overtly labelled by the experimenter. There was no control 
over the covert labels which subjects may have assigned to the 
comparison stimuli during Part 3 of the experiment. Furthermore, 
we cannot assume that a subject who had learned to identify 4 tastes 
by using 4 nonsense syllable names during Part 2 of the experiment 
actually used the same names when these 4 tastes appeared as 
comparison stimuli in Part 3 of the experiment. 
4. Whenever possible, it is desirable to use each subject as his 
own control, rather than to compare groups of subjects as was 
necessary in the pilot study. 
The above considerations have made it difficult to formulate 
specific predictions about the way in which the judged similarity 
between pairs of stimuli would be expected to shift under the 
influence of the manipulation of labels. 
It is of considerable theoretical interest to know whether 
the labelling effect observed for taste is found in other sense 
modalities, particularly in the senses which are more dominant in 
the human, such as vision and hearing. There are advantages in 
using the sense of taste as a model sensory system, as Pfaffmann 
(1962) has pointed out. However, in the present experimental 
approach, additional disadvantages arise from the fact that the 
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stimuli must be presented sequentially, preferably with a fresh-
water rinse between stimuli, and with a time interval to allow for 
recovery from receptor fatigue and adaptation. 
It was therefore decided to conduct the following experiment 
using visually presented stimuli, with a minimum period of delay 
between presentation of the standard and comparisGn stimuli, and 
with all stimuli labelled in the experimental condition. 
One point which does not appear to have received much 
attention in the literature is the relationship between the 
cognitive processes involved in similarity judgement and the 
processes involved in typical concept formation tasks. Nurminen 
(1965) has pointed out that if the perceived relationship (e.g. 
similarity) between stimuli can be changed by pairing name8with the 
stimuli then this will have relevance to the study of concept 
formation. Part of the literature reviewed in Chapter I has 
concentrated on the role of stimulus labelling in concept formation. 
For example, Fenn and Goss (1957) found that labels paired with 
blocks influenced the sorting of blocks into sets, such that, in a 
sense, the perceived similarity in terms of certain relevant 
dimensions was influenced by labelling. It may be of some relevance, 
therefore, to consider whether similarity should be regarded as a 
concept or as a process (such as generalization). Wallach (1958)-
has discussed four ways in which psychological similarity has been 
defined. The first approach is simply to define similarity in 
terms of common environmental properties. This approach makes the 
invalid assumption that if common properties are present in the 
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environment they will be perceived. A second approach aims at a 
more operational definition by defining similarity in terms of 
common responses - if a person responds in the same way to two 
objectively different situations then the two situations are 
psychologically similar for him. For example, in the Shipley (1935) 
experiment the common response of winking made to both light and 
shock indicated their psychological similarity for the s~bject. 
Osgood (1953) and others developed this view that the common response 
itself constitutes psych6logical similarity - this approach has been 
discussed in Chapter I. Yet another approach discussed by Wallach 
is to suggest that neural traces are laid down along various 
dimensions when a stimulus impinges on the organism and psychological 
similarity depends on how far a new stimulus is located from the old 
stimulus on such a dimension. This is the theory of primary 
stimulation gradients; it is particularly suited to describing 
those cases of similarity that are based on generalization and 
discrimination learning. The fourth approach and the one which 
Wallach finds the most fruitful is to conceive of similarity as 
dependent on the application of a rule which leads one to assign 
items to a common category. Prior to making the assignment, the 
subject mus~ of course, learn the rule which guides the response. 
To quote Wallach, " recognition of the similarity of two 
events depends on their being classed as equivalent ••.. " (p.112). 
He adds that the classification rules seem to be influenced by two 
main determinants: (a) the nature of the instances presented (i.e. 
the environmental properties to which we have been exposed) and 
(b) our predilections for some bases of classification and 
prejudices against others. 
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This fourth view of similarity as proposed by Wallach bears 
a striking resemblance to the methods by which subjects are 
considered to identify concepts. Kendler (1961) for example, has 
defined concept learning as any situation that involves the 
"acquisition or utilization or both of a common identifying response 
to dissimilar stimuli". Hunt (1962), on the other hand, considers 
concept learning to be the learning of names, where a name is a 
symbol used to refer to a set; the concept is thus the meaning of 
the name (Church, 1958). Wallach (1958) further argues that by 
varying the basis on which we classify stimuli it should be possible 
to influence psychological similarity in predictable ways. That is, 
by facilitating or hindering the ease with which subjects can arrive 
at rules for classifying stimuli in terms of properties which they 
potentially have in common, we should be able to influence judged 
similarity. One method of altering the potential classification of 
a set of stimuli is by differentially pairing verbal labels with 
individual stimuli. According to Wallach1s fourth definition of 
similarity, then, if we can effectively alter the subject1s 
classification of the stimuli, we should also be able to manipulate 
the judged similarity of the stimuli as they appear under the 
altered classification scheme. This point will be discussed further 
in the concluding pages of this chapter. 
Early studies by Hull (1939) have shown that generalization 
gradients which are comparable to those obtained in classical 
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conditioning studies can be obtained by using appropriate 
instructions and scaling procedures which are not unlike the scale 
of similafity / dissimilarity used here. A necessary factor is 
that the stimuli on the continuum to which the subjects are to 
respond should be physically separated by equal intervals. 
It was proposed that the following experiment should 
investigate whether or not judged similarity can be manipulated by 
using names to reclassify a set of stimuli into new classes or 
conceptualisations which differ fro~ the ways in which the stimuli 
would be expected to be classified in the absence of the labels 
provided. 
By using a set of stimuli which vary in Slze along an equal 
interval scale, it is possible to make precise predictions about the 
way in which the gradients of judged similarity would be expected to 
shift under different labelling conditions if the labels do in fact 
affect similarity. 
Recent work by Katz (1963) has suggested that 
(a) the adding of a common label to two similar stimuli results 
in increased perceptual equivalence, and 
(b) adding different labels to the stimuli results in increased 
distinctiveness. 
Her work was based on the predictions of Dollard and Miller (1950) 
that when labels become associated with physical objects the 
linguistic cues will influence the generalization gradients of the 
stimuli such that (a) distinctive labels will reduce the initial 
generalization tendencies whereas (b) similar or identical labels 
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will increase the amount of stimulus generalization. Katz points 
out that a number of studies have confirmed these predictions 
(e.g. GOBS, 1953; Jeffrey, 1953; McAllister, 1953; Rossman and 
Goss, 1951; and Spiker, 1956) while others have produced negative 
results (e.g. Arnoult, 1953; De Riviera, 1959; Robinson, 1955). In 
her 1963 study she showed that when children learned to pair common, 
distinctive, or no labels with four highly similar nonsense shapes, 
the effect of the common labels was to cause the stimuli to be 
perceived as identical more often and to render the stimuli more 
difficult to discriminate in a learning task. In a later study, 
Katz and Zigler (1969) further demonstrated the effect, with the 
prediction, derived from Piaget (1951) that names may be more 
important for seven-year old than for nine-year old children. The 
subjects were required to judge the shapes as "same" or "different"; 
and a clear labelling effect emerged which was more pronounced for 
the younger children. The authors concluded that 
"Older children may be relatively insensitive to the 
verbal predifferentiation of stimuli and only allow 
such labelling training to influence their perceptual 
judgement in those instances where few other cues for 
judgements are available." 
Our theoretical approach differs from that of Katz et al in 
that we wish to examine the labelling process in terms of cognitive 
mechanisms as exemplified by the judgement of similarity, rather 
than in terms of stimulus generalization and discrimination. The 
approach adopted here assumes that the subject can clearly 
discriminate between the stimuli used and that his judgements of 
similarity / dissimilarity are based, not on generalization or 
perceptual equivalence, but on a cognitive weighting of the two 
disparate sources of information present in the stimulus complex 
shape-pIus-label. His judgement is therefore viewed as a cognitive 
transduction of the information rather than as a response based on 
confusion or inability to discriminate. 
It was also proposed to use this experiment as a pilot study 
for possible future investigations of the role of conceptualisation 
or classification of the stimuli in the forming of similarity 
jUdgements. 
EXPERIMENT 2. 
The stimulus continuum chosen for this study was an_equaL 
interval series of rectangles with successively decreasing base / 
height ratio but constant area. The middle stimulus in the series 
was a square; it served as the standard against which the 8 
remaining stimuli were judged. This stimulus series was considered 
to be potentially useful because it formed a set of stimuli which 
could be conceptually organised in several distinct ways: 
(a) A two-part series consisting of relatively "long thin shapes" 
(numbers 1, 2, 8 and 9) and "short thick shapes" (numbers 3, 4, 6 
, 
and 7). This will be referred to as the "linearity" conce-ptualization" 
(b) A two-part division of the stimuli into shapes lying on their 
sides (numbers 1 to 4) as compared with shapes 'standing on end' 
(numbers 6 to 9). This will be referred to as the "orientation" 
conceptualization. 
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(c) A series varying simply in base / height ratio (given that 
area is constant). This will be referred to as the "optimal" 
conceptualization. 
It was then theorised that if, by use of appropriate instruct-
ional sets, we could cause subjects to categorise the stimuli in 
different ways, then these different categorisations may influence the 
judged similarity of stimuli. For example, subjects responding 
to the stimuli in terms of linearity conceptuali4ation might show a 
displacement of points on the similarity gradient which corresponds 
to the boundaries between the "long thin" and the "short thick" 
shapes, whereas subjects responding under the "optimal" 
conceptualization would not be expected to show displacement. 
Although these non-optimal categorisations leave room for the-
extension of the present experiment to investigations of the 
influence of various conceptualizations on similarity judgements, 
it was decided to limit this experiment for the present to an 
investigation of the influence of labels in the optimal categoris-
ation case. 
To ensure that all subjects were aware of the various ways 
in which the shapes could be categorised, the three conceptual-
izations were pointed out in the instructions to subjects, with 
emphasis placed on the optimal categorisation. 
The aim of the experiment, then, is to ret ermine whether 
or not the pairing of nonsense labels with individual stimuli will 
induce a shift in the similarity jUdgements produced when subjects 
compare various rectangles with a square. There are two distinct 
classes of similarity judgements in this experiment: 
(i) Judgements of unlabelled rectangles against an unlabelled 
standard square. 
(ii) Judgements of labelled rectangles against a labelled 
square. 
If we assume that similarity judgements are influenced by 
the verbal labels that are paired with the stimuli to be judged, 
then two predictions can be made: 
(a) Rectangles which share a common label with the standard 
square will show a shift towards greater judged similarity to the 
square in the labelled, as compared with the unlabelled condition. 
(b) Rectangles which are paired with a label which is different 
from that paired with the square will show a shift towards grea~er 
dissimilarity to the square in the labelled, as compared with the 
unlabelled condition, i.e. stimuli possessing different names 
should show a decrement in judged similarity. 
Two distinct forms of pairings between nonsense labels and 
the geometric shapes were used; the counterbalanced forms 1(a) 
and 1(b) listed below were based on the orientation concept 
mentioned above while forms 2(a) and 2(b) were a counterbalanced 
alternating form of labelling. 
STIMULI 
Condln. 
1(a) 
1(b) 
2(a) 
2(b) 
1 
L1 
L2 
L1 
L2 
2 
L1 
L2 
L2 
L1 
3 
L1 
L2 
L1 
L2 
4 
L1 
L2 
L2 
L1 
5 
L1 
L1 
L1 
L1 
6 
L2 
L1 
L1 
L2 
7 
L2 
L1 
L2 
L1 
8 
L2 
L1 
L1 
L2 
9 
L2 
L1 
L2 
L1 
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Condition 1 thus allows us to examine the effects of labelling on 
similarity when the labels form the basis of a simple concept 
("all shapes lying on side have one label, while those standing on 
end have the other label"). Condition 2 however is unlikely to be 
perceived as containing an underlying concept, since the labels 
al~ernate, along with the added difficulty that the matching pairs 
1, 9; 2, 8; etc. have different labels. 
A series of eight rectangles and a square were prepared and 
photographed to produce black shapes on a white background. The 
dimensions of the nine shapes were as follows: (in centimeters): 
Stirn. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Height 3.60 4.30 5.00 5.70 6.32 7.02 8.00 9.30 11.20 
Base 11.20 9.30 8.00 7.02 6.32 5.70 5.00 4.30 3.60 
The stimuli thus form a physically equal interval series in 
which area is constant. The standard (number 5) lies in the middle 
of the series and the successively longer (or taller) pairs of 
shapes are all clearly discriminable from the standard and from each 
each other. 
Apparatus: 
This consisted of two tachistoscopic projectors connected to 
a control unit. A pair of electrically operated Alphax shutters 
were mounted in front of two Leitz (Wetzlar) 35mm projectors so that 
a standard 35mm slide could be projected for brief predetermined 
intervals onto the appropriate screen. The apparatus was set so 
that the sequence of events was as follows: 
Beginning of trial: Shutter of left hand projector open to 
'rHE LIBRARY 
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illuminate screen for 1 second. Closure of left hand shutter 
followed immediately by opening of shutter of right hand projector 
to illuminate the screen for 1 second. (Projection of the nonsense 
label was always from the left hand or first projector; the 
geometric stimuli were always projected on the right hand screen.) 
This completed the presentation of the standard; a pause of 
approximately 4 seconds followed while the slides were replaced 
with the comparison stimulus then the sequence was repeated: 
presentation of the label for 1 second followed immediately by the 
rectangle which was to be judged against the standard. A pause of 
up to 10 seconds followed during which time subjects recorded 
their responses on the prepared response sheets. 
The response scale used is shown in the instructions to 
subjects. (Category 10 was altered as it was pointed out that the 
phrase "completely opposite" as used in experiment 1 was in a 
sense inconsistent with the rest of the similarity scale.) The 
scale was used in conjunction with numerals to facilitate scoring 
of the subject's responses. Subjects were instructed to write the 
chosen response category number in the appropriate bo~ for each 
trial. 
In the initial unlabelled trials the same sequence of events 
was followed except that the left hand projector remained switched 
off to avoid a flash of white light on the screen. 
Two 4' square screens were placed adjacent to each other, at 
eye level on a wall in front of the subjects who were seated at a 
table about 8 feet from the screens. To avoid dark adaption between 
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trials, and to allow subjects to record their own responses on the 
prepared data sheets a blue-tinted 50w bulb was used to illuminate 
the room throughout the experiment. Care was taken to avoid 
distortion of the projected image due to parallax by mounting the 
projectors at eye level and perpendicular to the screens. 
The subjects were 32 college students serving to fulfil their 
laboratory course requirements in introductory psychology. They 
served as available either singly or in groups of 2 or 3. Subjects 
were seated at a table and presented with the following typed 
instructions to read: 
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1. (Unlabelled shapes) 
In this experiment you will be required to judge the 
similarity of a series of rectangles to a square. The square and 
rectangle all have the same area but differ in other ways. The 
square will be shown before each rectangle, then after the rectangle 
has been projected your task is to select a category from the list 
below to express how similar you think the rectangle is to the 
square. 
The categories are: 
1. Ident ical 
2. Nearly identical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
1:)2 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different. 
Try to respond as accurately as possible and do not look at 
your neighbour's work. Use the sheets provided to record your 
responses. You need only write the number of the response category 
which you choose, e.g. if you judge a given rectangle to be "similar" 
to the square then you will write a number (4) in the appropriate 
space on the sheet. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS. 
1. The shapes can be classified in a number of ways, e.g. we 
could arbitrarily divide them into 
(a) short, thick, as distinct from long, thin rectangles. 
(b) rectangles lying on their longer side, as distinct 
from those standing on the shorter end. 
(c) a series of rectangles with successively shorter 
bases (and therefore, successively longer heights, 
since they have constant area). 
For this experiment, please try to categorise them by the 3rd method 
above, that is, note that they all have the same area but different 
ratios of base to height; that is as the base lengths successively 
decrease, the heights increase. 
2. The standard square is always presented first; you are 
required to judge similarity of the rectangle to this square. 
3. Before we start the experiment I will show you the whole series 
of slides to give you an idea of how much they differ from each other." 
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The 18 unlabelled trials followed after a demonstration 
trial on which any questions raised by subjects were answered. 
The standard square was always presented first (on the right hand 
screen) followed by the comparison stimulus (on the right hand 
screen). Each of the 9 comparison stimuli was presented twice on 
the 18 randomly ordered trials. Subjects' response sheets were 
then collected and fresh sheets were handed out along with the 
instructions for Part 2. The 36 randomly ordered labelled trials 
then followed and subjects were instructed to continue responding 
as before. The instructions for Part 2 were as follows: 
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2. (Labelled shapes) 
Part of this experiment is concerned with people's ability to 
learn nonsense syllable labels when they are paired with geometric 
figures. 
On the left hand screen a 3-lettered nonsense syllable label 
will be projected at the same time as the square or rectangle 
appears on the right hand screen. Try to learn which syllable goes 
with which shape; there will be a test at the end of the experiment 
to see how many of the geometric figures you are able to correctly 
label. Please continue judging similarity of the rectangle to the 
square as before. 
The categories are: 
1. Identical 
2. Nearly identical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
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5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different. " 
The final test, in which the stimuli were presented In 
order 1 to 9, was included to attempt to force subjects to pay 
attention to the labels during the previous trials on which the 
similarity judgements were made. This post_test also enabled us to 
divide subjects into concept solvers vs. nonsolvers since in 
Condition 1 (easy concept) subjects either got the label-stimulus 
pairings completely or almost completely correct, or else they 
showed by their responses that they were obviously guessing. 
The four counterbalanced pairings of labels with stimuli 
are shown above; each subject served only once in one of the 4 
conditions. The labels used were selected from the list of 
0% Association Value (Glaze, 1928) and were as follows: L1 QAP 
L2 : ZIQ. 
Results: 
For each subject, the mean response category number was 
calculated by pooling the two responses to each comparison stimulus 
in Part 1 (unlabelled) and again by pooling the 4 responses to the 
labelled stimuli in Part 2. The mean response to the labelled 
stimulus was then subtracted from the mean response to the 
unlabelled stimulus to produce a mean category shift score for each 
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of the 9 stimuli that were judged by each subject. On the basis 
\ 
of the post test which was given to each subject at the conclusion 
of the experiment, subjects were divided into those who solved the 
concept involved (as shown by an errorless pairing of each label 
with each geometric shape) and those who had not learned the correct 
pairings during the four labelled trials on which each stimulus was 
presented. Approximately half of the subjects solved the relatively 
simple concept in Condition 1 but only one subject produced the 
correct pairings in Condition 2 where the obscurity of the concept 
involved meant that a strategy bordering on rote learning (the type 
VI of Shepard, Hovland & Jenkins, 1961) was the only one likely to 
lead to learning of the correct stimulus-label pairings. 
The mean category shift scores for each subject under each 
condition are shown in Table 3:1. 
The mean category shift scores were analysed using the 
discriminant analysis program outlined in the pilot taste experiment. 
In order to satisfy the formal statistical requirements of the 
method used it was considered advisable to combine concept solvers 
and nonsolvers into single groups and analyse only in terms of the 
four different conditions in which labels were differentially 
paired with the shapes. 
The analysis yielded a Mahalanobis D-square of 36.5Twhich 
is distributed as Chi-squared with 27 degre~s of freedom. This 
falls far short of statistical significance. However, when the 
mean Bayesian a posteriori probabilities were calculated by pooling 
the probabilities given by the 8 subjects in each group a fairly 
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TABLE 3:1 MEAN CATEGORY SHIFTS BETWEEN JUDGEMENT OF UNLABELLED 
AND JUDGEMENT OF L~BELLED SHAPES FOR EACH OF THE 8 SUBJECTS IN 
THE ~ EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS. 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
S1 1.00 1.25 2.25 1.50 0.75 -2.50 -0.25 -0.25 0.00 
S2 0.50 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 0.25 -0.50 -1.00 -1.00 -0.25 
S3 -1.50 0.25 1.00 0.25 1.00 0':25 0.00 -0.25 -0.75 
s4 0.25 2.00 0.75 1.50 0.75 -0.50 3.25 1.50 -0.50 
S5 1.50 1.00 0.75 1.50 -1..50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.25 -0.25 
s6 -1.25 -1.75 -0.25 1.75 1.25 0.75 1.25 -1.25 -0.75 
S7 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 -0.50 -0.25 1.00 0.75 0.25 
s8 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00 
-1.75 -1.00 
S9 0.00 1.75 -0.25 0.75 0.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.25 0.00 
S10 1.25 0.50 1.75 1.50· 0.50 0.75 2.25 0.00 1.50 
S11 0.00 0.00 0.75 -1.50 -0.25 -4.00 2.50 1.50 1.50 
S12 0.50 0.50 1.75 1.50 0.00 -0.25 1.00 -1.00 0.25 
S13 -1.25 -0.75 -1.00 2.00 -0.50 -1.50 -1.25 -0.25 0.00 
s14 0.25 0.25 0.75 1.25 -0.50 -0.25 1.00 -0~50 -1.00 
S15 0.00 -0.25 2.75 1.00 1.50 4.25 4.00 0.00 
-0.75 
s16 1.00 3.25 -0.25 0.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 0.75 0.75 
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Table 3:1. 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
S17 0.50 0.00 2.75 1.75 0.00 0.50 2.25 0.50 0.00 
s18 0.50 1.75 1.25 -0.25 -0.50 2.00 0.25 -0.50 0.50 
S19 1.50 0.25 0.00 1.75 0.50 2.25 1.50 1.00 0.00 
S20 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.00 
S21 1.25 0.00 1.00 1.75 0.50 0.75 -0.75 -0.25 0.00 
S22 0.00 0.25 2.00 0.50 0.00 -0.25 1.25 0.50 0.50 
S23 0.00 -1.50 2.25 2.50 0.50 -0.25 1.25 -0.75 0.00 
s24 1.50 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.25 -1.00 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 
S25 0.50 -0.25 0.50 1.25 1.00 0.50 1.50 1.00 0.75 
S26 0.00 -0.75 -0,50 2.00 0.00 1.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S27 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.50 -1.75 0.25 -0.50 -0.75 
s28 1.75 2.00 2.50 1.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 1.25 0.00 
S29 -0.50 -1.00 0,50 0.25 0.25 -0.25 -0.50 -1.25 -0.50 
S30 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.25 0.75 0.50 0.50 
S31 -0.25 -1.00 2.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 -1.00 1.25 -1.00 
S32 0.50 0.50 3.50 3.25 1.00 1.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.25 
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clear trend in the expected direction emerged. These probabilities 
are plotted as histograms In figure 3:1. The most clear-cut 
separations appear in the two counterbalanced groups In Condition 
1, where the mean probability associated with each appropriate 
group shows a relatively large separation from the three remaining 
groups in each case. The results for the two counterbalanced 
groups in Condition 2 show a less clear-cut separation. This could 
be taken as slight evidence that the subjects in Condition 2 were 
faced with a conceptually more difficult task; hence they performed 
less satisfactorily on it and thus provided less statistical basis 
f~ separating out differences in response profile in their data. 
The mean judgements to each labelled and unlabelled stimulus 
for the -8, subjects in each of the 4 experimental groups are plotted 
in figure 3:2. Note that in each case the judgements made to each 
stimulus (as compared against the standard) tend to show a general 
enhancement of similarity for each shape regardless of which label 
was paired with the shape. There are a number of possible explanations 
for this apparent shift In judgements bdtween the labelled and the 
unlabelled conditions. The fact that the judgements between 
labelled stimuli were always made following the judgements of the 
unlabelled shapes suggests that there may be a consistent tendency 
for subjects to redistribute their responses on the scale with 
successive exposures to the stimuli over time. For example, if 
on repeated exposure to the stimuli, subjects tended to see greater 
similarity between the square and the rectangles, we would obtain 
the effect shown in figure 3:2. However, this question can be 
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answered by referring back to the original data. If subjects 
tend to use successively lower categories on the ten point scale 
with repeated exposure to the stimuli, then this trend should show 
up within the 4 repeated trials that were given for each stimulus 
pair under the labelled condition. If we take the 1st and 4th 
presentation of each labelled stimulus pair in turn, we can tally 
the frequencies with which the response given to the first 
presentation of the stimulus exceeds in scale value the response 
given to the same labelled stimulus on its 4th presentation. 
For the 4 experimental conditions, these frequencies were 
as follows: 
Frequency 
Condition 1(a) 19 out of 72 or 27.7% 
" 
1 (b) 11 out of 72 or 15.3% 
" 
2(a) 23 out of 72 or 31.9% 
" 
2(b) 26 out of 72 or 36.1% 
There does appear to be a slight tendency for judgements to 
shift over repeated trials however the table shows that the shift 
is in the direction of greater judged dissimilarity over 
successive trials whereas the graphs in Figure 3:2 show a shift 
in the opposite direction. We can thus rule out the possibility 
that a progressive shift, over trials, towards greater judged 
similarity accounts for the enhanced similarity shown for judgements 
between labelled as distinct from unlabelled stimuli. 
This lends further support to the interpretation that the 
shift in judgements can be attributed to a labelling effect. Since, 
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in the majority of cases, the labelled stimuli are judged to be more 
similar to the labelled square than is the case with the unlabelled 
shapes, it seems reasonable to suggest that the effect of labelling 
is to produce a general enhancement of similarity regardless of the 
"meaning" that we have attempted to attach to the nonsense labels. 
That is, we have again demonstrated a phenomenon that is similar 
to the effect reported in the pilot study, where nonsense labels 
seem to act as a second stimulus dimension and reduce the judged 
difference between the stimuli, by overwriting any real-word 
categorisation that subjects may have assigned to the stimuli in 
the absence of nonsense labels. That is, from the subject's point 
of view, the labels ZIQ and QAP are handled as equivalent, (but 
secondary) cues in the judgement situation. 
As a statistical test of the hypothesis that the nonsense 
labels have enhanced the judged similarity of the rectangles to the 
standard square, a tally was made of the frequencies with which, 
for each subject's judgement of each stimulus pair, the mean 
unlabelled judgement exceeded in scale value the mean labelled 
judgement. The number of tied pairs was subtracted to give 162 
out of 240 or 67.5% of the differences in the predicted direction. 
The Binomial test gave a z-value of 5.36, which is significant 
beyond the 0.001 level. There is thus considerable support for· 
the hypothesis that the labels function as a kind of second 
dimension, in which the two labels ZIQ and QAP are functionally 
equivalent, and by virtue of the fact that they apparently add a 
perceptually identical cue to all of the shapes, they enhance the 
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perc~ived similarity of the labelled shapes. Since there was minimal 
delay between presentation of the standard, and presentation of the 
comparison stimulus, the observed shift in judgements cannot be 
attributed to the effects of labels on trace decay. 
A separate analysis of the data from Condition 1 was carried out 
to investigate the possibility that those subjects who had solved the 
"concept" may have responded differently from those who were unable 
to remember which labels had been paired with each shape. No 
systematic tendency emerged however; perhaps for some of the 
following reasons. 
1. Our criterion for "concept" solution was not particularly 
stringent. Many of the subjects who solved the "concept" may have 
done so in the final trials of the experiment only, so that the 
majority of their responses were made in ignorance of the system 
under which the shapes and labels had been paired. 
2. By pairing labels with shapes in this way we are attempting 
to force subjects to reorganise their conceptualization of the 
underlying dimensionality of the stimuli. In this sense we are 
pitting a few trials of experimental manipulation against a lifetime 
of learned conceptual organising responses. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the nonsense syllables did not come to acquire meaning. 
The manipulation may have been more effective if we had used labels 
like 'horizontal' and 'vertical' to attempt to force subjects to 
recategorise the shapes. 
3. The way in which subjects categorise the stimuli may not be 
related to the outcome of the similarity judgement task. 
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Gregson (in preparation) has pointed out that it is possible 
to take a theoretical position which states that similarity as 
such is a purely subjective event which exists entirely within the 
organism in much the same way as the perception of aesthetic appeal 
is considered to operate. It can be argued however, that all 
perception is In this sense subjective, in that the classification 
of the outside world into concepts, classes or stimulus relations 
exists only within the observer. The relationship between similarity 
perception and the perception of conceptual relations is considered 
to be theoretically significant by this writer, in that although 
the methodological and theoretical approaches to both are considered 
to be distinct, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the two 
processes may be closely related. Posner, Goldsmith and Welton 
(1967) have attempted to develop a psychophysics of form-similarity 
which is appropriate to the study of concept learning. A form of 
cognitive classificatory behaviour which has been termed schema theory 
by Evans (1967) can be considered to be related to concept learning 
in the more traditional sense. Rankin, Markley and Evans (1970) 
have shown that pretraining of subjects in the identification of 
schematic concepts significantly increases the judged similarity 
of the pairs of items comprising the concept. These findings 
appear to implicate similarity processing in conceptual behaviour. 
Brown and Danseraau(1970), however, report that somewhat different 
features of the stimuli are used in making classification responses 
and similarity judgements. This however, does not necessarily mean 
that the cognitive processes used in similarity assessment and 
118 
conceptual behaviour are different. However, the postulate that 
related cognitive mechanisms are used in the two processes would be 
strengthened if it could be shown that the verbal processes which 
are considered to playa significant role in concept formation 
could also be shown to play the same part in the perception of 
similarities. It was decided however, to limit this research to the 
investigation of verbal processes in similarity judgement for the 
present. 
CHJ,PTER IV 
SOME EFFECTS OF QUALITATIVE LABELS ON 
TASTE SIMILARITY JUDGEMENTS 
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The experiments described in Chapters 2 and 3 made use 
of nonsense syllables as labels for the stimuli. It was pointed 
out that the apparent failure of nonsense labels to acquire 
meaning as a consequence of being paired with stimuli may be 
due to the fact that subjects already possess highly learned 
or overlearned labels for the familiar kinds of stimuli used in 
these experiments, and that these pre-experimental labels are 
difficult to overwrite during the few trials which are available 
in an experimental setting. An alternative approach is to use 
potentially unfamiliar stimuli and label them in a variety of 
ways using real word labels. If labelling is important in the 
categorisation or classification of stimuli, and this categorising 
process influences the judged similarity between the stimuli, then 
the judgements produced by groups of subjects under various 
labelling conditions will presumably vary systematically from 
grmcp to group. It is assumed that when a subject is confronted 
with an unfamiliar stimulus he will categorise it in terms of other 
more familiar stimuli. However, we need to determine whether or 
not this categorisation process can be influenced by using 
experimenter-provided labels. 
Recently, a new flavouring material has become available 
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which is rarely found as an isolated taste in ever~day life and 
which has complex qualitative characteristics. The substance is 
a nucleotide called Disodium 5' Guanylate (abbreviated D5'G) which 
is available in highly purified form; it is a white powder which 
is both readily soluble and fairly stable in aqueous solution. 
As a prerequisite to the experiment described in this 
chapter, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the qualitative 
gustatory characteristics of this substance. An experiment was 
conducted jointly by Gregson and the author to determine these 
characteristics. The experiment is described elsewhere (Gregson 
and Simmonds, 1971). 
In the concluding pages of Chapter 2, the role of memory 
in similarity judgement tasks was discussed in some detail. It 
was suggested that a temporal decay in memory traces might account 
for much of the variability in the responses produced by subjects 
in the pilot study, but that the pairing of labels with stimuli 
may help to counteract the effects of trace decay. It was 
decided in the experiment which followB, to return to the experi-
mental approach used in the pilot study, with gustation again as 
the sense modality to be investigated. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate the effects 
of verbal labels (which vary in the degree of precision or 
adequacy with which they conceptualise the taste qualities present 
in a set of tastes) on the judged similarity between the tastes. 
It is postulated that the verbal input which can be made to 
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accompany the taste solutions may influence the processing of 
the information contained in the input, when complex cognitive 
manipulation of this information is required, such as is 
presumed to take place during the process of similarity 
judgement. 
The pilot study showed that there is an appreciable error 
or noise level in the responses produced when subjects judge the 
similarity between pairs of tastes. This does not appear to be 
entirely attributable to confusion or failure to discriminate 
between taste sensations at the sensory input stage of the process, 
since the four tastes used in Condition 1 of t~e 8Kperiment were 
clearly discriminable (the four primary taste qualities were used 
and all were well above threshold concentration). In keeping 
with the theory of trace decay outlined by Brown (1958), it is 
hypothesised that part of this noise level may be attributable to 
decay in, or confusion between the memory traces involved when a 
taste which is present i~ the mouth is judged against a set of 
standards which are carried in the memory. When labels are 
paired with the stimuli they are considered to slow down the 
decay of the memory trace and hence facilitate the judgement task. 
Presumably, the more information carried by the labels, the more 
accurately will the memory trace be retained as shown by the de-greB 
of discrimination between pairs of tastes. In particular, 
judgements made between physically identical pairs of stimuli 
should show a decrease in error variance as we increase the degree 
to which various qualitative aspects of the taste stimuli are 
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captured by the labels. As well as the effect of labelling on 
judgements between physically identical tastes a number of other 
labelling effects will also be investigated. These include: 
(a) the effect of slightly inappropriate or erroneous labels 
on judgements between tastes 
(b) the effect of identical labels on tastes of varying degrees 
of physical dissimilarity 
(c) the effect of labels which vary in the number of taste 
qualities which they describe in the solutions used in 
the experiment. 
A qualitative rating scale will also be used as a post-
experimental check on the qualitative characteristics of the 
taste stimuli used. 
Appendix I. 
PROCEDURE 
A copy of this rating scale is shown in 
Four master solutions were prepared in the following 
concentrations, using deionised water: 
3% NaCl 
0.5% citric acid 
0.5% sodium benzoate 
0.04% D5'G 
(0.03 gm/ml) 
(0.005 gm/ml) 
(0.005 gm/ml) 
(0.0004 gm/ml) 
Two mixtures were prepared from the NaCl and citric acid master 
solutions to give a total of 6 taste stimuli: 
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standard 1 : 3 volumes of NaCl to 1 volume of acid 
Standard 2: 1 volume of NaCl to 3 volumes of acid 
Standard 3: Sodium benzoate (0.5%) 
Standard 4: D5'G (0.04%) 
Stimulus 5: NaCl C3 .0%) 
Stimulus 6: Citric acid (0.5%) 
Stimuli 1 to 4 served as the four standards against which the 
total set of 6 comparison stimuli were judged. 
The choice of stimulus concentrations was largely 
arbitrary, but nevertheless was influenced by the following 
considerations: Stimulus 1 and stimulus 2, the two mixtures, 
·were made from master solutions of NaCl and citric acid. The 
concentrations used werethe same as those used in the original 
pilot study; these appear in Gregson (1968) and were in turn 
based on a study by Beebe-Center and Waddell (1948). They are 
considered to be approximately of equal subjective intensity. 
However, when mixed in equal proportions they do not apparently 
produce an equally salty and sour mixture and in fact even at the 
3 to 1, and 1 to 3 mixtures used here there seems to be a tendency 
for the salty component to dominate (as shown by the subjective 
rating scale responses given by subjects from the unlabelled 
conditions). The intention, however, was merely to create a 
fairly similar pair of stimuli for which several labels were more 
or less appropriate or relevant (e.g. "salty", "sour", 
"saltY/Bour"), in the sense that the labelled component was at 
least detectably present, if not the dominant component of the 
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solution. (Again, the rating scale responses gathered from 
subjects under the "no labels" conditions suggest that both 
components could be detected in both mixtures.) 
Stimulus 3, sodium benzoate, is a peculiar substance in 
that it elicits all four primary taste sensations at the 0.5% 
concentration used here, though it is predominantly sweet, and 
slightly less predominantly salty at this intensity. (See Peryam, 
1960; also Amerine, Pangborn and Roessler, 1965, p.115; and 
Gregson, 1969). 
Stimulus 4, Disodium 5'Guanylate, also elicits the 4 
primary taste sensations, although it is not certain as yet, how 
much of this response pattern is attributable to noise (Gregson 
and Simmonds, 1971). The concentration used here is the same as 
the strongest concentration used in the Gregson and Simmonds 
study, although this concentration is consiierably nearer the 
threshold than the concentrations used for any of the other 5 
stimuli in this experiment. Although this relatively low 
concentration may have cau,sed some subjects to fail to detect the 
presence of the D5'G taste, it was considered desirable to have 
at least one low-intensity solution, since this may provide more 
latitude for a "labelling" effect than would be possible with a 
more clearly supra-threshold sweet-tasting solution. 
In order to evalllate the psychophysical method used in the 
original pilot study, and again in this study, and also to gain 
information about the nature of the taste memory trace when 
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standards are carried in the memory, it was decided to use 20 
subjects as a comparison group using a form of the more traditional 
method of paired comparisons. 
THE PAIRED COMPARISONS GROUP 
Ten permutations of a set of 24 randomly ordered pairs of 
stimuli were prepared; two subjects responded to each of these 
10 different orders of presentation. Although the method of 
paired comparisons is rather cumbersome and does not generate much 
data in this context (one response for every two tastes, plus 
rinses between tastes) every effort was made to keep the method 
as closely parallel to the "memorised standards method" as 
possible. Thus to equate the amount of pre-judgemental experience 
of the 4 standards in both methods, the subjects tested under the 
paired comparisons method were given the same block of initial 
discrimination learning trials, in which the names "Standard 1", 
'Standard 2", "Standard 3", and "Standard 4" were associated 
with the 4 standards to a criterion of at least one errorless 
identification of the set of 4 standards. To counteract for any 
tendency towards asymmetry of judgement of pairs (i.e. A cf B may 
not produce the same judgement as B cf A), within certain limits 
which are outlined below, the standard was presented"once as the 
first taste in each pair, and once as the second taste in the 
pair. The limitations mentioned are that, in order to cut down 
on the number of tastings and rinses made by each subject, the self-
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comparison pairs (Stimulus 1 with 1; 2 with 2, etc.) were 
presented only once in the series. Also since stimuli 5 and 
6 are not used as standards in the IImemorised standards ll method 
with the result that there is no counterbalancing for asymmetry 
there, stimuli 5 and 6 were never presented as the first of a 
pair in the method of paired comparisons used here. 
The total set of paired comparisons made by each subject 
then (shown here in nonrandomised order) was as follows: 
1 : 1 2: 1 3: 1 4: 1 1 :4 2:4 3:4 4:4 
1:2 2:2 3:2 4:2 1 :5 2:5 3:5 4:5 
1 :3 2:3 3:3 4:3 1:6 2:6 3:6 4:6 
The instructions to subjects used in the method of paired 
comparisons were as follows: 
11 INSTRUCTIONS FOR METHOD OF PAIRED COMPARISONS 
As part of this research program~e, it is necessary to 
determine the similarity between a number of different tastes. 
These tastes will be presented to you in pairs; you are required 
to judge the similarity of the second taste in each pair to the 
first taste in that pair. Please communicate your judgement by 
pressing the appropriate key on your right. For example, if you 
decide that the second taste of a pair is identical to the first 
taste then you will press the key labelled "identical". If you 
think the two tastes are completely different, then you will 
press the key opposite the label "completely different", and so on. 
Please try to make your judgements as accurate as possible, 
and follow the sequence of events as outlined below: 
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GREEN LIGHT: Rinse with water, rest and wait. 
RED LIGHT: Pick up the sample and prepare to taste. 
YELLOW LIGHT: Take the sample into the mouth, roll it around the 
tongue, and note its precise taste. 
GREEN LIGHT: Spit out in the cuspidor, rinse with water, and 
RED LIGHT: 
wai t. 
Pick up the second sample of the pair and prepare 
to taste. 
YELLOW LIGHT: Taste the sample, and note its similarity to the 
first taste of the pair. 
GREEN LIGHT: Hold the solution in your mouth while you make the 
key-press (I will press the buzzer when I want you. 
to respond), then spit out, rinse, and rest until 
we are ready to go on to the next pair. 
The tastes are all perfectly pure and harmless substances. 
ADDITIONAL NOTE 
Before we go on with the main part of the experiment as 
outlined above, it is necessary that you become familiar with 
four of the tastes that I will be presenting to you. These tastes 
will be presented to you in beakers labelled Standard 1, Standard 2, 
Standard 3, and Standard 4. It is essential that you learn which 
name belong to each taste before we go on with the main part of the 
experiment. (To test you ability to identify and name each taste, 
I will sometirr,es present them to you in unlabelled beakers and in 
different orders.) " 
The tastes were presented approximately at the rate of one 
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rinse plus taste per minute; the sequence of events is shown in 
the instructions. Each subject also completed one form of the 
qualitati~e rating scale for each of the four standards (i.e. 
four forms per subject). The information obtained from these 
ratings provided a pool of suitable labels to be used in the 
"memorised stands.rds" part of the experiment. To facilitate 
choice of the dominant taste sensation present in each standard, 
eight of the subjects were instructed to tick only one descriptive 
category on each form for each standard. 
THE "MEMORISED STANDARDS" GROUP 
The procedure for this group was basically the same as that 
used in the original pilot study. As with the paired comparisons 
group, subjects first learned to identify the four standards by name 
to a criterion of at least one errorless trial. The actual names 
used to label each taste were then pinned inside the subject's 
cubicle at eye level in front of him; the labels used are shown 
for all four experimental conditions shown in Table 4:1. 
-' ... ' 
TABLE 4:1 
"No Labels" "Contradicting "Partial Labels" "Complete Labels" 
Labels" 
STANDARD CONDITION 1 CONDITION 2 CONDITION 3 CONDITION 4 
1 . (NaCl + Acid) "Standard 1 " llSalty llSalty "Salty/Sour 
Standard 1" Standard 1" Standard 1" 
2. (Acid + NaCl) "Standard 2" "Sour Standard 2" llSour Standard 2" "Sour/Salty 
Stand,3.rd 2ll 
3. (Sod. Benz.) "Standard 3 ll "Sweet "Sweet "Sweet/Bitter 
Standard 3 11 Standard 3" Standard 3" 
4. (D5'G) "Standard 4" "Sweet "Sweet "Bitter 
Standard 4" Standard 4" Standard 4" 
COMPARISON CONDITION 1 CONDITION 2 COl'JDI'rION 3 CONDI'rION 4 STIMULUS 
1 • (NaCl + Acid) "Sal ty /Sour" II Sal ty" II Sal ty /Sour" 
2. (Acid + NaCl) llSour/Salty" " Sour" "Sour /Sal ty" 
3. (Sod. Benz. ) "Sweet/Bi tter" " Sweet" " Swe et/Bi t t er" 
4. (D5'G) "Bi tterll " Sweet" "Bi tter" 
5. (NaCl) "Pure Sal tyll " Sal tyll "Pure Salty" 
6. (Acid) "Pure Sourll " Sour" "Pure Sour" 
In all conditions except for Condition 1, the comparison stimuli were also labelled; 
sometimes with the corresponding tastes bearing the same labels as the standards 
(Conditions 3 and 4), sometimes with different labels (Condition 2) or with no labels 
(Condition 1). 
-> 
I\J 
\.0 
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Condition 1 - the "no l3.bels" condition - serves as a 
control on the labelled conditions, and also allows a direct 
comparison between the "memorised" standards method and the method 
of paired comparisons. Condition 2 will.be referred to as the 
"contradicting labels" condition as the standards and the 
comparison stimuli are labelled. in slightly different ways. Note 
that the D5'G is labelled as "Sweet" when tasted as a standard, 
but is labelled "Bitter" when it appears in the comparison series. 
In Condition 3, the labels only partially capture the total 
taste sensations that are present in the solutions - this is 
referred to as the "partial labels" condition. 
The labels used in Condition 4 more completely describe 
each taste, and, unlike Condition 3, no two tastes within the 
six comparison series tastes share the same label. Condition 4 
will thus be referred to as the "complete labels" condition. 
In all 4 conditions, each subject judged each of the six 
comparison stimuli against the four memorised standards a total 
of 4 times in random order. Five different permutations of the 
6 x 4 = 24 comparison stimuli were prepared and two subjects 
served under each permutation, giving 10 subjects in each of the 
four labelling conditions. 
The "memorised standards"method has been summarised in 
Chapter 2. The essential features of the method are that, after 
the initial discrimination training with the standards, they are 
not experienced as such again, although they occur in physically 
identical form in the comparison series. (Subject is not informed 
131 
that these tastes are identical to the standards). The subject's 
task, on tasting a given comparison stimulus, is to judge the 
similarity of this taste, while he holds it in his mouth, 
against his memory trace of the four stand~rds as initially 
experienced. The four judgements are made cOilsecutively, always 
responding in the order of comparison of the stimulus with 
standard 1 followed by 2, 3, and 4. The tastes were presented 
at the rate of approximately one per minute; there was a rinse 
between each taste and the 4 responses to each taste were made 
during the minute. Other details can be found in the instructions 
to subjects, which are given below. 
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR "MEMORISED STANDARDS" METHOD 
In this experiment you will be required to judge the 
similarity between various tastes by responding on the bank of 
keys on your right. You will first be presented with a set of 
four tastes called standards and your task is to judge the 
similarity of a number of tastes to each standard in turn. To 
make the task as simple as possible for you I will present the 
tastes in labelled beakers. It will be necessary for you to 
first learn which name goes with each one of the standards, which 
are clearly labelled Standard 1, Standard 2, Standard 3, and 
Standard 4. The same name will always be paired with the same 
taste, and it is essential that you learn the name of each one of 
these tastes before we proceed further with the experiment. (I 
will sometimes present the standard without giving you its name 
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to see if you can correctly identify it.) 
After you have learned the names for each of the standards 
1 to 4, I will then present another set of tastes, and you are to 
judge how similar each taste is to each of the four standards in 
turn. That is, you will make four key-presses for every taste 
in turn; the first keypress expressing the similarity of the 
present taste to Standard 1, the second press representing the 
similarity of this taste to Standard 2, and so on for Standards 3 
and 4. Please hold the taste in your mouth while you are making 
your responses, and follow the sequence of events as listed in the 
table below. 
substances. 
The tastes are all perfectly pure and harmless 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR SIMILARITY JUDGEMENTS 
GREEN LIGHT: Rest 
YELLOW LIGHT: Pick up beaker, read the label, and prepare to 
taste. 
RED LIGHT: 
GREEN LIGHT: 
1st buzz: 
2nd buzz: 
3rd buzz: 
4th buzz: 
Take full contents of beaker into mouth, roll it 
around the tongue, and note its precise taste as 
compared with the other tastes that you have 
experienced so far in this experiment. 
Make jUdgements by pressing the appropriate keys. 
I will press the buzzer four times: 
Judge similarity of taste tp Standard 1 
Judge similarity of taste to Standard 2 
Judge similarity of taste to Standard 3 
Judge similarity of taste to Standard 4 
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Spit out in cuspidor, rinse with water, then rest and wait for 
the next stimulus. II 
RESULTS 
The results were transposed directly from Esterline Angus 
charts to 5 4 x 6 matrix charts. The first 4 rows of each 6 x 4 
matrix were condensed into a half matrix by combining symmetrically 
opposite pairs of judgements to give five 18 cell tables of the 
following form: 
1 
2 
3 
Stimuli 
4 
5 
6 
1 
1 : 1 
1 : 5 
1 :6 
Standards 
2 
1 :2 
2:2 
2:5 
2:6 
3 
1 :3 
2:3 
3:3 
3:5 
3:6 
4 
1 :4 
2:4 
3:4 
4:4 
4:5 
4:6 
In order to determine whether or not the judgements 
between stimuli were influenced by the labels paired with the 
stimuli, four discriminant function analyses were carried out to 
compare the judgements made between a given standard and the six 
comparison stimuli under the 4 labelling conditions. Thus, for 
example, analysis 1 compared the judgements made by the 10 
subjects in each of the 4 labelling groups when Standard 1 was 
compared with each of the 6 comparison stimuli. The data from 
the paired comparisons control group was not included in these 
analyses as any differences in the data produced by the method 
used may have spuriously increased the value of the Mahalanobis 
D-squares produced by the analyses. 
analyses are shown below: 
The resul~s of the four 
Analysis number: 
(salty/sour standard) 
(sour/salty standard) 
(sodium Benzoate standard) 
D5'G standard) 
Mahalanobis D-squared 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
102.56 
64.56 
43.95 
55.82 
The Mahalanobis D-squared is distributed as chi-squared 
with 18 degrees of freedom. 
beyond the 0.005 level. 
All 4 analyses were significant 
Table 4:2 shows the frequencies with which the 10 subjects 
in each experimental group were in fact assigned to each group on 
the basis of the largest discriminant function calculated from 
their particular sets of similarity judgement scores. (The 
figures in parenthesis give the mean Bayesian probability 
associated with the largest discriminant function for the n 
subjects that were assigned a posteriori to each group.) 
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TABLE 4:2 
ANALYSIS 1 
(Salty/Sour Standard) 
Experimental Group No. of subjects assigned to each group 
1 • (Contradicting labels) Group 1 8 (0.8542) 
(abbreviated K.L.) Group 2 1 (0.8208) 
Group 3 1 (0.8467) 
Group 4 0 
2. (no labels) Group 1 1 (0.9301) 
(N.L. ) Group 2 7 (0.7975) 
Group 3 1 (0.4218) 
Group 4 1 (0.7276) 
3. (Partial labels) Group 1 2 (0.62611 
(P.L. ) Group 2 0 
Group 3 8 (0.7959) 
Group 4 0 
4. (Complete labels) Group 1 0 
(C.L. ) Group 2 0 
Group 3 0 
Group 4 10 (0.8147) 
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TABLE 4:2 
ANALY.3rS 2 
(Sour/Salty Standard) 
Experimental Group No. of subjects assigned to each group 
1 . (Contradicting labels) Group 1 6 (0.6057) 
Group 2 2 (0.6723) 
Group 3 1 (0.6405) 
Group 4 1 (0.4737) 
2. (No labels) Group 1 3 (0.5708) 
Group 2 5 (0.7710) 
Group 3 0 
Group 4 2 (0.6249) 
3. (Partial labels) Group 1 4 (0.4421) 
Group 2 0 
Group 3 5 (0.8335) 
Group 4 1 (0.4091) 
4. (Complete labels) Group 1 1 (0.5289) 
Group 2 0 
Group 3 0 
Group 4 9 (0.6775) 
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TABLE 4:2 
ANALYSIS 3 
(Sodium Benzoate Standard) 
Experimental Group No. of subjects assigned to each group 
1 • (Contradicting labels) Group 1 8 (0.6302) 
Group 2 0 
Group 3 2 (0.6012) 
Group 4 0 
2. (No labels) Group 1 1 (0.4814) 
Group 2 4 (0.7357) 
Group 3 1 (0.7525) 
Group 4 4 (0.5920) 
3. (Partial labels) Group 1 2 (0.5036) 
Group 2 1 (0.5128) 
Group 3 6 (0.5725) 
Group 4 1 (0.5298) 
4. (Complete labels) Group 1 1 (0.3937) 
Group 2 2 (005599) 
Group 3 2 (0.3546) 
4 
1- (0.6308) Group 5 
TABLE 4:2 
ANALYSIS 4 
(D5'G Standard) 
Experimental Group No. of subjects assigned to each group 
and mean probability associated with 
the largest discriminant function. 
1 . (Contradicting labels) Group 1 6 (0.9740) 
Group 2 3 (0.3699) 
Group 3 1 (0.3152) 
Group 4 0 
2. (No labels) Group 1 0 
Group 2 3 (0.8536) 
Group 3 6 (0.4661) 
Group 4 1 (0.5380) 
3. (Partial labels) Gro1,-p 1 2 (0.5694) 
Group 2 1 (0.4891) 
Group 3 3 (0.4483) 
Group 4 4 (0.4966) 
4. (Complete labels) Group 1 0 
Group 2 1 (0.4819) 
Group 3 3 (0.4135) 
Group 4 6 (0.5803) 
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In the majority of cases the a posteriori assignments of 
subjects to groups corresponds to the actual experimental 
assignments suggesting that the manipulation of labels has 
produced fairly consistent influences on the responses generated 
by individual subjects. Note that the relationship between a 
priori and a posteriori groupings shows the highest agreement for 
the salty/sour standard and the poorest correspondence for the 
D5'G standard. The mean responses made to each pair of stimuli 
were averaged by pooling across the ten subjects in the four 
experimental groups and the 20 subjects in the paired comparisons 
control group. These means are plotted in Figures 4:1 and 4:2. 
In order to clarify the relationships between the jUdgements made 
under each labelling condition, the pairs of tastes have been 
arranged in decreasing order of similarity (for the responses 
produced by the "no labels" control group) along the X-axis 
of the graphs. Figure 4:1 shows the shifts in judgements 
produced when the "complete labels" and "partial labels" groups 
are compared with the "no labels" control group. Note that in 
both of the groups with labels the following general trends emerge: 
1. For jUdgements below a scale value of approximately 5.0 the 
labelling has enhanced the judged similarity; this enhancement 
tends to be greater for the "complete labels" group than for the 
"partial labels" group. Note that in both cases the labels for 
standards and for comparison stimuli are identical for the same 
stimuli within each group, and also that of the total set of six 
stimuli in the "complete labels" group each has a different name 
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while i~ the partial labels group two different stimuli are 
paiced with each of the three names. Because of this "doubling 
up" of names in the partial labelB group, we would eXIJect 
discrimination to be poorer in the partial labels group than in 
the complete labels group, if labels serve as a cue to sharpen 
the memory trace and hence facilitate judgement. The grap~ shows, 
however, that compared to partial labels, the complete labels have 
caused similar stimuli to be judged still more similar but they 
have also caused dissimilar stimuli to be judged more similar, and 
not more dissimilar as we might expect if the labels were improving 
the subject's ability to discriminate. The reason for this trend 
may be revealed by further experimentation, however it should be 
noted here that the failure of precise labels to enhance the 
dissimilarity of dissimilar stimuli as compared with the effect of 
imprecise and confusable labels, does not support the postulate that 
labels facilitate judgement by improving the discriminability of 
stimuli. The effect could, however, be related to the choice of 
stimuli and labels in this particular experimental context. The 
fact that the "complete label" names mostly list two taste qualities, 
while thef~artial label~Ulist only a single quality leads to the 
possibility that stimuli which are completely labelled will have 
more name-cues in common and the possession of these common cues 
could enhance similarity between the "completely labelled" stimuli. 
This point is supported by the fact that most of the individual 
stimuli at the dissimilarity end of the continuum contain the word 
sour in one label and bitter in the other in the complete labels 
condition, but this is less often the case in the partial labels 
condition. There is evidence in the pilot study that the sour and 
bitter qualities are subjectively more similar than sour-sweet, 
sour-salty, bitter-sweet, and bitter-salty sensations. Confusions 
between sour and bitter qualities have also been reported by 
Robinson (1970) who concludes that the difficulty is one of naming -
"subjects seem to use the words 'sour' and 'bitter' badly". 
This fact alorre could account for the enhancement of similarity of 
otherwise dissimilar stimuli which contain the words bitter or sour 
in both the completely labelled standard and comparison stimulus, 
but not in one or the other of the partially labelled standard and 
comparison stimulus. 
Figure 4:2 shows the relationship between the pai~ed comparison 
control group judgements, the "contradicting labels" group, and the 
"no labels" gronp. Note that the paired comparisons show an 
enhancement of similarity and an enhancement of dissimilarity 
relative to the "no labels" group. Thus paired comparison judgements 
show the same wider spread of responding along the similarity scale 
that is produced when stimuli are labelled under the'memorised 
standards" method. This lends further support to the postulate 
that trace decay is an important factor in these experiments. When 
trace decay is minimal, as in paired comparisons, discrimination is 
sharper than wl;ten a temporal delay intervenes between presentation 
of the unlabelled standards and comparison stimuli. However, the 
trace decay which occurs as a result of delay between standard and 
comparison stimulus input can be largely eliminated by adequate 
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pairing of labels with the stimuli which are to be judged against 
each other. The "contradicting labels" group is also plotted in 
Figure 4:2. Note that when identical stimuli are given diff~rent 
labels (e.g. 4:4, 3:3 but not, contrary to predictions for 1:1 and 
2:2) judged similarity is reduced but when different stimuli are 
given the same label (e.g. 1:5,2:6) similarity is enhanced. The 
data presented in Figures 4:1 and 4:2 on the whole lend a 
considerable degree of support to the hypothesis that similarity 
can be manipillated by the appropriate pairing of real word labels 
with the stimuli. 
The mathematical model that we began to develop in Chapter 2 
can be applied to much of the data in the present experiment. 
Let us redefine the terms as follows: we shall refer to 
differentiated memory traces as D and undifferentiated or partially 
decayed memory traces as d. The symbol s refers to judged 
similarity between standards (i) and comparison stimuli (k). The 
baseline used will be the mid-point of our 10-point category scale; 
that is a scale value of 5.0. The simple model outlined in 
Chapter 2 states that: 
If we accept the finding that nonsense labels reduce memory 
trace differentiation then the model states that 
if D. s Dk > 5.0 then d. s dk < D. s Dk J.. J.. J.. 
and if D. s Dk < 5.0 then d. s dk > D. s Dk J.. J.. J.. 
In Experiment 1 it was noted that 73.1% of the points in Condition 1 
and 84.0% of the points in Condition 2 fitted this simple model. 
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For two tailed probabilities, the binomial test shows that the 
data for Condition 1 is significant beyond the 0.05 level while 
the data for Condition 2 is significant beyond the 0.01 level. 
The model, in its above form, Can be applied to the present 
data. We have postulated that real-word labels enhance memory trace 
differentiation. We therefore predict that, compared to the no-
labels control group, both the partial labels and the complete 
labels groups will show increased differentiation. For the 
partial labels group, 14 out of 18, or 77.7% of the observations 
fit the model; this is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
on the binomial test. For the complete labels group the 
proportion is 16 out of 17 or 94.1%; a value which is significant 
beyond the 0.005 level on the binomial test. A second prediction, 
that the complete labels group will show greater differentiation 
than the partial labels group, is not supported by the data, perhaps 
for the reasons suggested earlier. 
We can also postulate that the longer delay in the 
memorised standards ("no labels") condition as compared with the 
paired comparisons group will lead to a decay in the memory traces 
for the former group. On this prediction 160f the 18, or 88.8% 
(significant at 0.005 level) fit the model. 
The model thus appears to have some generality~ though it 
is weak in the sense that it makes no quantitative predictions of 
the degree to which differentiation might be expected to occur under 
various labelling conditions. 
the following chapter. 
We will return to this problem in 
It was suggested, in the conclusion to Chapter 3, that 
nonsense labels may, in some way, act as a second stimulus dimension 
such that subjects judging labelled shapes are responding to the 
complex stimulus shape-pIus-label as a 2-dimensional continuum. 
The problem of how the labels are combined with the stimuli to 
produce an overall assessment of similarity needs further 
clarification. 
Two alternatives seem possible: Let us suppose that an 
effect similar to that proposed by McCormack (1958) to explain 
the facilitation_of motor learning by verbal pretraining operates. 
That is the labels generate cues (1 1 , 1 2 , 13 , In) which accompany 
the stimuli S1' S2' S3 •...• Sn· Hence when S1 is encounted, the 
total complex which enters into the judgement is S1 + 1 1 . The 
first alternative is that the subject weights both the stimulus 
and the label so that when a similarity assessment between S1 and 
S2 is required the subject considers: 
(a) the similarity of S1 and S2 and 
(b) the similarity of 11 and 12 and 
then comes to an overall assessment in terms of the two dimensions 
involved. The problem for the psychologist then lies in determining 
how the two dimensions are weighted under various labelling 
conditions. The second alternative is that the labels are not 
weighted as a separate dimension, but rather they serve as 
information carrying cues which aid the subject in his 
classification of the sensory input which arises from his receptors. 
In this sense the labels merely increase the probability that 
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the qualities present in a given stimulus will be detected or 
attended to by the subject. If we assume that the nonsense 
labels used in Experiments 1 and 2 are equisimilar pairwise, 
then Experiments 1 and 2 favour the dimensional interpretation, 
since meaningless labels were used there but systematic shifts 
in similarity occurred. The absence of adequate control groups 
confounds this interpretation however. It may be that the 
nonsense labels did not decrease the range of responding shown by 
subjects, but rather the use of self-provided real-word labels in 
the control conditions increase~ the range of responding. 
To investigate this problem in greater detail it was 
decided to perform a series of multi-dimensional scalings of the 
similarity judgements produced by individual subjects in the 4 
labelling conditions of this experiment. It was postulated that 
if, by providing real-word labels for the stimuli, we increase 
the dimensionality of the stimuli being judged then this increase 
in dimensionality shouid appear more frequently as we move from 
the "no labelsn to the'~artiar~ and ~omplete labels~condition. 
The Shepard-Kruskal multidimensional scaling approach was 
used in the form of TORSCA version 9, a FORTRAN IV program 
written by Young and ~orgerson (1967). The details of the 
program have been described in Young (1968) and will be very 
briefly summarised here. 
The typical starting point for a multidimensional scaling 
is a matrix of judged similarities, such as is generated, for 
example by paired comparisons of the stimuli whose underlying 
1!.t8 
dimensionality we wish to determine. In general it has been 
proved by Young and Householder that, given a set of interpoint 
distan·:;es, the dimensionality of that set of points can be 
determined. Kruskal (1964) has defined multidimensional 
scaling as the problem of representing n objects by n points, 
so that the interpoint distances are monotonically related to 
the experimental dissimilarities between objects. Young (1968) 
points out that the program used here computes a geometric 
representation of a data matrix such that the distances between 
the points in the representation best reproduce the order of the 
entries in the data matrix. This problem was first posed and 
solved by Shepard (1962). The geometric representation may be 
in any Minkowski space. 
Distances in the Minkowski spaces are calculated according 
to the formula: 
d (x,y) = ~~1 1/ r 
where x = (x 1 ....• x m) and y = (Y2 •..•. Ym) for r ~ 1 
When r = 2, an Euclidtan solution results; r is set at 1 for 
"city block" space. 
However, Hyman and Well (1967, .1968) have suggested that when the 
stimuli used behave as "unitary wholes" then similarity is best 
represented by the Euclidian space; it was therefore decided 
to perform the scalings in Euclidian space (Minkowski constant 
= 2) in this experiment. The program automatically checks for 
and lists violations of triangular inequality and Kruskal's 
stress (Kruskal, 1964) is calculated as a measure of the 
goodness of fit of the derived configuration to the original 
similarity measures. 
The data were read into the computer as a series of 
triangular half-matrices, one for each subject. In this 
experiment we have 4 standard tastes judged against the same 4 
tastes as comparison stimuli (plus an additional two comparison 
stimuli which are not included in the analysis). The self 
comparisons, or judgements between a given taste as standard and 
the same taste as comparison stimuli do not usually form part 
of the data a~alysed by multidimensional scaling. However, there 
are two important considerations regarding the present experiment. 
First, the self-comparisons, by inspection, appear to be the 
judgements that are most heavily affected by the labelling 
manipulation; secondly although the 4 standards and 4 of the 
comparison stimuli are physically identical in taste, they are 
in some cases psychologically different stimuli because there is 
not always a one-to-one pairing between tastes and labels. 
Therefore to maximise the likelihood of Showing a shift in the 
underlying dimensionality of the stimuli when different sets of 
labels are paired with the tastes, it is necessary to treat the 
4 standards and the 4 corresponding comparison stimuli as different 
stimuli, thus producing~ 8 x 8 matrix of responses. (Stimuli 
5 and 6 do not enter into the analysis since they were not used 
as standards and were not compared in turn with every other 
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stimulus in the experiment.) 
The original 4 x 4 whole matrix was broken down into an 
8 x 8 half matrix as follows: 
Original Matrix 
Standard 1 Standard 2 Stand,~rd 3 Standard 
c. s. 1 a b c d 
c.s.2 e f g h 
c.s.3 i j k I 
c.s.4 m n 0 p 
New 8 x 8 Matrix 
Std.1 A 
c.s.1 B a 
Std.2 C b 
c.s.2 D e f 
std.3·E c g 
c.s.3 F i j k 
Std.4 G d h I 
c.s.4 H m n 0 p 
4 
There are 12 empty cells or "passive elements" in this half-matrix. 
These unfilled cells are replaced in each case by the mean of the 
16 "active elements" in the filled cells before the multidimensional 
scaling begins. 
Since there are a relatively large number of passive cells 
t~ the original dissimilarities (or data input) matrices, the 
stress calculated for each solution is ultra-conservative and 
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hence misleading. A measure which corresponds approximately 
to stress can be obtained by calculating the percentage of 
violations of triangular equality which occur in the disparities 
matrix corresponding with each n-dimensional solution. The 
rejection of any solution for which the violations exceed 7i% 
is suggested as a reasonably satisfactory cutloff point. A 
scattergram was drawn to show the dependence of stress on percent 
violations in the disparities matrix as calculated in 30 1,2 and 
3 dimensional solutions from 10 subjects responding under 
conditions not unlike these. There were no passive cells in 
the matrices plotted. The graph suggested that at least when 
the violations did not exceed 10% the stress was generally not 
greater than 0.10; i.e. a "fair" goodness of fit according to 
Kruskal's (1964) evaluation. There is evidence, however, that 
when the number of stimuli is small, Kruskal's evaluation is not 
sufficiently stringent (Klahr, 1969). 
Nine of the ten subjects in the "contradicting labels" 
condition were analysed in 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 dimensional space; 
however it was evident that two, or perhaps 3 dimensions were 
adequate to reason~bly conceptualise the subject's responses. 
The remainiftg subjects were therefore analysed in 1, 2 and 3 
dimensions, only. Of the 40 3-dimensional solutions only 3 were 
associated with violations greater than 0.0%. This indicates a 
very low stress for the majority of the solutions which in turn 
suggests that 2 or 1 dimensions would provide adequate solutions. 
The two dimensional solutions provided a more satiHfactory set 
of results; the 1 dimensional solutions were consistently 
associated with high percent violation figures. (Only 4 of 
the 40 solutions were associated with violations of less than 
25%. ) It was therefore decided to accept the 2-dimensional 
solutions as being likely to provide the most parsimonious 
conceptualisation of the underlying dimensionality. 
A priori, if labels alter the underlying dimensionality 
of the stimuli, then we would expect the most marked changes in 
dimensionality to appear in those cases where the qualities 
listed in the descriptive labels were changed by the experimenter 
from one treatment condition to the next. By assuming that 
symmetry holds, it was predicted that the following pairs of 
stimuli would appear as one of the poles to a dimension equally 
often in the~no-labels·group, since they represent symmetrically 
opposite judgements in the original 4 x 4 matrix: 
Stimuli 1 and 2, AD and BC 
Stimuli 1 and 3, AF and BE 
Stimuli 1 and 4, AH and BG 
Stimuli 2 and 3, CF and DE 
Stimuli 2 and 4, CH and DG 
Stimuli 3 and 4, EH and FG 
It was assumed that any large deviations from the frequencies of 
occurrence of the above symmetrical pairs as poles to a 
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di~ension which occurred in the partial, complete and 
contradicting labels groups could be attributed to the labels 
that were paired with each stimulus. 
However, the tables below. show that symmetrically 
opposite pairs of stimuli did not tend to emerge as dimensional 
poles equally often in the "no-labels II group. In fact the high 
level of intersubject variability which emerges makes it 
difficult to draw any conclusions about the specific changes in 
the underlying dimensionality of the stimuli which can be 
attributed to labelling. 
Tables 4:3 and 4:4 list the frequencies with which each 
pair of stimuli emerged as opposite poles to a dimension in the two 
dimensional solutions only. In Table 4:3 the frequencies with 
which each pair of stimuli emerged as the two most widely separated 
poles on any dimension are listed. A less stringent criterion 
was taken in Table 4:4. In this case a tally was made of all 
pairs of stimuli which emerged on any dimension with a varimax 
rotated configuration value which was greater than ~ 0.5. 
The varimax criterion for rotation of axes has been described in 
detail by Kaiser (1958). 
In the occasional rare cases where two stimuli emerged with 
equal separation at a given pole of a dimension,both of the 
stimuli are listed. 
TABLE 4:3 
FREQUENCIES WITH WHICH EACH PAIR OF STIMULI EMERGED AS THE 
TWO MOST WIDELY SEPARATED POLES ON A GIVEN DIMENSION 
(Data pooled from the 40 2D solutions) 
STIMULI: AB AC AD AE AF AG AH BC BD BE BF BG BH 
GROUP: 
N.L. 2 4 2 1 2 1 
P.L. 3 2 2 1 
C.L. 2 3 3 1 6 1 
K.L. 5 1 2 2 
CD CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH EF EG EH 
N.L. 1 4 2 1 2 
P.L. 2 2 4 3 
C.L. 3 2 1 2 
K.L. 2 2 1 1 2 
FG FH GH 
N.L. 
P.L. 
C .L. 
K.L. 2 
Notice that the la-belling appears to have affected the 
underlying dimensionality of the stimuli most markedly in the 
contradicting labels CK.L.) group. The overall pattern, 
however, shows a strong consistency across groups, suggesting 
that any effect of labels on the underlying dimensionality of the 
stimuli is very definitely second order. 
156 
TABLE 4:4 
PAIRS OF POLES WHICH EXCEEDED + 0.5 ON THE VARIMAX ROTATED 
CONFIGURATION FOR 2D SOLUTIONS 
STIMULI: AB AC AD AE AF AG AH BC BD BE 
GROUP: 
N.L. 1 1 5 2 7 5 
P.L. 1 7 2 4 8 
C.L. 6 2 3 7 
K.L. 1 5 2 2 5 
BF BG BH CD CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
N.L. 2 7 1 2 7 3 7 2 4 1 
P.L. 3 7 1 5 1 5 8 3 6 
C.L. 4 6 1 4 1 4 7 3 5 
K.L. 3 6 2 4 2 3 4 5 3 
EF EG EH FG FH GH 
N .L. 
P.L. 2 1 
C .L. 2 1 
K.L. 3 5 
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The multidimensional scaling was carried out in the attempt 
to show that labelling might induce changes in the underlying 
dimension~lity of the responses made to the 4 tastes. The data 
however provide little evidence for such a change, in fact there 
is a high degree of uniformity in the dimensions that were 
extracted from subjects in the four labelling groups. One further 
peculiarity noted in the two dimensional solutions was that 
approximately half of the solutions in each labelling condition 
showed a marked tendency for four distinct clusters of points to 
emerge - (Ae), (FH) on one dimension and (BD), (EG) on the other. 
However, since the stimulus pairs AB, CD, EF and GH are in fact 
physically identical, and in most cases (except the contradicting 
labels condition) were labelled identically it would appear that 
the extraction of a second dimension is actually artefactual and 
that, although the percentage of triangular equality violations 
were high in the 1-dimensional solutions, these latter analyses 
more correctly reflect the underlying perceived dimensionality of 
the stimuli. Klemmer and Shrimpton (1963) using the Shepard (1962) 
scaling technique found that a configuration containing two 
clusters, with large between-cluster and small within-cluster 
distances will collapse into one dimension with zero withi~~cluster 
distances and large between-cluster distance. A similar effect 
has been reported by Rankin, Markley and Evans (1970) and it appears 
likely that the present data could likewise be collapsed into a 
smaller dimensionality by combining clusters of pOints, although 
the clusters reported here are not directly comparable with those 
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mentioned above. Both the 1-dimensional and the 2-dimensional 
solutions for the majority of subjects suggest that stimuli ABC 
and D are one pole and stimuli EFG and H are the opposite pole 
of a unidimensional continuum of salty/sourness - bitter/sweetness 
or perhaps strong (concentrated)-weak (diluted) tastes, or even 
unpleasant-pleasant tastes. In fact, if we take the most widely 
separated poles on the 1-dimensional solutions, and neglect the 
high percentage of violations for these solutions, 10 of the 10 
solutions in the'~o labeldlandt~artial labels"conditions and 9 
of the 10 solutions in the ~omplete labelsUcondition favour a 
division of the stimuli into the two poles ABCD and EFGH. This 
dichotomous division of the stimuli appears to have been so marked 
that the labels produced no shift in the underlying dimensionality. 
One further point remains to be investigated however. Perhaps 
the labels show a consistent trend towards increasing the 
distances or degree of separation of the two poles on this single 
dimension. That is, as the precision of the labels increases, 
the range of responses should increase and this may be reflected 
in the degree of separation between labelled stimuli that is shown 
in the analysis. 
For the 1-dimensional solutions, the following pairs of 
'points exceeded + 0.5 in the derived configurations: 
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NO LABELS CONDI'rION 
Subject 1 BF BH DF DH 
Subject 2 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF- DG DH 
Subject 3 AF AH CF CH 
Subject 4 
Subject 5 AE AG CE CG 
Subject 6 AE AF AG BE BF BG CE CF CG DE DF DG 
Subject 7 AF AH BF BH CF CH 
Subject 8 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 9 AG AH 
Subject 10 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
(Total 80 pairs, all favouring the ABCD-EFGH dichotomy) 
PARTIAL LA3ELS CONDITION 
Subject 1 
Subject 2 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE D·F DG DH 
Subject 3 AE AF AG BE BF BG CE CF CG DE DF DG 
Subject 4 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 5 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 6 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH CE DF DG DH 
Subject 7 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH 
Subject 8 BE" BF BG CE CF CG DE DF DG 
Subject 9 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 10 CG CH 
(Total 111 pairs, all favouring the ABCD-EFGH dichotomy) 
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COM'PLETE LABELS CONDITIQII; 
Subject 1 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 2 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 3 CE CF 
Subject 4 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 5 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 6 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 7 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 8 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 9 AF AG AH BF BG BH CF CG CH DF DG DH 
Subject 10 AB AF AH DB DF DH 
(Total 128 pairs of which 126 favour the ABCD-EFGH dichotomy) 
CONTRADICTING LABELS CONDITION 
Subject 1 AD AE BD BE 
Subject 2 BE BF BH CE CF CH DE DF DH 
Subject 3 AE AF AG BE BF BG CE CF CG 
Subject 4 CE CF CG DE DF DG 
Subject 5 AE AF AG AH BE BF BG BH CE CF CG CH DE DF DG DH 
Subject 6 BE BF DE DG 
Subject 7 BF BH DF DH 
Subject 8 AH BH 
Subject 9 AF EH GH 
Subject 10 BG DG 
(Total 59 pairs of which 57 favour the ABCD-EFGH dichotomy) 
There is thus a clear trend for a stronger separation of 
stimuli to occur along the single dimension as the precision of 
the labels increases. The contradicting labels have led to a 
poorer separation, but the underlying dimensionality remains much 
the same. We can tentatively conclude that labelling does not 
alter the dimensionality of the judgement task when real word 
labels are used, but rather the labels alter the perceived 
relationship of stimuli to each other within the dimension. 
The conclusion that a unidimensional classification of the 
taste stimuli appears to have operated here suggests that the 
labels are not responded to as a new dimension but rather they 
simply enhance the distinctiveness of the stimuli within the 
dimension" This does not support the conclusion drawn in 
Experiment 2 where it was proposed that nonsense labels increase 
the dimensionality of the subject's task by providing an additional 
dimension of uniformly similar verbal cues. 
One alternative to the hypothesis that labels modify 
similarity judgements by adding an extra dimension to the task, is 
the "overwriting" hypothesis which was developed in Chapter 2. 
Although Experiments 1 and 3 are not directly comparable, it does 
appear that the use of real word labels has produced a larger 
shift in judgements than the use of nonsense labels. This 
suggests that the meaningfulness of the label is a relevant factor, 
and that overwriting, if it does occur, is more effective when we 
overwrite using a real word than when we use a nonsense label. It 
was suggested that ease of overwriting may be related to the 
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familiarity of the stimulus where familiarity is defined in terms 
of degree of prior exposure. However, with taste stimuli we are 
generally only able to infer that one taste sensation will have 
been experienced more frequently than another. 
An alternative to the overwriting hypothesis is to explain 
the facilitation of judgement in terms of the provision of 
additional relevant information by the labels that are paired 
with stimuli. Presumably if labels merely provide additional and 
in some cases redundant information then familiarity of the stimuli 
will be a less critical consideration. 
In summary, the greater differentiation or precision of 
judgement that was observed under the labelled conditions 
supports the hypothesis that labels facilitate judgement by 
supplying the subject with additional cues which label aspects of 
the stimuli that might otherwise have passed unnoticed by the 
subject, or which may have been noticed but lost due to rapid decay 
in the memory traces which are generated when a physical stimulus 
is experienced. 
The effect of labelling on the actual judge.ment process also 
needs to be considered in some detail. Newell (1968) has 
described judgement (the act of judging) as a cognitive process with 
the following characteristics: 
1. The main inputs to the process, that which is to be judged, 
are given and available; obtaining, discovering, or 
formulating them is not part of judgement. 
2. The domain of the output - the set of admissible responses -
is simple and well defined prior to the judgement. The 
response itself is variously called a selection, estimation, 
assertion, evaluatioil or classification (in the sense of 
identification of cl~ss membership, not of creating the 
classes), depending on the nature of the domain. 
3. The process is not a simple transduction of irtformation; 
judgement adds information to the output. 
4. The process is not simply a calculation, or the application 
of a given rule. 
5. The process concludes, or occurs at the conclusion of, a 
more extended process (the causal role is not completely 
clear) • 
6. The process is rather immediate, not being extended in time 
with phases, stages, subprocesses, etc. (If such occur, 
they tend to be referred to as preparation for judgemento) 
7. The process is to be distinguished from searching, discovering, 
or creating, on the one hand; and from musing, browsing, or 
idly observing on the other. 
In the unlabelled condition of Experiment 3, the judgement 
task can be considered to possess all seven of the characteristics 
listed above. However, in the ,!!complete labels" condition, and 
is 
particularly in those cases where a given stimulus/judged against 
itself, the task appears to become more of the type described by 
Shelly· and Bryan (1964, p.9) as "the reading of a number off a 
dial"; a reaction to which the term "judgement" is not considered 
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to apply. Thus by labelling the stimuli it could be argued that 
we have changed the judgement task in almost all of its 
characteristics: 
1. The main inputs to the process are altered, however this is 
more relevant to the question of discrimination than to 
the problem of judgement. 
2. The domain of the output changes from a response based 
mainly on selection or estimation, to a classification 
response. 
3. The process may move nearer to being a simple transduction 
of information. 
4. Likewise the response could now be considered to involve 
the application of a rule, particular in the case of 
judgements between identical stimuli. 
5. The process may be less extended than before, since labels 
appear to facilitate judgement. 
6. This thesis is partly concerned with whether or not a verbal 
labelling or categorisation subprocess occurs during the 
preparation for judgement. If such a process does occur, 
then we will have altered not only the characteristics of 
the judgement task but also at least one of the stages or 
processes involved in the preparation for judgement. 
7. The process could be considered to have moved from the 
searching end of the continuum to a process more like 
observation, or choice. 
This argument assumes, however, that: 
Ca) the subject actually accepts the labels at face value and 
does not question their accuracy, and 
Cb) the judgement is based at least in part on the information 
conveyed by the labels. 
Bock and Jones (1968) p.4. take the view that judgement is a 
comparison made by a subject between two stimuli each of which are 
experienced as a continuously variable physical event along a 
sensory continuum. They add that "When the subject is required 
to choose among alternatives on the basis of personal perference, 
his response is ordinarily called a choice." 
If we consider Newell's description of the judgement process 
the task remains judgemental only in the sense that the subject is 
still required to order the labelled stimuli along a dimension of 
similarity. However, on the Bock and Jones definition, the task 
retains the characteristics of a judgemental rather than a choice 
proc~ss. 
CHAPTER V 
SOME EFFECTS OF VERBAL LABELS ON 
NONSENSE SHAPES. 
In the experiments described so far, the labels which were 
overtly paired with stimuli by the experimenter either provided 
no additional information about the physical characteristics of the 
stimuli (e.g. the nonsense labels of experiments 1 and 2) or else 
they provided relevant information in varying degrees of redundancy, 
or even contradicting or incorrect cues (Experiment 3). The real 
word labels of experiment 3 were not designed to attempt to alter 
or modify the input associated with the taste stimuli, rather they 
were provided as supplementary or additional input cues for the 
subject to use as he chose. It was noted that the familiarity (as 
shown by degree of prior exposure) of the stimuli was a relevant, 
but uncontrolled variable. 
Since similarity judgement can sometimes tend to nothing more 
than a categorising process, it would appear to be likely that the 
meaningfulness or ease with which a stimulus can be categorised is 
a relevant factor in similarity judgement. Meaningfulness has 
frequently been associated with the number of associations that 
are aroused by a stimulus (e.g. Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957) 
or have been conditioned to a stimulus (e.g. Staats, 1968). A 
stimulus which arouses few associations is thus expected to be 
relatively meaningless compared with a stimulus which arouses many 
associations within a subject. 
It has been suggested that labels enhance the judged 
similarity and differences between stimuli by several possible 
mechanisms including: 
(a) the reduction of trace decay when there is a delay between 
presentation of the standard and comparison stimuli, 
(b) the channelling of the subject's perceptual response towards 
certain relevant features of the labelled stimulus and hence 
decreasing generalization between stimuli, and 
(c) the labels may increase the dimensionality of the stimulus 
input so that instead of judging similarity between stimulus 1 and 
stimulus 2, the judgement is made between stimulus 1 + .label 1 
and stimulus 2 + label 2. 
If the labelling shift is entirely attributable to trace 
decay then by presenting pairs of labelled stimuli to the subject 
we would not expect to observe the labelling shift for stimuli 
that are paired with real-word labels which carry redundant sensory 
information. If labels have an effect other than reducing trace 
decay then with simultaneous presentation of stimuli a shift 
in judgement should still be observed. Furthermore, in the 
experiments previously described, subjects were never instructed 
to refer to the labels as part of the overall stimulus complex 
which was to be considered during judgement.- By actually 
instructing the subjects to assign some weight to the labels as 
well as the stimuli it may be possible to force subjects to use 
the labels as an additional dimension. By having a further group 
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of subjects judge the similarity in meaning of the labels used 
it may be possible to determine, through multidimensional scaling 
whether the labelled stimuli are responded to mainly in terms of 
their physical characteristics (as shown. by a response pattern 
which is similar to that generated by subjects who are required to 
judge physical (unlabelled) similarity only) or in terms of their 
labelled characteristics (i.e. a response pattern which is like 
that produced by subjects judging the meaning of the labels only). 
An answer to this problem would give us information regarding the 
question of whether stimuli are cognitively manipulated in terms 
of raw sensory input or in terms of some kind of simplified verbal 
schemata in which stimuli are classified by the names which subjects 
assign to them. The stimuli chosen for this experiment were 
selected from the Vanderplas and Garvin (1959) list of nonsense 
shapes. The nonsense shapes have been classified in terms of 
complexity by the number of randomly plotted points that were 
joined to make each solid figure. This experiment uses the 4 
highest and the 4 lowest association value shapes from the 24 
point series of shape~ that is, stimuli 1 to 4 (high A.V.) and 
stimuli 26 to 30 (low A.V.) as shown in Vanderplas and Garvin 
(1959). The stimuli are shown in actual size in Figure 5:1. 
It was postulated that if labelling aids the assessment of 
similarity and the classification of stimuli by sharpening 
discrimination (or reducing generalization) then easily labelled 
(or high association value) shapes should be judged as less 
similar to each other than low association value shapes which are 
169 
FIG. 5: 1 
The 8 Vanderplas and Garvin (1959) Nonsense 
Shapes Used in Experiments 4 and 5. 
High Association Value Shapes 
11. 1 
I ~' t.l Shape ~ I 
Stimulus Number 1(A) 2(B) 3(C) 4(D) 
Low Association Value Shapes 
Shape ~I, l' -, ~ I I 
Stimulus Number 5(E) 6(F) 7(G) 8 (H) 
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a priori difficult to label subjectively. Since the stimuli are to 
be presented simultaneously, it will not be possible to attribute 
any shift in judgement to trace decay. 
Because associations can be expected to vary considerably 
from one subject to the next, it was decided to assess independently 
the association value of each shape in the experiment for each 
subject. We would expect that those subjects who are required to 
assess the 'meaningfulness' of a set of shapes before judging the 
similarity of the same set of shapes to each other will be more 
aware of the differences between high association value shapes and 
the similarities between low A.V. shapes than subjects who judge 
similarity between the shapes first and then assess the 'meaningful-
ness' of the stimuli. We would expect to find little or no 
difference between the judgements made by the two groups on the low 
association value shapes if awareness of 'meaningfulness' of the 
shapes is a rBlevant variable in this experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 4. 
Stimuli and Procedure. 
The stimuli were the Vanderplas and Garvin (1959) 24 point 
shapes, ~umbers 1 to 4 and 27 to 30. A photocopy of each shape was 
mounted on a white card measuring 2 by 4 inches. To introduce the 
subject to each stimulus the entire set of 8 shapes were first 
exposed to the subject for 10 seconds each. A set of test cards was 
then shown in which one of the target stimuli was placed randomly 
in an array of 9 other masking stimuli selected from the 16 and 24 
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point shapes. The association test consisted of a form on which 
subjects were given as much time as they required to write a word 
or phrase describing whatever they were reminded of by the 8 shapes. 
The instructions were as .follows: 
I1IN3'rRUCTIONS FOR ASSOCIATION TEST. 
I am going to show you a number of shapes. Some of the 
shapes may remind you of some familiar object or situation while 
others may not remind you of anything. Your job will be to name 
whatever the shape reminds you of, if anything. If the shape 
reminds you of something that you can describe in a word or two, 
simply write that word or phrase in the appropriate space below. 
If the shape doesn't remind you of anything, write I1nothing". It 
is essential that you write something - either a word, or phrase 
if the shape reminds you of something you can describe, or else 
I1nothing" if you are not reminaed of anything during the 10 seconds 
for which I will show you each shape." 
The subjects were all undergraduate volunteer students and 
no subject served more than once under any of the 4 conditions. 
There were 10 subjects in each of the 4 experimental conditions. 
Condition 1. 
The subjects were {irst shown the 8 shapes, exposed consecutf-vely 
for 10 seconds each. The identification test cards were then shown, 
subjects having been previously warned that they would be required 
to pick the 8 target shapes out of an array of masking shapes. The 
s~bject was told that only one of the shapes on each card had been 
seen before and was required to guess if uncertain (unlimited time 
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was given). The responses were scored by the experimenter as 
"correct" or "incorrect". 
The 8 stimuli were then shown again, while subjects wrote 
their association for each shape on the form provided. Fifty-six 
paired comparison similarity jUdgements were then taken, judgements 
were made using the same 10 point scale (with numerals) as in 
Experiment Two. The pairs of stimuli were presented In random 
order, with all stimuli serving once as standard and once as 
comparison stimulus against which the 7 remaining stimuli were 
judged. Subjects wrote their chosen response In the appropriate 
space below the trial number on their instructions form. The 
instructions to subjects for the judgement tasks in Conditions 1, 
2, 3 and 4 were as follows: 
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITIONS 1 AND 2 (SHAPE SIMILARITIES) 
I am going to show you a number of shapes - your job is to 
judge the similarity of certain pairs of shapes, using the scale 
1. Identical 
2. Nearly ident ical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different 
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Here is a sample of the kinds of shapes you will be comparing: 
The shapes will be presented to you In pairs; you are required to 
judge how similar yo~ think the second shape in each pair is to 
the first member of the pair. For example, if you think the second 
shape in the pair is IDENTICAL to the first shape, write the 
number 1 in the appropriate space below; if you think it is 
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT write 10, etc. It is essential that you avoid 
repeating the same response for each different pair, however, try 
to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. 1I 
IIINSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION 3 (LABELLED SHAPE SIMILARITIES). 
I am going to show you a number of shapes - your job is to 
judge the similarity of certain pairs of these labelled shapes, 
using the scale: 
1 , Identical 
2. Nearly identical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different. 
The shapes, along with their appropriate labels, will be presented 
to you in pairs; you are required to judge how similar you think 
the second labelled shape in each pair is to the first member of the 
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pair. For example, if you think the second labelled shape in 
the pair is IDENTICAL to the first shape, write the number 1 in 
the appropriate space below; if you think it is COMPLETELY 
DIFFERENT, write 10, etc. Try to make your judgements by 
combining the information given in both the physical shape and the 
verbal label, to give an overall judgement of similarity. That is, 
don't judge either the shapes only, or the labels only, against 
each other, but try ~o combine both shape and label into a single 
overall judgement for each pair of cards. 
Try to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible." 
"INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION 4 (LABEL SIMILARITIES). 
I am going to show you a number of words - your job is to 
judge the similarity in meaning of certain pairs of words, using thfr 
scale 
1 • Ident ical 
2. Nearly identical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different. 
The words will be presented to you in pairs; you are required to 
judge how similar you think the meaning of the second word in each 
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pair is to the first member of the pair. For example, if you think 
the second word in the pair is IDENTICAL in meaning to the first 
word, write the number 1 in the appropriate space below; if you 
think it is COMPLETELY DIFFERENT in meaning, write 10, etc. It is 
essential that you avoid repeating the same response for each 
different pair, however, try to respond as quickly and as accurately 
as possible." 
Condition 2. 
Condition 2 was id~ntical to condition 1 except that the 
association test followed the similarity judgement task rather than 
preceding it. Conditions 1 and 2 form a complete experiment in 
that any systematic differences in judgement across the two groups 
of subjects can be attributed to the fact that subjects in 
condition 1 had overtly assigned names or labels to the nonsense 
shapes, while subjects in condition 2 had not named the stimuli 
before making their judgements. 
Condition 3. 
For condition 3, the sequence of events was the same as in 
condition 1. However, the associations made by subjects in 
conditions 1 and 2 were examined, and a single word which reflected 
the most frequently occurring association to each of shapes 1 to 4 
was printed clearly in black ink above the appropriate shape on thEf 
cards used in the similarity judging task. .Instructions to 
subjects were modified to emphasise that subjects should attempt 
to consider both the label and the physical shape and combine both 
elements into a single overall similarity judgement. The labels 
used for stimuli 1 to 4 were TREE, BEAR, SWAN and CRAB while 
stimuli 5 to 8 (i.e. the Vanderplas and Garvin shapes 27 to 30) 
were all labelled with the word NOTHING. 
Condit ion 4. 
The 10 subjects in this condition were simply instructed to 
judge the similarity of the meanings of the 5 words TREE, BEAR, 
SWAN, CRAB and NOTHING. The words were printed as before on white 
cards measuring 2 by 4 inches and the total set of 20 paired 
comparisons were presented ln random order. The nonsense shapes 
were never viewed by these subjects. 
RESULTS. 
Conditions 1 and 2 test the hypothesis that stimuli which 
are relatively meaningful in the sense that they can be readily 
labelled by a subject will be judged as less similar to each other 
than relatively meaningless shapes which are not easily labelled by 
a subject. They also test the hypothesis that a prior task in 
which subjects are required to label the stimuli will. make subjects 
more aware of the stimulus differences so that discrimination or 
judged dissimilarity between pairs of stimuli will be greater for 
those subjects who label the stimuli first (in the association 
test) than for those subjects who judge similarity first, t-rrerr label 
the stimuli. 
Conditions 1 and 2 also provide a check on the possibility 
that as the experiment progresses, all stimuli may have come to 
acquire meaning, due to longer exposure to the shapes. In fact, 
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the 10 subjects in condition 1 gave a total of 25 responses of 
"nothing" while in condition 2 the total number of occasions on 
wnich a stimulus shape failed to arouse an association was 30, 
suggesting that the longer exposure to the shapes that was 
received by subjects in condition 2 (during the judgement task) 
did not increase their probability of producing an association to 
each shape in the association test. 
The data showed no systematic trend for condition 1 subjects 
to show a greater range of scale usage than the subjects In 
condition 2. The hypothesis that subjects who judge similarity 
first and then label the shapes will be less aware of shape 
similarities and differences than subjects who label the stimuli 
first and then judge similarity was, therefore, not supported. 
Our other hypothesis is that the pairs of stimuli which 
have high association values will be judged as more dissimilar to 
each other than pairs of stimuli which have low association values. 
We can test this hypothesis by partitioning subjects according to 
their actual association-test responses. Thus, for each stimulus 
pair we can pool data from subjects into one of 3 categories: 
(a) both stimuli in the pair produced associations; these will 
be referred to as the high/high group, 
(b) neither of the stimuli in the pair produced as association 
(the low/low group), and 
(c) one of the stimuli produced an association, the other member 
of the pair did not (referred to as the high/low group). 
Unfortunately, the majority of subjects gave associations to 
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more than half of the shapes; we thus have an abundance of high/high 
paired comparisons but a shortage of low/low comparisons. In fact, 
comparisons between the mean judgements produced in all 3 of the 
response classes are possible only for the stimulus pairs 4:5, 
4:6, 4:7, 4:8, 5:6, 5:7, 5:8, 6:7, 6:8, and 7:8. The pooled data 
from groups 1 and 2 (i. e. association tests both preceding and 
following the judgement task) are shown below: 
Stimulus Pair High/High High/Low Low/Low 
4:5 4.41 5.70 3.50 
4:6 5.06 5.12 5.25 
4:7 5.30 6.80 6.00 
4:8 7.18 7.77 7.50 
5:6 4.66 6.83 4.71 
5:7 5.58 7.15 5.16 
5:8 5.37 7.50 6.32 
6:7 7.00 6.96 6.29 
6:8 7.00 7.50 4.45 
7:8 4.43 5.20 5.16 
In only 4 of the 10 stimulus pairs the high/high judgement 
exceeds the low/low value; our hypothesis is thus not supported. 
In 1'8 cases out of 20, however, the mean judgement for the high/low 
group exceeds either the high/high or the low/low mean judgement. 
There is thus a tendency for both the high/high and the low/low 
judgements to show greater similarity for a given pair of shapes 
than when one shape was of high and the other was of low association 
value. One possible explanation for this is suggested by the actual 
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associations given to the stimuli. An independent scorer tallied 
the entire set of 30 association test responses (from conditions 1, 
2 and 3) in terms of animate, inanimate and IInothingll responses. 
The percentages of responses which fell into each category for each 
stimulus were as follows: 
Stimulus 
1 (A) 
2 (B) 
3 (C) 
4 (D) 
5 (E) 
6 (F) 
7 (G) 
8 (H) 
Animate 
60.00% 
86.67% 
96.67% 
66.67% 
36.67% 
36.67% 
3.33% 
33.33% 
Inanimate 
36.67% 
0.00% 
3.33% 
6.67% 
6 .67% 
16.67% 
23.33% 
26.67% 
Nothing 
3.33% 
13.33% 
0.00% 
26.67% 
56.67% 
46.67% 
73.33% 
40.00% 
Thus for the high association value shapes (stimuli 1 to 4) the 
majority of responses were animate (in fact, vertebrate animals, 
particularly mammals) while for stimuli 5 to 8 the majority of 
responses were IInothing ll (meaning that the shape did not remind 
the subject of lIany familiar object or situationll ). We would thus 
expect that, if labelling influences similarity judgement, the 
responses made between high association value stimuli would in 
fact be influenced by labels referring to a highly homogeneous set 
of objects (vertebrates) while for the low association value shapes 
the judgements are again made between stimuli which are associated 
with a homogeneous set of labels - in this case, the verbal response 
IInothing ll • For judgements between the high/low stimulus pairs, 
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however, the subject would, in general be comparing the category 
"nothing" with the category "vertebrate animal" hence we would 
expect an enhancement in the judged dissimilarity between the 
stimuli under this situation. The 2-tailed probability of 
obtaining 18 out of 20 differences in the same direction by chance 
is given by the Binomial test as less than 0.01, the observed 
trend in the data is thus statistically significant. The hypothesis 
that subjects who see no associations in a pair of nonsense shapes 
will judge them to be mOTe similar than subjects who do see familiar 
objects or situations in the same pair of shapes has not been 
supported. However, an alternative hypothesis which states that 
there will be greater judged dissimilarity between meaningful and 
meaningless shapes than between either pairs of meaningful, or pairs 
of meaningless shapes was supported by the data. This latter 
finding lends further support to the theory that labelling influences 
judgement since, by manipulating the association value of nonsense 
shapes we have been able to produce shifts in judgements across 
groups of subjects which are, presumably, independent of the actual 
physical contours of the stimuli used. It appears then that 
meaningfulness of stimuli (as measured by the number of associations 
aroused) is a relevant factor in the judgement task; the meaning-
fulness factor appears to exert its influence on subject's 
judgements even in the absence of instructions which suggest to the 
subject that he judge similarity in terms of both the physical shape 
and the associations evoked by the shape. That is, subjects appear 
spontaneously to make use of the cues that arise from the 
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associations evoked by the shapes and these associations. enter 
into the judgement process as additional stimulus cues which are 
considered to be relevant to the assessment of similarity. 
A second reason for perfor~ing the present experi~ent was 
to attempt to determine whether the labels that are paired with 
stimuli act as an additional or secondary cue or whether they are 
assimilated with the physical stimuli along already existing 
dimensions. That is, when we pair labels with stimuli we may either 
(a) add a new dimension to the input, as was suggested as an 
explanation for the shifts in judgements that were apparently 
induced by nonsense labels in experiments' 1 and 2, or 
(b) we may simply increase the magnitude of the input along 
already existing dimensions as appears to have happened in 
experiment 3 where the labels salty, sour, etc., seem to have 
simply increased the subject's awareness or certainty that these 
qualities were actually present in the stimuli to which he responded. 
It may be that both factors operate under different circumstances, 
depending on what form the labels take, and on what new or 
additional information they give to the subject. 
One major characteristic of the present set of nonsense 
shape stimuli is that they are subjectively difficult to order along 
a continuum of similarity on the basis of their physical character-
istics alone. (Compare the nonsense stimuli with the shapes used 
in experiment 2 where the underlying dimensionality was immediately 
obvious.) Consider now the problems.faced by a subject who is 
required to classify these heterogeneous and complex shapes in 
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terms of their similarity. In the absence of any marked physical 
basis for classifying the stimuli it seems reasonable to postulate 
that he may classify them in terms of real-word physical objects 
which the shapes remind him of. If this were so, then we would 
expect the dimensionality of the responses made by subjects to the 
shapes to be reflected to some extent in the dimensionality of 
the responses made by subjects to the labels that are paired with 
the shapes. If, however, shape similarity judgements are made on 
purely physical terms and independently of the similarity of the 
associations aroused by the shapes then we would expect the 
dimensionality of the labels to differ from the dimensionality of 
the shapes and the dimensionality of the responses made to the 
overtly labelled shapes in condition 3 should reflect both the 
dimensionality of the shapes and of the labels. In other words, 
if labels paired with stimuli add a new (verbal) dimension to the 
judgement task, then the dimensionality of the shape plus label 
judgements should in some way emerge as the sum of the 
dimensionalities of the jUdgements made to the shapes alone and to 
the labels alone. If, however, the labels simply assimilate with 
already existing dimensions (as we might expect if covert labelling 
of shapes occurs regardless of our overt label manipulation) then 
the dimensionality of the shape judgements should not differ greatly 
from the dimensionality of the shape-pIus-label jUdgements. (We 
will tentatively assume that the overt labels which we paired with 
the stimuli do not differ greatly from the covert labels which 
subjects would have associated with the stimuli in the absence of 
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our verbal manipulation.) 
The similarity matrices generated by each of the 40 subjects 
in conditions 1 to 4 were analysed using TORSCA 9, the FORTRAN IV 
program by Young and Torgerson (1967) which was described in. 
chapter 4. Since input was in the form of triangular half-matrices 
with no passive elements, the stresses calculated by the program for 
each solution provide a valid index of goodness of fit. Data from 
each subject in conditions 1 to 3 was analysed in 1, 2 and 3 
dimensions for an 8 x 8 half-matrix of judged dissimilarities. The 
5 x 5 half-matrices for condition 4 were analysed in 1 and 2 
dimensions only. Hoben (1968) performed a nonmetric scaling of 20 
random shapes (which were similar to those used in this experiment) 
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in various Minkowski spaces. In contrast to the approach used here, 
he analysed pooled data from groups of more than 200 subjects. 
There was a clear trend for the data to fit an Euclidean model as 
well as, or better than, various other Minkowski metrics. The 
poorest fit was obtained with the city-block metric. It was 
therefore decided to perform the scalings for this experiment in 
Euclidean space. 
Stresses tended to be rather high for all solutions, perhaps 
due to the higher level of intrasubject response variability that 
was noted in this experiment as compared with the earlier studies. 
Table 5:2 shows the stresses associated with each solution for 
all 4 experimental conditions: 
Subject 1 
" >=l 3D Soln. 0.056 
0 
:G 2D Soln. 0.167 
°ri 
rQ § 1D Soln. 0.393 
a 
N 
>=l 
3D Soln. 0.eJ39 
0 
:;:; 2D Soln. 0.123 
°ri 
rQ § 1D Soln. 0.301 
a 
"" 3D Soln. 0,064 >=l 
0 
:;:; 2D Soln. 0.124 
ori 
rQ 0.248 § 1D Soln. 
a 
.;j-
§ 2D Soln. 0.003 
ori 
4-' 0.036 ~ 1D Soln. 
>=l 
0 
a 
TABLE 5:2 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0.012 0.047 0.022 0.031 0.064 0.056 0.047 
0.170 0.085 0.012 0.047 0.158 8.137 0.064 
0.404 0.370 0.161 0.166 0.278 0.248 0.239 
0.057 0.068 0.053 0.126 0.066 0.043 0.079 
0.128 0.145 0.156 0.218 0.138 0.151 0.152 
0.231 0.315 0.301 0.376 0.269 0.275 0.275 
0.026 0.094 0.086 0.066 0.029 0.030 0.059 
0.117 0.177 0.165 0.152 0.108 0.084 0.147 
0.365 0.320 0.410 0.245 0.291 0.170 0.243 
0.009 0.035 0.046 0.013 (0.000) 0.058 0.004 
0.125 (0.316) 0.015 0.023 (0.293)(0.000) 0.230 
9 
0.069 
0.133 
0.267 
0.062 
0.173 
0.366 
0.027 
0.093 
0.173 
0.001 
0.139 
10 
0.058 
0.133 
0.336 
0.028 
0.092 
0.247 
0.089 
0.135 
0.329 
0.014 
0.003 
-' 
CD 
+ 
It was initially decided to take a stress value of 7~% as 
the criterion for a satisfactory solution. According to Kruskal's 
(1964) evaluation this is midway between a "good" and a "fair" 
fit between the raw data and the multidimensional scaling, although 
Klahr (1969) has challenged this evaluation. This cutoff point of 
0.075 leaves us with 24 of the 30 3D solutions in conditions 1, 2 
and 3 but only one of the 2D and 1D solutions as satisfactory 
scalings of the data. (Only two of the 3D solutions slightly exceed 
a stress of 10%.) The 3D solutions will be taken as the best 
sol~tions for conditions 1 to 3. 
" Because of the relatively small number of paired comparisons 
involved in condition 4, one of the 2D solutions and 4 of the 1D 
solutions proved to be insoluble. Table 5:2 suggests that the 2D 
solutions most adequately capture the underlying dimensionality for 
condition 4. If we increase the cutoff value to 10% stress to 
include borderline cases then we have available for analysis 18 
3D solutions from conditions 1 and 2 combined (in which similarity 
of shapes alone was judged) and 10 3D solutions from condition 3, 
along with 9 of the 10 2D solutions from condition 4. 
Two considerations are of interest to us in these analyses: 
(a) the pairs of poles which showed the widest separation OR a 
given dimension for each solution, and 
(b) the pairs of poles which exceeded an arbitrary cutoff 
criterion of +0.40 units in the varimax rotated configurations for 
each solution. 
The following table lists the two polar stimuli which 
emerged with greatest separation on each dimension for the 40 
subjects under the 4 experimental conditions: 
TABLE 5:3 
Condition 1 
SUBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dimension 1 AC AD AF AF AF BE AC AE AD 
\ 
" 2 BE BH CD CD BD CG AF AH BF 
" 3 FH CF EH CH CG FH DH CF CE 
Condition 2 
SUBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dimension 1 AH BF AG AD AD AH AF AE AE 
" 2 BE CD BC BE CF BE BH BH AH 
" 3 CD EH EF CG GE CF CD DG CF 
Condition 3 
SUBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dimension 1 AF AF AE AC AH AE AE AG AH AC 
" 2 BC BH BG DG BG BH BH BH BD BE 
" 3 BD CG CH FH CE CF CG CF CG BH 
Condition 4 
SUBJECT I! 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dimension 1 AC AD AD AE AD AE AB AC AB 
" 2 CE CD CE DE BE BE CE DE CE 
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It is also useful to have information on the ways in which dimensions 
co-vary within individual subjects; for this we need to examine 
the solutions calculated for individual subjects in terms of 
(a) sets of mutually exclusive dimensions, and 
(b) sets of two or more dimensions which frequently occur 
together within individual subjects. 
Table 5:4 gives a subject-by-subject listing of all stimuli 
which emerged as poles with separations greater than +0.40 on the 
Varimax rotated configurations. 
TABLE 5:4 
Conditions 1 and 2 (Shape Similarities). 
Subject (1) BE DE 
FH 
CA CG 
Subject (1) 
Subject (2) Subject (2) 
Subject (3) 
Subject (4) 
Subject (5) 
CF 
BG BH 
AD 
CD 
EG EH 
AF 
CD 
CE 
GH 
Subject (3) 
Subject (4) 
Subject (5) 
AE BE 
CD CF 
AH 
GH 
AD CD 
BF 
AC AG 
BC BD 
E *F 
AD DH 
BE BF 
CG CH 
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Subject (6) AF Subject (6) AD DR 
BD DR CF 
CE CG EG 
Subject (7) BE BR DE DR Subject (7) AF CF 
I FR AG AR DG DR 
CG BE 
Subject (8) DR ER Subject (8 ) AF AG 
AC AG BR 
AF BF CD 
Subject (9) AC CF Subject (9) AE AF 
AE DG FG 
AG AR BR CR 
Subject (10 ) AD* Subject (10 ) AE 
BF* BR 
CE CF 
Condition 3 (ShaEe Elus Label similarities). 
Subject ( 1 ) BC Subject (4) EG 
AE AF FR 
BD AC 
Subject (2) BR DR Subject (5 ) BG 
CG* AR 
AF CE DE 
Subject (3) AE Subject (6 ) BG BR 
CR CF 
BG AD AE 
1<39 
Subject (7) BH DH Subject (9) CF CG 
AE BE AD AF BD BF 
CF CG AH 
Subject (8) AG Subject (10) BH 
BF CF AC AE 
BH AH 
Condition 4 (Label Similarities) . 
Subject ( 1 ) BC Subject (6) 
AC 
Subject (2) BC BE CD DE Subject (7) B*E 
AD AE 
Subject (3) C*E Subject (8) CE 
AC AD AB AD 
Subject (4) DE Subject (9) D*E 
A*C* AC 
Subject (5) BE Subject (10) CE 
A*D* AB 
The asterisk denotes a pole which did not achieve a separation 
greater than +4.0 in the varimax rotated configurations, but for 
which no other solution was available on that dimension. 
The next step requires the interpretation of the underlying 
structure of these extracted dimensions. First, however, a number 
of technical points need to be discussed. Two alternative approaches 
are available when we conduct multidimensional scalings of data 
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generated by groups of subjects under a specific experimental 
treatment. The first approach is to scale the responses generated 
by each individual subject and then pool the extracted dimensions 
in the attempt to come to an understanding of the underlying 
dimensionality of the experimental treatment task - we have used 
this approach here. 
A second alternative is to pool data from subjects first, and 
then perform the multidimensional scaling. We tend to lose 
information and risk gaining invalid results under both approaches. 
Gregson (in preparation) has compared the two approaches and his 
study gives rise to a number of important' points. By pooling the 
results from a series of individual analyses we can arrive at a 
configuration of points which is in fact representative of no 
individual subjective strategy. For example, suppose five subjects 
respond to a set of nonsense shapes in terms of a strong angularity 
dimension with a subsidiary closure dimension while another five 
subjects respond predominantly in terms of closure, with a secondary 
angularity dimension. By pooling we come to an overall configuration 
in which both closure and angularity emerge as equally dominant 
strategies whereas in fact no one subject responded in quite this 
way. It will be readily apparent that a number of such distortions 
can arise, including the summation of various strategies that were 
actually used in isolation by various individual subjects. 
The alternative method, the analysis of pooled data can be 
even more misleading since fewer dimensions may emerge as indicated 
by lower stress values for a given n-dimensional solution, and as 
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with the first approach, the dimensions which do emerge may not be 
representative of individual response strategies. Thus, a 
considerable degree of caution is needed, no matter which approach 
we use. Gregson suggests that, as a compromise between the two 
approaches, a case could be made for grouping subjects into 
subgroups before performing nonmetric scalings. The above points 
stress the necessity for caution when we interpret the multidimension-
al scalings summarised here. The fact that stresses are high for the 
solutions obtained also suggests a need for caution in interpreting 
the analyses reported here. 
It has been pointed out that condi~ions 1 and 2 are almost 
identical in terms of experimental treatment . thus _ data from these 
two conditions has been pooled - it will henceforth be referred to 
as the "shape-similarities" group. Taken singly, stimuli A, C and 
F occur most frequently as the most widely separated stimuli on a 
given dimension as shown below (this is condensed from Table 5:3): 
STIMULI 
FREQUENCY 
A 
19 
B 
12 
C 
18 
D 
10 
E 
12 
F 
14 
G 
6 
H 
13 
We can also tally the frequencies with which each stimulus pair 
emerged as 
(a) the two most widely separated poles on any dimension, and 
(b) poles which were separated by more than +4.0 units in the 
~arimax rotated configurations: 
(a) 
(b) 
(a) 
(b) 
AB 
BG 
2 
EF 
1 
AC 
2 
4 
BH 
3 
5 
EG 
1 
2 
AD 
4 
4 
Cli) 
5 
5 
EH 
2 
2 
TABLE 5:5 
AE 
3 
4 
CE 
1 
3 
FG 
1 
AF 
5 
5 
CF 
5 
6 
FH 
2 
2 
AG 
1 
4 
CG 
3 
4 
GH 
2 
AH 
4 
3 
CH 
1 
2 
BC 
1 
1 
DE 
2 
BD 
1 
2 
DF 
BE 
5 
5 
DG 
1 
2 
BF 
2 
4 
DR 
1 
6 
The interpretation of the dimensional structure underlying the 8 
nonsense shapes is necessarily fairly subjective; however, a certain 
amount of useful information was obtained from individual subjects 
during informal discussion of the experiment after they had 
completed their judgement tasks. One strategy which was frequently 
described as a basis for judging shape similarities, was a 
tendency to respond to the "cup-shapedness" or "closure" of certain 
stimuli; another common strategy appeared to be based on the 
"angularity" or "pointedness" of the stimuli. With information 
such as this we can attempt to work back to the underlying perceptual 
structure of the shapes. 
Let us first consider the "closure' dimension. This is best 
exemplified by stimuli D, E and F. Note that the pairs DE, DF and 
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EF occur very infrequently as the poles to a dimension while taken 
individually the stimuli D, E and F occur frequently (in total, 36 
times) as Qne pole of a dimension when paired with some other 
stimulus. We would expect the opposite pole of a "closure" dimension 
to be exemplified by relatively "solid" stimuli with most of their 
area concentrated centrally, rather than peripherally as in the 
case of stimuli D, E and F. The "solid" shapes appear by 
inspection of figure 5:1 to be stimuli B, C and H. If there is a 
dimension of "solidity /closure" then we would expect that 
(a) there will be relatively few BC, BH and CH poles extracted 
as the most widely separated poles on a dlmension (in fact, there 
are a total of 5), and 
(b) the combinations BD, BE, BG, BH, CD, CG, CE and CH would be 
expected to occur relatively frequently; in fact, their frequencies 
of occurrence are 1, 5, 0, 3, 5, 1, 3 and 1. There is thus some 
slight evidence for a "solidity / closure" dimension in the 
subjects' responses. 
A second possible dimension could be described as "roundness / 
angularity", as exemplified by stimuli Band C (with relatively 
few re-entrant angles) for roundness and stimuli D, H, G and E 
(with many re-entrant angles) for the "angularity" pole. (Stimulus 
B has 5 angles which are less than 90 degrees; C has 8 suc4 angles, 
while D, E, G and H have between 12 and 14 such angles, each.) 
In support of this postulated dimension, reference to the table 
above will show that 
(a) the combinations expected to occur with low frequencies, i.e. 
BC on the one hand, and DE, DG, DH, EG, EH, and GH on the other 
occur in total only 6 times as the most widely separated poles on 
a dimension, and 
(b) the combinations expected to occur with greater frequency, 
namely BD, BE, BG, BH, CD, CE, CG, and CH in fact occur with 
respective frequencies of 1, 5, 0, 3, 5, 1, 3, and 1 (total 19). 
There is thus some measure'of support for a "roundness / angularity" 
dimension. 
A third dimension suggested by some subjects during post-
experimental discussions was the presence or absence of a long, 
thin, 'linear appendage'. This is best exemplified by stimuli A, 
H and to a lesser extent, C, while its opposite pole seems to be 
suggested ~y stimuli such as E, F and G. If this dimension exists 
as a basis for some of the subjects' responses, we would expect 
few solutions involving the 'pairs AC(2), AH(4), CH(1), EF(1), 
EG(1) and FG(O) as the most widely separated stimuli on a dimension; 
while the relatively frequently occurring combinations should be 
AE(3), AF(5), AG(1), CE(1), CF(5), CG(3), EH(2), FH(2) and GH(O). 
There thus appears to be some evidence for a weaker third dimension 
"appendage / no appendage". 
In the above argument we have assumed that subjects judged 
the shapes purely in terms of physical contour. The possibility 
remains however, that, in the absence of experimenter-provided 
overt labels for the shapes, the subjects may, in fact, covertly 
label the shapes and then assess similarity in terms of these 
covert labels. 
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There is evidence, which will be presented later, that the 
associations which were most frequently given to the shapes by the 
subjects in the "shape-similarities" group can be classified in 
two dimensions: 
(1) an "animal/vegetable" dimension, and 
(2) a much stronger "meaningful/meaningless" dimension. 
Now, if subjects tended to assess shape similarities in terms of 
the dimensions which they assigned to the stimuli when requested 
to overtly label the shapes, then this underlying dimensionality 
should emerge in the shape similarity jUdgements. Arguing from the 
responses given on the association tests by subjects from conditions 
1 and 2, we would expect an "animal/vegetable" dimension to be 
most strongly polarised in terms of stimuli A (which is the only 
stimulus to which a vegetable association was given more frequently 
than an animal association) and Band C (both of which frequently 
elicited animal associations. In fact, the actual frequencies with 
which the pairs AB and AC emerged as the most widely separated 
points on a dimension were 0 and 2 respectively, thus providing 
very little support for the hypothesis that subjects covertly 
labelled the shapes then assessed similarity on an "animal / 
vegetable" dimension. A stronger dimension which emerged in the 
multidimensional scaling of the labels was a "meaningful / meaning-
less" dimension. The associations given to each shape in conditions 
1 and 2 suggested that stimuli 1 to 4 were meaningful while stimuli 
5 to 8 were frequently classified as meaningless (as shown by the 
number of responses of "nothing" that were given on the association 
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test). 
If we examine the frequency with which each pair of stimuli 
appears as the most widely separated points on a dimension, we 
arrive at the following tables: 
Expected low frequency occurrences: 
AB (0) , AC (2) , 
EG ( 1 ) , EH ( 2 ) , 
AD (4) , BC (1 ) , 
FG (0) , FH (2) , 
BD (1) , 
GH (0) • 
Expected high frequency occurrences: 
CD ( 1 ) , EF ( 1 ) , 
(Total 15) 
AEO) , 
BH(2) , 
DG (1) , 
AF( 4) , 
CE(1 ) , 
AG (1 ) , 
CF( 4) , 
AH(4), BE(4), B'F(2), BG(O), 
CGO), CH(1), DE(O), DF(O), 
and DH(1) ( Tot al 31) f-erI'--t-he-s-ame-R-1±m-6-e-J?--0-'f-pa-'i--±!-e-_) 
There is thus a fair degree of support for the hypothesis that 
a "meaningful/meaningless" dimension may have influenced the 
similarity judgements generated by subjects under the condition 
in which no labels were overtly paired with the stimuli. (In fact, 
this finding confirms the analysis reported earlier in this chapter 
where high association value shapes tended to be judged less 
similar to low association value shapes, compared with judgements 
between high/high and low/low pairs.) However, there appears to 
be no evidence that a more specific covert categorisation of 
classification of the stimuli by subjects influenced their jUdgements. 
A more convincing interpretation of this point could be made 
by comparing the multidimensional scaling of each individual subject's 
197 
responses with the associations that he gave to each stimulus since 
much relevant information is lost by pooling data across subjects. 
If, for example, subject x gave associations of "nothing" to stimuli 
F, G and H but "animal" responses to stimuli B, C and D, and if 
his shape similarity judgements were based on his verbal classification 
of the stimuli, then we would expect stimuli B, C, and D to emerge 
at one pole and stimuli F, G, and H to emerge at the other pole of 
a dimension. If, however, his judgements were based on some other 
schema then this pattern would not emerge. In fact, only one of 
the twenty subjects showed a clearly marked tendency for the two 
, 
classes of association responses (A = squirrel; B = elephant; 
C= man; D, E, F, G, H = "nothing".) to emerge as two distinctly 
separated clusters of points in the multidimensional scaling. The 
more usual tendency was for all shapes that aroused the association 
"nothing" to be spread throughout the space, while stimuli with 
similar associations, e.g. "crab", "pincer", showed no tendency 
to emerge as closely distributed points on any dimension. 
Interpretation is necessarily subjective with multidimensional 
scaling but it is the feeling of this writer that the majority of 
subjects did judge shape similarities largely in physical terms and 
independently of the associations which they gave to the stimuli 
either before or after they judged the similarities of the shapes. 
Earlier references were made to the multidimensional 
scalings of the labels used in condition 4. These analyses will 
now be discussed in detail. The stimuli consisted of 5 words; 
TREE, BEAR, SWAN, CRAB and NOTHING. Only 9 solutions were available 
but for 8 of the 9 subjects under consideration, stimulus E (or 
5; "NOTHING") emerged as one pole of one or more of the 
dimensions. The opposite poles are A (twice) B (twice) C(four 
times) and D (twice). We can thus conclude that there is a strong 
dimension of "animate object" / "nothing" or "meaningful / meaning-
less shape". Of the remaining possible dimensions, AB, AC and AD 
each occur twice; these pairs are TREE / BEAR, TREE / SWAN and 
TREE / CRAB, and taken together they suggest a dimension of 
"vegetable / animal". It is of interest to note that of the three 
remaining possible combinations, BC and BD do not occur as the most 
widely separated poles of a dimension, wtiile CD (swan / crab; 
perhaps "vertebrate / invertebrate II) occurs only once as a sec ondary 
dimension. The distribution of points in 2-dimensional space 
showed a striking consistency across subjects with a cluster A, B, 
C, D spread on one dimension and widely separated on the other 
dimension from stimulus E. This pattern appeared clearly in the 
scalings of the data for 8 of the 9 subjects that were available. 
Finally, we wish to determine whether the pairing of labels 
with shapes induces a change in the underlying dimensionality of 
the similarity jUdgements. Several alternatives are possible, 
depending on the weights which subjects assign to the labels. In 
the extreme cases the labels may either be assigned zero weights 
(i.e. labels are neglected and similarity is judged in much the same 
way for labelled shapes as for unlabelled shapes) or alternatively 
the shapes may be given minimal weights and the similarity of the 
labels alone may dominate the judgement. It seems more likely, 
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however, that subjects will use a strategy somewhere between these 
two extremes and the question to be answered is whether the overall 
similarity is best described as a sum, a mean, or some other 
transformation of the information provided by both the shapes and 
labels separately. Although the multidimensional scalings for the 
unlabelled shape judgements show little intersubject consistency, 
the scalings of the label similarities were highly consistent. It 
should therefore be possible to show whether or not the experimenter-
provided labels have influenced the shape similarities by searching 
for a pattern of point clusters in the labelled-shape scalings which 
resembles the pattern shown in the label similarity scalings. If 
the 'animate object / nothing" dimension, which was very marked in 
the label scalings, has become superimposed on the 3 dimensions 
extracted for the unlabelled shape judgements, we would expect to 
find a tendency for stimuli A, B, C, and D to cluster at one pole 
and stimuli E, F, G, and H to cluster at the other pole to form one 
of the 3 dimensions. The second label-similarities dimension 
("animal/vegetable' objects) is unlikely to dominate the physical 
shape dimensions as its effect was much weaker than the "animate 
object / nothing" dimension in the judgements between label similar-
ities. In fact, by inspection of the labelled shape analyses 
there appeared to be little evidence for such a trend. One subjerrt 
showed a clear clustering of points A, B, C, and D, while a second 
subject showed a clear cluster of points E, F, G, and H. Two other 
subjects showed a marked emergence of two clusters A, B, C, and 
D, E, F, G, H, suggesting that there was a strong labelling effect 
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for those subjects, but that stimulus D bore some similarity to the 
shapes E, F, G, and H, which cut across the labelling effect. The 
distribution of points for the remaining 6 subjects showed no 
apparent pattern, with high intersubject variability. The 
multidimensional scalings thus do not give a clear-cut description 
of the effects of labels on the dimensionality of the subject's 
responses. Much of the difficulty arises from the degree of 
subjectivity that is required to interpret the scaling solutions. 
However, the complexity of the experimental situation, particularly 
with regard to the fact that the effect of labels is definitely 
second order in comparison with the contribution of the actual 
physical stimulus differences themselves is also an important factor. 
It appears likely that actual strategies used by subjects in 
combining the information that is present in both the shapes and the 
labels lS highly variable, so that some subjects may give minimal 
weight to the labels while others use them as the main basis for 
categorising or classifying the stimuli. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the way in which 
the overall stimulus complex shape-pIus-label similarity is judged 
relative to the two components shape similarity and label similarity, 
it was decided to extend the model which has been sketched in 
preceding chapters. 
Since the overtly labelled shape carries more information 
than either the shape alone or the label alone, it was suggested 
that a mode~ which could be applied to the integration of information 
in judgement processes would be applicable to the problem of 
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describing how the two components, physical shape and overt l~bel, 
are combined into an overall assessment of similarity. One such 
model has been developed by Anderson (1970 ). In very general 
form it predicts that when a subject is required to reach some 
kind of judgement on a set of stimuli, the judgement will be a 
linear function of the values of the items: 
J = 
wnere J is the judgement, C is a constant and Sk and wk are the 
scale value and weight of the kthitem in the set. 
When the items are presented sequentially, as in attitude 
change experiments, it can be assumed at least in the simplest 
applications, that each new piece of information will be integrated 
with the then current judgement to yield a revised judgement. In 
this special case, the model may be written, 
= 
where J k and J k _1 are the values of the judgement after and before 
presentation of the kthstimulus, Sk is the scale value of the 
kthstimulus and Ck is the change parameter, (Anderson, 1968). 
M~thematically, this is an averaging, rather than an adding model; 
the more general model however, although formally an adding model, 
includes averaging subtracting, dividing and mUltiplying models, 
as well as proportional change models (Anderson, 1970 ). 
In the present experiment we have the situation in which the 
similarities of labelled shapes, unlabelled shapes and labels have 
been judged by independent groups of sUbjects. Ideally the 
Anderson model should be applied to judgements made by single 
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subjects who assessed individual similarities under all 3 conditions. 
As an initial investigation however, it was decided to attempt to 
apply the model by testing individual subjects' judgements of 
labelled shap~ similarities against the mean judgements given by 
the 10 subjects in each of the shape similarities and the label 
similarities conditions. 
Let A represent .. the similarity between a pair of labelled shapes 
" 
B 
" " " " " " " 
shapes 
" 
C " " " " " " " labels 
From Anderson's model, for the case of sequentially presented items, 
we can postUlate that for a given individual i and a given pair of 
stimuli j, k the similarity between labelled stimuli will be given 
by 
A' 0 Ok lJ = woBo k + (1 - wo) CO k l J l J 
where w is a weight which corresponds to the constant C in 
Anderson's equations and A' is the calculated or predicted value of 
A. Note that when w = 1, labelled shape similarities are equal to 
unlabelled shape similarities, i.e. the labels have no effect on 
the judgement of A. Conversely, when w = 0.0 the labelled shape 
similarities are equal to the label similarities, i.e. subjects are 
judging entirely in terms of the names that we have paired with the 
shapes. 
A priori, we expect w to be somewhere between 0 and 1, it is 
of theoretical interest to know just wh2t weight is assigned to the 
labels and how much the weight varies from-subject to subject. 
Anderson (1968 , 1970-) has stressed the importance of measuring 
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the .goodness of fit of a model to the data it is considered to 
represellt; he has extensively used analysis of variance as a 
measure of goodness of fit. 
For the present experiment, however, it was decided to 
measure goodness of fit in terms of percentage error. The best 
solution is the one which minimises the sum of the squared 
differences between the predicted values of A' 0 ok (as derived by lJ 
solving the equatibn in terms of Bjk and Cjk ) and the experimentally 
observed values of Aijk • The squared differences are divided by 
the sum of the squared values of Ao ok (experimentally measured) to lJ 
yield the percentage error: 
PERCENT ERROR l:(Ao ok -lJ 
2 l: (A ° ok) lJ 
A' ° ok)2 lJ 
The minimum value of the percentage error, with its associated w 
(and v) values gives the best solution for the model. 
Gregson (personal communication) has suggested two extensions 
of the Anderson model which made allowance for the fact that th~ 
judgements made by subjects frequently appear to exhibit adding, 
rather than averaging, under certain conditions. 
The data were analysed in terms of 3 models; model 1 is 
the averaging model of Anderson, given above. 
Model 2 is as follows: 
The exponent to which the mUltiplier ~ is raised has the effect of 
(~04 
reducing the value of A look lJ The reduction is slight when Bjk 
and CO k differ only slightly in scale value, however when the . J 
judgements produced between pai~s of shapes (B jk ) and pairs of 
labels (C jk ) are widely separated along the scale the exponent 
can reduce the magnitude of the predicted Alo ok quite considerably. lJ 
This modification captures the situation in which adding occurs when 
the magnitude of separation in scale value for Bjk and Cjk is large, 
but averaging occurs when Bjk and Cjk are close in scale value. 
form: 
Gregson also 
Ao ok lJ = 
suggested a third model which took the following 
vi (3i~ - Gjd ~ - ( I3jk ot- Gjk) ] 
In this case, the modulus or absolute difference of the scale 
values of Bjk and Cjk divided by the sum of the scale values is 
used. In itself, this gives an exponent which is always less than 
1.0, but by including an additional multiplier, v, it is possible 
for the exponent to vary between zero and any positive value we 
choose. In the present experiment, v was varied between 0.2 and 
2.0 in increments of 0.2; this gives a maximum magnitude to the 
multiplier of 0.5 1 •64 (or 0.322) which occurs in the case where 
v = 2.0 and Bjk and Cjk take the maximum possible difference in 
scale values. This multiplier again has the effect of lowering 
the calculated value of AI ° ok' however model 3, unlike model 2 lJ 
allows for the possibility that adding may occur not only when 
Bjk and Cjk differ widely in scale value, but also when they are 
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cloae in scale value. 
Note that as we have assigned a scale value of 1.0 to the 
"identical" pole of the similarity scale, then adding occurs when 
Aijk is less than both Bjk and Cjk , averaging occurs when Aijk 
is intermediate between Bjk and Cjk and subtracting occurs when 
Aijk is greater than both Bjk and Cjk None of the models used 
in this experiment allows for subtracting since by taking the 
square of the difference between Bjk and Cjk in one case, and the 
modulus of the differenc~, with an associated v-value of 2.0 or 
less in the other, we ensure that the exponent is always positive. 
The mean judgements made by each of the 10 subjects in 
conditions 1, 3 and 4 are shown as pooled data in figure 5:2. 
Note the subtracting occurs at only 3 points but adding occurs at 
several points where the differences between Band C are both 
small and quite large. That is, figure 5:2 suggests that when 
averaging does not occur, adding is the more frequently occurring 
form of the two remaining strategies. However, this graph is based 
on pooled data; for individual subjects the pattern of responses 
may be quite different. 
A computer program was written to calculate the goodness of 
fit, as measured by percentage error for models 1, 2 and 3 under 
w values ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.05. For model 
3 the values of v ranged from 0.2 to 2~0 in increments of 0.2. 
Table 5:6 lists the minimum percentage errors and the 
corresponding w (and v) values for the three models. The individual' 
responses made by each of the 10 subjects in condition 3 of 
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experiment 4 (i.e. the Aijk values for s~bjects 1 to 10) are 
evaluated against the pooled mean responses made by the 10 
subjects in condition 1 ( the Bjk values ) and the 10 subjects in 
condition 4 (the Cjk values). 
TABLE 5:6 MINIMUM PERCENTAGE ERRORS AND ASSOCIATED 
W (AND V) VALUES FOR SUBJECTS 1 TO 10 TESTED UNDER MODELS 1, 2, & 3. 
The asterisk denotes the best solution for a given subject. 
MODEL 1: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value 
1 4.42* 0.15 
2 3.18 * 0.55 
3 9.02 0.20 
4 5.76* 0.00 
5 9.39 0.25 
6 3.68 0.15 
7 8.85 0.35 
8 4.69 0.20 
9 3.61 0.20 
10 4.60* 0.05 
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MODEL 2: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value 
1 18.55 0.65 
2 9.87 1.00 
3 15.20 0.00 
4 23.82 0.65 
5 15.03 0.20 
6 12.55 0.25 
7 11.76 0.55 
8 8.28 0.15 
9 12.99 0.45 
10 18.56 0.55 
MODEL 3: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value V Value 
1 4.98 0.05 0.20 
2 3.53 0.55 0.20 
3 6.71* 0.00 0.80 
4 6.57 0.00 0.20 
5 6.43* 0.00 1.20 
6 2.85* 0.00 0.60 
7 6.41* 0.20 1.00 
8 2.10* 0.00 0.80 
9 3.49* 0.15 0.20 
10 4.96 0.00 0.20 
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Model 3 provides a better fit with the data for 6 of the 
18 subjects; the remaining 4 subjects favour model 1. Note that 
v took on its minimum possible value of 0.2 in all cases in which 
model 1 produced a better fit than model 3; this is to be expected 
since, as v tends to zero the multiplier in model 3 tends to unity, 
and model 3 then becomes identical to model 1. 
In all except one case, the w. values associated with the 
l 
best fit tend to be small for both models 1 and 3. This suggests 
that the judgements have been almost entirely dominated by the 
labels, however this may be attributed to the fact that we have 
; 
compared individual judgements of A. 'k with the pooled values of lJ 
Bjk and Cjk • Since estimates of shape similarity show wider inter-
subject variability than estimates of label similarity, the 
pooling of data will have produced a greater regression towards the 
mid-point of the scale for the pooled shape judgements than for the 
pooled label jUdgements. The pooled mean responses to the labels 
will hence show a comparatively wider range of scale usage, as will 
the individual estimates of Aijk • The Cjk and the Aijk pairs of 
corresponding points will both tend to be separated from the Bjk 
values, thus producing a spuriously low weighting of the Bjk (shape 
similarity) values in the models. 
Model 2 does not provide a good representation of the process 
involved - this can be explained in term~ of the points noted 
earlier: Model 2 predicts that 
(a) adding occurs when Bjk and Cjk are widely separated, and 
averaging occurs when Bjk and Cjk are close in scale value. 
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In fact, the data suggest the opposite trend; averaging occurs 
when Bjk and Cjk are widely separated but adding (or perhaps to a 
larger extent, subtracting) occurs when Bjk and Cjk are close in 
scale value. It is thus not surprising that the percentage errors 
are high for model 2. The best solutions for models 1 and 3 tend 
to have high error terms (a value of less than 5% error seems to 
suggest a reasonably good fit between data and model); however, 
this is not surprising when we consider that individual judgements 
of labelled shape similarities have been tested against pooled 
shape similarity and label similarity jUdgements from independent 
groups of 10 subjects. It was therefore decided to perform a final 
experiment in which subjects each judged under all 3 of the 
experimental conditions: 
(a) judgements between unlabelled shapes, 
(b) judgements between labelled shapes, and 
(c) judgements of the similarity in meaning of. the labels. 
This experiment will now be described in detail. 
EXPERIMENT 5. 
The stimuli used were the 8 Vanderplas and Garvin (1959) 
nonsense shapes as used in the preceding experiment. The label 
"nothing" was omitted from the set however, to give the following 
label-shape pairings: 
Stimulus Label 
1 TREE 
2 BEAR 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
SWAN 
CRAB 
TREE 
BEAR 
SWAN 
CRAB 
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The subjects were 20 volunteer graduate and undergraduate 
students. Each subject was paid $1.00 for participating; the 
experiment took less than one hour per subject. To balance for 
temporal factors in the judgement processes, ten subjects judged 
shapes first followed by labels, and fina~ly the labelled shapes, 
while the remaining ten subjects judged labelled shapes first, 
followed by labels and finally the unlabelled shapes. As in 
experiment 4, a complete method of paired comparisons was used in 
all 3 parts of the experiment. The 8 stimuli gave 56 judgements in 
conditions 1 and 3; identical pairs of stimuli were not presented. 
The actual order of presentation of stimuli was random, and varied 
cyclically from subject to subject. For each individual subject 
the labelled shapes were presented in a different order from the 
unlabelled shapes. Subjects were permitted to examine the stimuli 
ad. lib. before they were required to assess similarities. 
The instructions to the first 10 subjects are shown below; 
they were suitably modified for subjects 11 to 20 for whom labelled 
shapes rather than unlabelled shapes were judged in Part I. 
"INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS. 
There are three parts to this experiment - all three parts 
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involve the making of similarity judgements between pairs of 
stimuli. You are to make judgements using the scale below: 
1. Identical 
2. Nearly identical 
3. Very similar 
4. Similar 
5. Slightly similar 
6. Slightly dissimilar 
7. Dissimilar 
8. Very dissimilar 
9. Extremely dissimilar 
10. Completely different. 
When you make a judgement between a pair of stimuli, simply 
say to me the number that is paired with the appropriate word or 
phrase used in the ten-point scale above. You may keep these 
instructions beside you. 
PART 1. 
In part 1 you will be judging the similarity between pairs 
of unfamiliar shapes called "nonsense shapes". Most people see some 
of the shapes as representing all kinds of familiar objects. However, 
please try to ignore any objects or situations that each shape may 
remind you of, and try to judge similarity in terms of the actual 
-
physical contour or outline of the shape alone. There are a total 
of 56 pairs if we judge each of the 8 shapes in turn against every 
other shape. Before you make your judgements, I will show you the 
whole set of 8 shapes, so that you can get some idea of how much the 
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shapes vary from one to another. 
PART 2. 
In part two, you are required to. judge the similarity in 
MEANING of a number of words. You will use the same ten-point 
response scale as before. Try to respond in terms of the general 
meaning of the words as such, do NOT try to respond to particular 
examples of the objects or situations described by each word. In 
particular,· you must avoid, for the present, any tendency to refer 
the words gack to the shapes that you have seen earlier in this 
experiment. Here are the four words that will be used: 
TREE, BEAR, SWAN, CRAB. 
PART 3. 
Part 3 combines the stimulus material used in parts 1 & 2. 
This time you are required to attempt to integrate the information 
present in both the shapes and the labels, to produce an OVERALL 
assessment of similarity. That is, when judging each labelled 
stimulus, try to take account of both the physical shape and the 
meaning expressed by the label to come to an overall assessment of 
the similarity of the total stimulus complex. 1I 
Note that the instructions are designed to maximise the shift 
in judgements produced by labelling in that subjects are requested 
to judge shape similarity on the basis of physical contour alone, 
while the jUdgements between labelled ·shapes require both shape and 
label to be integrated into the overall judgement. Care was taken 
to ensure that neil~her the averaging nor the adding / subtracting 
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strategy was suggested in the instructions; in fact, one of the 
aims of this experiment is to determine which of the strategies 
the subjects will use spontaneously. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES. 
Symmetrically opposite pairs of stimuli were combined for 
each subject and their means were calculated to give two 8 x 8 
half-matrices of unlabelled and labelled shape similarities and a 
4 x 4 half-matrix of label similarities. 
The computer program for models 1, 2 and 3 was altered to 
calculate the goodness of fit of the data when independent measures 
of A 0 ok' Book and Cook are available for each individual subj ect. lJ lJ lJ 
The mathematical structure of the models themselves, and the 
range of Wo and v values used was not altered. The results for 
l 
each subject as tested under the three models are given in Table 
The asterisks in the percentage error columns signify the 
best solution for each subject. In those cases for which the 
percentage error as shown in the table was equal for both models 1 
and 3, the data actually favoured model 1 - as shown by slightly 
lower minimum values of L:(Ao ok - A' 0 0k)2; the differences in lJ lJ 
these values for models 1 and 3 were lost however in the rounding 
2 
of numbers during division by L:(Ao ok) • lJ 
Although the percentage errors for model 2 are all below 
1.25%, representing a good fit betw!en the model and the data, 
better fits are obtained for models 1 and 3. Fourteen of the 
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TABLE 5:7 MINIMUM PERCENTAGE ERRORS AND ASSOCIATED 
VALUES OF W (AND V) FOR SUBJECTS 1 TO 20 TESTED UNDER MODELS 1, 2 & 3. 
MODEL 1: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value 
1 0.04* 0.75 
2 0.08* 0.45 
3 0.18 * 0.80 
4 0.18* 0.70 
5 0.10* 0.35 
6 0.18 * 0.85 
7 0.53 0.20 
8 0.47* 0.65 
9 0.33 0.70 
10 0.04* 0.50 
11 0.13 0.25 
12 0.21 0.50 
13 0.26 0.55 
14 0.06* 0.45 
15 0.14 0.60 
16 0.29* 0.75 
17- 0.07* 0.60 
18 0.02* 0.25 
19 0.28* 0.35 
20 0.51* 0.50 
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MODEL 2: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value 
1 0.25 0.65 
2 0.67 0.55 
3 0.50 0.00 
4 0.39 0.60 
5 0.59 0.50 
6 1.03 1.00 
7 1.11 0.25 
8 1.22 0.00 
9 0.70 1.00 
10 0.25 0.00 
11 0.79 0.00 
12 0.46 0.35 
13 0.78 1.00 
14 0.34 0.40 
15 0.81 1.00 
16 0.90 0.80 
17 0.63 0.40 
18 0.42 0.00 
19 0.89 0.00 
20 1.23 0.45 
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MODEL 3: 
Subject Min. % Error W Value V Value 
1 0.04 0.70 0.20 
2 0.09 0.40 0.20 
3 0.18 0.75 0.20 
4 0.19 0.65 0.20 
5 0.12 0.30 0.20 
6 0.19 0.85 0.20 
7 0.46* 0.10 0.80 
8 0.48 0.60 0.20 
9 0.23* 0.75 1.80 
10 0.05 0.45 0.20 
11 0.08* 0.45 0.40 
12 0.20* 0.40 0.60 
13 0.14* 0.60 1.40 
14 0.07 0.40 0.20 
15 0.08* 0.65 1.20 
16 0.30 0.75 0.20 
17 0.08 0.60 0.20 
18 0.02 0.15 0.20 
19 0.31 0.30 0.20 
20 0.52 0.50 0.20 
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subjects showed a best fit with model 1, the remaining 6 favoured 
model 3. Reference to the data generated by individual subjects 
indicates that the three processes of adding, subtracting and 
averaging appear to occur in all subjects but to different degrees 
in different individuals. The w values associated with the best 
fit for each subject also appear to be highly variable across 
subjects; however, they are approximately normally distributed 
with a mean of w = 0.54 suggesting that in general both shapes and 
labels have been given ap~roximately equal weightings in this 
particular experiment. We would expect however that instructions 
to subjects would have a large effect on the weight given to the 
labels; in experiment 5, the mean weight for the 10 subjects was 
w = 0.11 which suggests that the labels were given much greater 
weight than the shapes in the judgement process in that particular 
study, although it contained a methodological artefact. 
The problem of why subjects sometimes add, sometimes average, 
and sometimes subtract the judged similarities of shapes and of 
labels when coming to an overall assessment of labelled-shapes 
similarity needs closer examination. 
Table 5:8 lists for each stimulus pair the frequencies with 
which the judgements of labelled shape similarity showed adding, 
subtracting or averaging by the twenty subjects who responded to 
each pair in experiment 5. 
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TABLE 5:8 
Stimulus Pair (Stirn. ) 1 :2 1 :3 1: 4 1 :5 1: 6 1: 7 1 :8 2:3 
Freq. of Adding (+) 5 8 7 0 8 6 3 4 
Freq. of Subtracting(-) 5 3 3 3 2 3 11 2 
Freq. of Averaging (Av) 10 a 10 17 10 11 6 14 
(Stirn.) 2:4 2:5 2:6 2:7 2:8 3:4 3:5 3:6 3:7 3:8 4:5 
(+) 9 5 0 5 5 5 4 2 0 6 0 
(-) 2 4 0 7 6 3 5 4 2 2 10 
(Av.) 9 11 20 8 9 12 11 14 18 12 10 
(Stirn.) 4:6 4:7 4:8 5:6 5:7 5:8 6:7 6:8 7:8 
(+) 0 5 0 0 4 3 281 
(-) 8 0 0 11 8 6 735 
(Av.) 12 15 20 9 8 11 11 9 14 
The results are slightly biased in favour of the averaging 
formulation since on those occasions in which the judgement of 
labelled shape similarity was given the same scale value as either 
the shape similarity or the label similarity the judgement was 
tallied under the averaging formulation. 
Note that the identically labelled shapes (1:5, "tree"; 
2:6, "bear"; 3:7 "swan" and 4:8, "crab" almost exclusively produce 
an averaging response. This suggests that when label similarities 
are much greater than shape similarities, averaging occurs. (Totals 
for the 4 pairs are zero adding, 5 subtracting and 75 averaging 
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responses). A priori we might also expect averaging to occur 
when shape similarities are much greater than label similarities, 
however no data is available to support this prediction since there 
were apparently no highly dissimilar pairs of labels and no highly 
similar pairs of shapes in the stimulus sets used. The data also 
suggest that when label similarities are only slightly greater than 
shape similarities, as shown by the pairs 1:4, 1:6, 1:7, 2:3, 2:4, 
2:5, 2:7, 3:6, 3:8, 6:7, and 6:8, then averaging responses 
predominate but adding and subtracting of similarities also occur 
relatively frequently. Likewise, we would expect a similar trend 
to emerge when shape similarities are onl~ slightly greater than 
label similarities as shown by the pairs 1:8, 4:5, 4:6, 5:6, and 7:8. 
The mean number of adding, subtracting and averaging responses per 
stimulus pair is shown for each of these conditions in the table 
below: 
Adding Subtracting Averaging 
For label s much greater than shape s o 1.25 
For shape s much greater than label s No data available. 
For label s slightly greater than shape s 5.64 3.54 
For shape s slightly greater than label s 1.33 8.83 
18.75 
10.82 
9.98 
The pooled data thus suggest that subjects may be making use 
of three different strategies in this experiment. Averaging seems 
to occur when label similarity and shape similarity are widely 
separated in scale value. When the shape similarity and label 
similarity are close in scale value however, adding and subtracting 
strategies become more prevalent. More specifically, when label 
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similarity is slightly greater than shape similarity then labelled 
shape similarity tends to be greater than unlabelled shape similarity, 
i.e. either. averaging or adding occurs. Conversely when label 
si~ilarity is less than shape similarity, then labelled shape 
similarity tends to be less than unlabelled shape similarity, i.e. 
averaging or subtracting occurs. Figure 5:3 shows the pooled mean 
responses made by the 20 subjects in experiment 5. The trend 
towards an averaging / adding strategy when label similarity is 
greater than shape similarity, but an averaging / subtracting 
strategy when label similarity is less than shape similarity is 
clearly discernible. The graph also provides some evidence for a 
weaker trend in which adding occurs when label similarity is only 
slightly greater than shape similarity and subtracting occurs when 
label similarity is only slightly less than shape similarity. From 
the psychological viewpoint it seems reasonable that these trends 
should emerge. 
When shape similarities and label similarities differ in 
scale value and a subject is required to combine the two dimensions 
into an overall judgement of similarity then the averaging approach 
would seem to provide a straight forward and satisfactory strategy. 
However, when shape similarity and label similarity are very close, 
or even identical in scale value, a different approach would appear 
to be necessary. Suppose that a subject is presented with two pairs 
of stimuli, x, y and x', y'; his task is to judge the similarity 
of each pair; let us further assume that he assigns a scale value 
of 5.0 to each pair. We now present the subject with two complex 
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stimuli x + Xl and y + yl and require him to assess their similarity. 
On the averaging strategy he will assign a value of 5.0 to the pair 
of stimuli. If however he decides that the similarity of a pair 
of stimuli relates to the number of elements that they have in 
common then he may judge the bidimensional stimuli as having either 
a smaller or a greater number of common elements than either of x, y 
or Xl. y' taken separately. In order to express this perceived 
shift in similarity when the dimenSionality of the stimuli is 
increased, the subject must abandon the averaging strategy and 
adopt a new adding or subtracting strategy to accommodate his 
change in judgement. 
H8ijer (1969) in a similar investigation in which unidimensional 
stimuli were combined to give bidimensional stimuli found that the 
judgements produced could be described by an additive model, 
however his stimuli formed a more homogeneous set than those used 
here, so that the averaging model ( which perhaps fits better when 
stimulus differences are large) may not have been applicable in 
his case. 
Anderson (1965 a) has pointed out that neither ,the adding 
nor the averaging formulation of information integration may be 
entirely adequate since both are supported in the literature. In the 
majority of cases for which the averaging model has been applied to 
judgement data (e.g. Anderson, 1965 b, Anderson, 1966) the scale 
values of the stimuli used have been fairly widely separated in 
magnitUde. An exception is the study reported by Anderson (1967) 
in which sets of adjectives were of equal value were presented 
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to subjects who were required to judge the likeabi~ity of the 
person described by the adjectives. Contrary to our present view 
which states that adding or subtracting occur when stimuli are of 
equal scale value, Anderson reports that the results could be 
accounted for by the hypothesis that the response is a weighted 
average of the adjective values and a neutral impression. Some 
slight support for our position is given by an experiment conducted 
by Anderson and Jacobson (1965). They required their subjects to 
judge the likableness of persons described by sets of 3 adjectives 
under one of 4 instruction conditions, including a condition in 
which each adjective was required to be rated as equally important. 
In this case it was reported that the simple averaging model worked 
reasonably well, though not perfectly. It may be then, that 
adding or subtracting strategies tend to dominate the judgement 
process when the stimuli that are to be combined in an overall 
judgement have similar or equal scale values, however the point needs 
further detailed investigation and experimental testing. The argument 
would be more convincing if we could show that the effect is 
observable not only within the pooled responses from the 20 
subjects of experiment 5, but also within the sets of responses 
generated by individual subjects. Let us take as our hypothesis 
the statement that when shape similarity and label similarity· differ 
by a scale value of 1.5 or less, then adding and subtracting 
responses will predominate and that furthermore, adding will 
predominate when label similarity is greater than shape similarity, 
but subtracting will tend to occur when shape similarity is greater 
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than label similarity. We also predict that averaging responses 
will predominate when shape similarities and label similarities 
differ in scale value by more than 1.5. For each individual 
subject the number of adding, subtracting and averaging responses 
made when the shape and label similarity scale values (a) differed 
by 1.5 units or less, and (b) differed by more than 1.5 units were 
tallied. (On those occasions in which shape similarity equalled 
label similarity in scale value, the responses were not included 
in the tally.) From the·sums of these tallies, the mean number of 
adding, subtracting and averaging responses per subject was 
calculated. These means are shown in the' table below: 
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Small differences (~1.5) in 
shape and label similarities. 
Adding, subtracting, averaging. 
1.10 1.55 1.55 
1.65 2.05 
Large differences (>1.5) in 
shape and label similarities. 
Adding, subtracting, averaging. 
0.55 0.75 3.90 
1.50 8.45 
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There is thus a weak trend in the predicted direction, 
however it is masked by the high frequency of averaging responses 
in the two conditions where subtracting (Cell 1) and adding (Cell 
3) are expected to occur. As predicted, averaging occurs more 
frequently when stimulus differences are large (Cells 2 and 4 of 
the table above). 
In general then, the basic strategy for integrating the 
information that is present in the shapes and the labels follows 
the averaging formulation developed by Anderson. There are 
suggestions that research into the hypothesis that adding and 
subtracting occur when differences in sca~e value of the labels and 
the shapes are small, may prove to be fruitful. 
Although our hypothesis appears to be supported to some 
extent by the data, it should be pointed out that the hypothesis, 
as stated, accounts for the majority of logical alternative trends 
that it is in fact possible for the data to exhibit. 
More specifically, if A, B, and C refer to labelled shape, 
unlabelled shape and label similarities respectively, then our 
hypothesis predicts that 
(1) If C ~ B 
Then A can be greater than B but less than C (Averaging formulation) 
or A can be greater than B and greater than C (Adding formulation). 
But A cannot be less than B. 
(2 ) If B ::::=:- C 
Then A can be greater than C but less than B (Averaging formulation) 
or A can be less than C and less than B (Subtracting formulation) 
226 
But A cannot be less than C. 
One way to test this hypothesis would be to alter model 3 
so that it allows not only adding (as at present) but also 
subtracting to occur when the difference between Band C is small. 
This could be effected by using a larger range of v values, as 
suggested earlier. If this modification then improved the goodness 
of fit to such an extent that model 3 became superior to model 1, 
then this could be interpreted as favouring an hypothesis that 
subjects change from an averaging to an adding or subtracting 
strategy when differences in scale value between Band C are small. 
The model fitting exercise could be repeated on data for which the 
differences between Band C were known to be small and the point at 
which the hypothesised shift in strategy occurs could be determined 
in terms of the magnitude of difference between A and B. 
These points, along with many of the other questions that have 
been raised by the 5 experiments described in this thesis may be 
answered in future research. In the chapter which follows, the 
main results reported to dat~ will be summarised and the relevance 
of this research to the experiments described in chapter 1 will be 
outlined briefly. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A BRIEF SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEAR~H. 
In this final chapter, we will summarise the main findings 
and attempt to draw some general predictions concerning the role of 
labels in cognitive behaviour. 
The literature summarised in Chapter I was revi~wed in two 
distinct sections, neither of which included research that could be 
considered to bear much resemblance to the experiment approach used 
in the studies reported here. There are a number of reasons for 
this: Firstly, unlike the majority of studies in psycholinguistics 
we have used the judgement of subjective similarity as our approach 
to cognition; the present approach therefore owes more tb·psycho-
physics than to linguistics. Secondly, we have treated similarity 
assessment as a form of cognitive categorising behaviour, in keeping 
with the fourth definition given by Wallach (1958). By contrast, 
the majority of studies reviewed in the section on mediation, have 
treated similarity, if at all, in terms of primary stimulation 
gradients. In these cases, similarity is considered to be based on 
generalization and discrimination learning (the third definition 
given by Wallach, 1958). Other studies have investigated the role 
of mediation in the acquisition of relatively simple motor skills 
rather than in complex cognitive processes. 
It was suggested that many of the mediation studies reported 
in Chapter I point to the need for a more adequate conceptualisation 
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of the ways in which subjects process information in a variety of 
experimental situations. Contemporary cognitive theory appears to 
provide for such a conceptualisation. A number of diverse approaches 
are currently developing which, instead of emphasising the role of 
conditioning in cognitive activities, draw our attention to the role 
of strategies, and such factors as conceptual, schematic and 
classificatory processes ih cognition. 
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the effect of nonsense labels 
on judged similarity between pairs of stimuli. The results for 
experiment 1 suggested that the nonsense labels increased the 
psychological distances between similar stimuli but reduced the 
distance between pairs of dissimilar stimuli by producing a 
regression of judged similarities and dissimilarities towards a 
mid-scale baseline. This result was interpreted in terms of a trace 
decay theory which postUlates that the rate of decay of memory 
traces is altered by pairing verbal labels with stimuli. In 
experiment 1, the nonsense labels were considered to increase the 
rate of trace decay by increasing the confusion between tastes 
which were paired with a set of unfamiliar and presumably 
meaningless nonsense words. 
Later experiments however suggest that trace decay theory is 
not in itself sufficient to account for the shifts in judgements 
that are induced by labelling, for even when labelled stimuli are 
presented simultaneously for judgement (thus allowing no opportunity 
for trace decay to occur) the labelling effect still appears. 
In experiment 2, the two nonsense labels used produced an 
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enhancement of judged similarity (or reduction in psychological 
distance) regardless of whether the stimuli themselves (in 
unlabelled form) were judged near the similar or the dissimilar 
end of the continuum. We have noted for experiment 1, however, 
that the labels increased the psychological distance between similar 
stimuli but decreased the distance between stimuli at the dissimilar 
end of the continuum. The trace decay model provides an explanation 
for the direction of shift in experiment 1, however in experi~ent 
2 a different approach ii required to explain the consistent 
enhancement of similarity for all stimuli induced by the nonsense 
labels. The model suggested was that th; labels act as a 
secondary dimension such that the labelled stimuli were judged as 
more similar to a labelled standard square than when the same 
shapes were judged without labels. It was necessary to assume that 
the two labels used, ZIQ and QAP were functionally equivalent as 
elements in a dimension of similarity. It is not clear how the data 
from experiment 1 could be explained in terms of the dimensional 
model however. If the four labels used, ZUM, TOV, JEG and DAX, add 
a perceptually equivalent cue to the tastes, we would expect an 
enhancement of similarities to occur across all scale values; 
likewise if the labels added an extra dimension of dissimilar~y we 
would expect a decrease in judged similarity across all scale values. 
Instead however, we have the two-way shift in judgements (relative 
to the baseline) that is reported above. It is therefore necessary 
to assume both the trace decay model and the dimensionality model 
bperate under the two different conditions that were experimentally 
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tested, alt~ough the possibility remains that the direction of 
shift is related to differences in the psychophysical method employed 
(four standards in experiment 1, but only one standard in experiment 
Experiment 3 further investigated the labelling phenomenon 
by examin ~.ng the effects of qualitative descriptive labels on 
similarity judgements. A comparison of two different experimental 
approaches, the traditional method of paired comparisons (with only I 
brief delay between presentation of standards and comparison stimuli), 
and the "memorised standards" method of experiment 1 showed that 
when the delay between presentation of st&ndards and comparison 
stimuli is long, then judgements tend to regress towards the mid-
scale baseline, a finding which supports the trace decay model. 
When labels which adequately conceptualise the taste qualities 
present in the stimuli are paired with the tastes, then the degree 
of regression to the baseline is red~ced, again supporting the decay 
model with its assumption that adequate descriptive labels reduce 
the rate of short term trace decay. 
By performing a series of nonmetric multidimensional scalings 
of the data, an attempt was made to show that the labels add to the 
dimensionality of the situation. However, the actual number of 
dimensions that was extracted appeared to be largely unaffected by 
the labels, although interpretation of the results of the scalings 
was necessarily subjective. There was a tendency for the constant 
I 
I 
I 
i 
underlying dimensionality to emerge with greater or stronger 
separation as the precision with the labels describing the taste 
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qualities was increased, lending some support to the interpretation 
that the labels assimilate along the already existing dimensions 
rather than adding new dimensions to the underlying structure of the 
judgement task. This finding is again consistent with the trace 
decay model. 
As with experiment 2, the method used in experiments 4 and $ 
allowed for simultaneous presentation of labelled shapes; there 
was thus no opportunity for the postulated trace decay to occur 
during the judgement task~ yet systematic shifts in judgements 
again appeared. It thus appears that, while the decay model 
explains much of the data reported here, it is not in itself 
sufficient to account for the observed shifts in judgements when 
-labels are paired with stimuli. The model needs to be systematically 
investigated before it can be conclusively evaluated, however there 
are suggestions in the data that instructions to subjects may be an 
important subsidiary determinant of the attention or weight assigned 
to the labels. 
-
The results of experiment 4 suggested that covert labelling 
strategies may also be important determinants of judged similarity. 
The experiment set out to investigate the role of meaningfulness, as 
measured by association value, in the judgement task. There was a 
significant trend for certain pairs of nonsense shapes to show 
greater judged dissimilarity for subjects who saw one of each member 
of the pair as meaningful, and the other member as meaningless, than 
for subjects who saw both of that pair as either meaningful or as 
meaningless. 
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A series of multidimensional scalings of the data supported 
the interpretation that a covert labelling process was used by 
subjects such that when both shapes were interpreted as meaningful 
they both may have been given covert animistic labels, while a 
subjective interpretation of the shape as meaningless caused it to 
be given no s11ch covert animistic label. These animism / nonanimism 
labels were postulated to have influenced similarity judgements by 
enhancing the similarity of pairs of shapes when both were given 
either animistic or nonanimistic labels, but reducing judged 
similarity for subjects who responded to one shape of the pair as 
animistic and the other as nonanimistic. ~ 
In experiments 4 and 5 overt labels were also paired with 
shapes in order to assess the weightings given to the two 
components of (a) stimulus, and (b) label when the components are 
synthesised into a judgement of overall labelled-stimulus 
similarity. The occurrence of adding, averaging and subtracting 
strategies was examined and all three were found to occur in 
the responses produced by individual subjects. However, there was 
little evidence that switching between the three strategies could 
be related to the magnitude of the differences in scale values 
between the component shape similarities and label similarities 
for any given pair of labelled stiwuli. 
The research discussed in this thesis indicated that there 
are small but consistent verbal factors which influence the 
judgement of stimulus similarities. It is not yet evident to what 
extent the effects shown could be considered to be special effects 
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in that they relate directly to the psychophysical method and the 
expe~imental situation employed. The finding in experiment 4 that 
covert labels influence similarity assessment is worthy of more 
detailed investigation, and the present results suggest interesting 
parallels with schema theory (Rankin, Markley and Evans, 1970). 
The trace decay model also needs further investigation; in its 
present form however, it is consistent with the position taken by 
Lenneberg (1967) that verbal factors influence recognition under 
certain experimental conditions - particularly when the task is 
difficult. Support for the trace decay model also comes from 
studies such as those of Bartlett (1932) ,nd Kurtz and Hovland 
(1953) which showed that subjects who verbally categorise stimuli 
at the time of perceiving them exhibit superior retention of 
details of the stimuli when tested after a timed interval. The 
Carmichael, Hogan and Walter (1932) effect is also consistent with 
the trace decay model - these studies have been reported in detail 
In Chapter I. 
I 
A more detailed investigation of the effects of labels on I . 
I 
the underlying dimensionality of stimuli as revealed by multi-
dimensional scaling would also be useful. Analyses of experiments 
3 and 4 of the present research tentatively suggest that when real-
word labels are used to describe stimuli they do not add to the 
dimensionality of the stimuli but rather they assimilate along 
existing dimensions. This finding would be presumably related to 
the relevance of the labels used however. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the research reported 
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here investigates only the effe~t of simple verbal stimuli on 
relatively simple judgement processes. The role of language in 
more complex cognitive behaviour such as reasoning, theorising 
and other complex activities remains to be investigated. 
ii 
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APPENDIX I 
The subjective rating scale used in Experiment 3 is shown below. 
Desccibe the taste by giving it a rating 
on each of the following lines, by ticking the appropriate column. 
Read all the scales first. 
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acidic (sour) 
almond-like 
bitter 
burning 
cool 
greasy 
meaty 
oily 
peppery 
salty 
scented 
sticky 
sweet 
warm 
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